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Spanish and French Rivalry in the Gulf Region of the United States, 1678-1702

The Beginnings of Texas and Pensacola

By

WILLIAM EDWARD DUNN

Instructor in Latin-American History in the University of Texas;
Sometime Fellow in History, Columbia University

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The benefits of education and of useful knowledge, generally diffused through a community, are essential to the preservation of a free government.

Sam Houston.

Cultivated mind is the guardian genius of democracy. . . . It is the only dictator that freemen acknowledge and the only security that freemen desire.

President Mirabeau B. Lamar.

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SPANISH AND FRENCH RIVALRY IN THE GULF REGION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1678-1702.

PREFACE

The history of the colonial relations of Spain and France within the region of the United States may be conveniently divided into three main periods. The first period includes those events which are connected with the premature clash between the two nations as a result of the attempted founding of a Huguenot colony in Florida in the latter half of the sixteenth century. This conflict grew out of the action taken by a persecuted religious sect among the French people, and does not therefore constitute the true beginnings of formal state rivalry. The second period comprises those years during which the French monarchy itself first manifested its determination to contest with Spain the possession of the Gulf region and the lower Mississippi Valley. It may be said to have begun in the early years of the reign of Louis XIV, and to have been brought to a close with the definite and permanent establishment of French settlements in Louisiana by 1702. The third period covers the relations of Spain and France as colonial neighbors, until the French were compelled to abandon their ambitions for a colonial empire in America. The romantic incidents of the first conflict in Florida have been told in fullest detail. No attempt has hitherto been made, however, to present a systematic and connected account of the later and more important rivalry of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is the purpose of the present monograph to provide the first portion of such an account by covering the events of the second period mentioned above, when France was endeavoring to secure a foothold on the mainland of the Gulf of Mexico. The writer hopes, however, within the near future to publish the remainder of the study in its complete form.

In the preparation of this monograph, it has been realized that the general facts of French colonization in the United States have been set forth time and again by a great number of writers. No effort has therefore been made to repeat these familiar facts,

except where brief summaries have seemed indispensable for a proper understanding of the topics under discussion. Instead, emphasis has been laid upon the Spanish side of the subject. The utilization of a large mass of new documentary material from the archives of Spain has made it possible for this neglected view to be developed for the first time. Many unknown but important phases of Spanish activities in the Gulf region of the United States have been brought out, and new light thrown upon various movements which were fairly well known, but chiefly as isolated episodes. Specific references might be given to explain this two-fold contribution. The first class includes such topics as the colonization projects of Martín de Echagaray in Florida; the disclosure of the secret of La Salle's Texas colony, and the impression produced in Spain and Mexico; the Spanish search for La Salle's colony, resulting in the practical rediscovery of the coast-line of the Gulf of Mexico; Spanish diplomacy in England, as a foil to French encroachments in America; and the detailed history of the movement leading to the founding of Pensacola. All of these topics have been practically entirely unknown. In the second class, may be mentioned such matters as the Peñalosa episode, the first occupation of Texas, and the attitude of Spain toward the French colonization of Louisiana. These last named topics, as well as many other minor ones which have been partially known, take on new significance when brought together in a connected narrative, and studied in the light of new material and from the point of view here developed. In short, it is believed that the present study will clear up the gap which has hitherto existed in the history of the Gulf region of the United States during the latter part of the seventeenth century, and that it will show to an extent never before realized that the keynote to Spanish activities in this region must be sought almost wholly in the fears entertained by Spain in regard to French encroachments.

This monograph may be considered as the first fruits of an extended investigation carried on by the writer for the University of Texas and the Library of Congress in the *Archivo General de Indias* at Seville, Spain, since the summer of 1914. During a residence of sixteen months in that city, the writer ex-

amined approximately one thousand bundles (*legajos*) of documents covering all phases of Spanish activities within the United States during the period from about 1675 to 1821. The contents of each *legajo* were fully noted, and the more important documents bearing upon the history of the United States were copied entire. Up to the present time, more than seventeen thousand pages of transcripts have been secured of such material, copies of which have been deposited in the manuscript collections of the University of Texas and the Library of Congress. In this study, however, reliance has not been placed solely upon this voluminous collection. The writer has also examined material for the period covered in the *Archivo Histórico Nacional* of Madrid, and in the *Archivo de Simancas*, and has also had access to the large collection of transcripts from Mexican archives in the possession of the University of Texas. It is therefore confidently believed that no important sources from the Spanish view point, have been overlooked and that little if any additional important material on the subject is yet to be made available. A number of hitherto unpublished maps have also been reproduced from among those found at Seville.

The writer desires first of all to express his deep obligation to Professor William R. Shepherd of Columbia University, under whose direction this dissertation¹ has been written, for valuable criticism and friendly advice. He is greatly indebted to Professor Eugene C. Barker, Chairman of the School of History at the University of Texas, for constant encouragement and aid. He wishes also to take this opportunity of acknowledging his immense debt to Professor Herbert E. Bolton of the University of California, without whose unfailing sympathy, inspiration, and patient years of training in the past this study could never have been written. For friendly coöperation and assistance in the gathering of the materials included herein sincere thanks are hereby returned to the efficient staff of the *Archivo General de Indias*, including its scholarly director, Señor Torres Lanzas, and the department chiefs, Señores Rubio, Navas, Lafita, and Cervera; and also to Señor Montero, the able and sympathetic chief of the *Archivo de Simancas*. Mrs. M. A. Hatcher, archivist of the University of Texas, has given much assistance in the reading of proof.

¹This study has been accepted as a doctoral thesis at Columbia University.

CHAPTER I

EARLY PHASES, 1578-1685.

Introductory.—By the opening of the last quarter of the seventeenth century, Spain had begun to enter upon the lowest stage of her long period of decline. Ruled by a periodically insane sovereign, handicapped by a pernicious economic and industrial system, and exhausted by repeated wars, the once foremost nation of Europe was only saved from open bankruptcy and collapse by the tribute of gold and silver that was still remitted annually from America. Already serious inroads were beginning to be made upon her vast colonial domain. The seventeenth century had witnessed almost simultaneous action on the part of the great powers of Europe in obtaining a foothold in the new world. In the first decade of that century, the foundations were laid for the French, English, and Dutch colonies on the continent of North America. These remote settlements, however, caused Spain far less anxiety than did foreign encroachments within her immediate sphere of influence in the West Indies. In 1625 the deserted island of San Cristóbal, later called St. Kitts, was occupied by French and English adventurers. This action was merely the prelude to a general scramble by foreign nations for the lesser islands of the Antilles. The French appropriated such islands as Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Tortuga; the Dutch, St. Eustatius, Tobago, and Curacao; the English, Nevis, Barbuda, Antigua, and Montserrat. These settlements became the centers of a rapidly increasing population of lawless adventurers, who preyed upon Spanish commerce, and plundered at frequent intervals the unprotected coast towns. In 1655 the first open conquest of territory within this region was made when the English seized Jamaica. Fifteen years later England forced Spain to make a formal treaty, in which the former's right to Jamaica, as well as to the territory occupied by English colonists along the Atlantic seaboard, was definitely recognized. With the conclusion of this treaty, distasteful and unsatisfactory as it was to the Spaniards, the relations between

Spain and England in America were considerably clarified. England agreed to respect in the future the territorial claims of Spain, and promised to assist in exterminating the pirates who were causing the ruin of Spanish commerce.¹

While the English attitude toward America was thus in a measure defined, the relations between Spain and France in the same connection were far from being satisfactorily adjusted. Indeed, it was France which inspired in Spain the liveliest anxiety for the safety of the Indies. The unscrupulous ambitions of Louis XIV in Europe had already been only too well exhibited. His plans of aggrandizement on the continent at the expense of Spain had been almost uniformly successful. Spain was convinced that he merely awaited a favorable opportunity to extend his aggressions to the new world, and attempt to wrest away the choicest portions of her colonial domain. Under the direction of the great Colbert, a notable revival of French interest in America had been apparent. Steps were taken to foster the commerce and general prosperity, not only of New France, but of the various islands in the West Indies which had been appropriated by French subjects. The creation of the French Company of the West Indies in 1664 was a distinct challenge to the exclusive claims of Spain. At the same time Louis XIV announced in no uncertain terms his determination to secure for his subjects the freedom of the Spanish seas, and a share in the lucrative trade of the western hemisphere.

Of all the measures adopted by the French in America as a result of Colbert's aggressive policy, those which concerned the island of Hispaniola or of Santo Domingo, Spain's oldest colony in America, were probably most offensive to the Spaniards. While the northern coast of Santo Domingo had been frequented by French adventurers as early as the year 1630, no claim to sovereignty over that territory had been made at first by the French crown. Although repelled at various times, the persistence of the buccaneers had outlasted the spasmodic vigilance of Spain, and they had continued to grow in numbers and in

¹For an excellent account of the rise of the buccaneers in America, see C. H. Haring, *The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the Seventeenth Century* (New York, 1910).

daring. Upon the organization of the Company of the West Indies, Louis XIV had placed the stamp of his royal approval on their encroachments by including in the patent of the French governor of Tortuga full jurisdiction over the settlements on the northern coast of Santo Domingo. Families were sent over from France, courts were established in the principal towns, and the region became an integral portion of the French colonial domain. By 1675 it was estimated that the French population in northern Santo Domingo numbered several thousand inhabitants, while Spanish settlements in the south contained only a scant fifteen hundred souls.²

This action on the part of Louis XIV seemed to indicate clearly the policy that he intended to follow in regard to Spanish rights in America. Spain confidently believed that the French settlements in Santo Domingo would be but a stepping-stone to more formidable aggressions on her mainland colonies, and that in such aggressions the pirate host of the Caribbean region would be utilized in hiding the true designs of the French until the desired usurpation should be successfully accomplished.

Spain's solicitude for the integrity of her insular possessions in the West Indies was in strong contrast to the comparative indifference with which she regarded that portion of her colonial domain which is now included within the limits of the United States. The islands of the Antilles commanded the approaches to the heart of Spain's most productive colonies. They lay within the beaten track of travel and commerce. The mainland of the continent north of Mexico, however, was valued chiefly as a great barrier region providentially erected for the protection of the rich mining provinces from which Spain secured a large part of her revenues.

²Report of the fiscal of the Council of the Indies, June 28, 1740, summarizing French activities in Santo Domingo from the earliest times (Archivo General de Indias, Seville; Santo Domingo, 55-1-12, 28 pp.) Throughout this study, citations will be made to transcripts in the collection of the University of Texas made from the original documents. These transcripts are classified according to their original archive designations. Where the citation is given in "folios" (ff.), the documents are available in manuscript only. Unless otherwise indicated, all references will be to documents in the Archivo General de Indias.

In the first flush of energy that followed the discovery of America, while the spirit of romance and mystery hovered over the entire new world, there had been no lack of interest manifested in the region of the United States. Repeated expeditions were made within this territory during the first half of the sixteenth century, but no quick and easy road to fame and wealth was found within its vast extent. Interest gradually waned, and the geographical knowledge secured through the efforts of such pioneers as Narváez. Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, De Soto, and Coronado was soon forgotten, leaving only vague rumors of great riches to excite the imagination of later generations. In 1565 the first permanent Spanish settlements within the present boundaries of the United States were planted in Florida, as an answer to the attempted Huguenot colony that had been sent out by Coligny. Fifteen years later the next advance into the territory north of New Spain began, and by the end of the century Spanish dominion had been established over the pueblo groups of New Mexico. With the occupation of these two widely separated regions, Spanish expansion within the United States seemed to have spent its force. Proposals were made by various individuals from time to time for an advance into new fields, both from the region of Florida and from that of New Mexico, but little official interest was aroused by such petitions. As long as there was no pressing need for the occupation of new territory, the exhausted Spanish monarchy was content to allow the deserted region that lay between New Mexico and Florida to remain in a state of nature. It was not until a definite scheme of conquest by a foreign power threatened Spain's claim to this region that attention was turned in earnest to a consideration of its defence and development. Such a menace arose in the year 1678, just at the close of another of the periodical struggles between Spain and France. It took the form of the well-known proposals of Diego de Peñalosa at the court of France. This famous scheme was to lead to the reawakening of Spanish interest in the region of the United States, and was to signalize the beginning of the long struggle between Spain and France for the possession of the unoccupied coast line of the Gulf of Mexico, and the vast interior of the Mississippi Valley.

The Peñalosa scheme, and the royal cédula of 1678.—A few weeks before peace was made between Spain and France by the treaty of Nimwegen, in the autumn of 1678, news reached Madrid that a renegade Spaniard, who called himself the Count of Peñalosa, was endeavoring to interest the French monarch in a project to conquer certain provinces on the northern frontier of New Spain. Peñalosa had already been the source of much trouble to the Spanish government. A native of Peru, he had fought for many years in the wars of the southern viceroyalty; and later going to New Spain, had been made governor of the frontier province of New Mexico in 1660. After serving in that capacity for several years, he had become involved in a controversy with the Inquisition, as a result of which he was fined, exiled, and debarred from holding further office in the Spanish dominions.³ Failing to obtain redress for his grievances, he had gone to England in 1670, and had attempted to enlist the aid of Charles II in some aggression against Santo Domingo or South America. Reports concerning his activities were sent to Spain at that time, and the Spanish ambassador had been instructed to try to get Peñalosa out of England before he succeeded in causing any injury to the interests of Spain.⁴ Shortly after this,

³The Inquisition's sentence against Peñalosa, dated Feb. 3, 1668, may be found in the *ramo* of "Inquisición," Tomo 16, Archivo General y Público, México, D. F. (Citation furnished by Mrs. A. F. Bandelier.)

⁴Consultas of the Council of the Indies, Aug. 29 and Dec. 10, 1671, cited in consulta of Nov. 18, 1678 (Archivo General de Indias, Seville: Indiferente General, 141-3-1).

The writer has found a number of documents in the Archivo de Simancas relating to Peñalosa's activities in England. On June 12, 1671, Marcos de Oñate, of the Spanish embassy in London, wrote the king that Peñalosa was still trying to promote his schemes; that money had been furnished him; and that he had gone to Dunkirk for an audience with the king of France. Oñate said that an effort would be made to seize Peñalosa, and send him to Flanders, but that it would be a difficult undertaking (Letter of Oñate, cited in consulta of the Council of State, July 31, 1671; Archivo de Simancas, Legajo 2546). In a dispatch of August 31, 1671, the Spanish ambassador, Count of Molina, reported that he had been unable to arrest Peñalosa, and that he had resolved to ask the aid of the English king in apprehending the adventurer (Consulta of the Council of State, Sept. 23, 1671, *ibid.*). Such a step was opposed by the Council of State as contrary to the practice of nations.

Peñalosa had gone to France, and no further attention had apparently been paid to him by the Spanish government until his presence in Paris was reported in the autumn of 1678. This news was contained in a letter of a high official of Flanders, which was sent by the king to the Council of the Indies on October 16, 1678. Few details were given as to the nature of Peñalosa's proposals to the king of France. It was merely stated that he had offered to effect the conquest of the provinces of Quivira and Tagago (Teguayo), which he said were fabulously rich in precious metals, and with which he claimed to be familiar through expeditions made to those regions during his term as governor of New Mexico.⁵

In obedience to the king's decree, the Council of the Indies gave its attention once more to the threatening activities of the troublesome Peñalosa. The ignorance of the Spaniards in regard to the region north of Mexico is well illustrated by the fact that the supreme governing body of the colonies as then constituted had apparently never heard of the province which Peñalosa had offered to conquer for the king of France. After a vain effort to find some one who could throw light upon the location of Quivira and Teguayo, the Council began to search through its archives for a possible clue. There was finally unearthed among the "papeles curiosos" of the Council a memorial presented in 1630 by a missionary of New Mexico, which made reference to the provinces in question. This was the now well-known "Benavides Memorial," drawn up by Father Alonso Benavides, custodian for many years of the Franciscan missions in New Mexico. The object of the memorial had been to call attention to the work of the Franciscan order on the northern frontier of New Spain, and to obtain royal support for the evangelization of the unoccupied territory to the north and east of New Mexico. With this end in view Father Benavides had given a glowing account of the wonders and riches of that region. Among other things

⁵Consulta of the Council of the Indies, Nov. 18, 1678, 141-3-1, pp. 1-2.

Molina was instructed to say nothing to the king of England, but to endeavor to seize Peñalosa secretly (*ibid.*). Cf. Daenell, *Die Spanier in Nordamerika, 1513-1824*, pp. 99-103, for an account of Peñalosa's activities in England and France.

he told of the reports given by the Indians concerning the great kingdoms of Quivira and Aixaos, which were said to be thickly populated, and rich in silver and gold. In order to facilitate the occupation of this rich territory, Benavides suggested that a new way of approach should be opened up by way of Espíritu Santo Bay, which he believed to be situated between Apalache and Tampico in latitude twenty-nine degrees, and only about one hundred leagues from Quivira. The occupation of this famous bay, long reputed to be the best harbor on the Gulf of Mexico, would shorten the distance to New Mexico and Quivira by more than eight hundred leagues (the usual route being overland via Mexico), and would lead to the conquest of a vast new kingdom, with corresponding benefits to the royal treasury. Such were the points in Father Benavides's memorial to which the Council of the Indies now devoted its attention after a delay of nearly fifty years.⁶

With the foregoing information in its possession the Council proceeded on November 18 to discuss the question of Peñalosa's activities in France. It did not believe that the king should be greatly disturbed as to the safety of the provinces of Quivira and Teguayo. One of two things, the Council said, must be true. Either those provinces were not as rich as Peñalosa reported them to be, or their conquest was a very difficult undertaking: for otherwise the English from the nearby region of Virginia would have attempted to gain possession of them many years before. With its usual caution, however, the Council thought that no chances should be taken in the matter, especially since it was reported that Peñalosa had been assured by the French king that his proposals would be carefully considered as soon as France should again be at peace. This condition had recently been met by the conclusion of the treaty of Nimwegen. The Council was of the opinion, therefore, that some steps should be taken to guard against a possible invasion of the region threatened by Peñalosa's activities. It recommended to the king that the colonial officials of New Spain should be instructed

⁶The *Memorial* is translated in the *Land of Sunshine*, vols. XIII and XIV. A separate *de luxe* edition based upon this translation has recently been published by Mr. Edward E. Ayer of Chicago.

to report as to the feasibility of occupying Espíritu Santo Bay, and of opening up a new route to New Mexico and Quivira, as suggested by Father Benavides in his memorial. In regard to Peñalosa himself, the Council said that such a pernicious character might do much harm to the interests of Spain if allowed to remain among her enemies, and urged that some means should be devised for spiriting him away from France.⁷

The king concurred in the opinion of the Council, and the corresponding royal *cédula* was issued on December 10. It was addressed to the viceroy of New Spain, but copies were also ordered sent to the governors of Havana and Florida. The *cédula*, which contains a good summary of the causes for its promulgation, instructed the viceroy to make a detailed report in regard to the advisability of opening up communication with Quivira and Tegnayo by way of Espíritu Santo Bay. He was to tell what means were available for the undertaking, and for the conversion of the natives of those provinces; whether there were priests in New Spain who might be sent as missionaries to the new region, or whether it would be easier to carry on the work from Florida; and, finally, whether or not on account of the proximity of the English and French any injury was to be apprehended from the proposals which Peñalosa had made to the king of France.⁸

The *cédula* of December 10, 1678 marks the first definite step in the reawakening of official Spanish interest in the deserted Mississippi Valley and Gulf region of the United States. The indefinite rumors of foreign encroachment had done more than the repeated petitions of soldiers, settlers, and priests. That the action taken by the crown at this time was not more vigorous was due largely to the fact that it was not yet fully aroused to the seriousness of the danger. The whole matter was merely shifted to the shoulders of the viceregal officials of New Spain.

⁷Consulta of the Council of the Indies, Nov. 18, 1678; *Indiferente General*, 141-3-1, 6 pp.

⁸Real *cédula*, Dec. 10, 1678; *Archivo General y Público*, México, D. F., *Reales Cédulas*, Vol. 16, ff. 189-190. (Transcript in the collection of the University of Texas, 4 pp.)

and further action postponed until the requested reports could be secured.

Continued rumors of French designs.—While the Council of the Indies was evidently not greatly alarmed at Peñalesa's proposed conquest of Quivira and Teguayo, there is much evidence to show that the strongest fears were entertained in regard to French aggression in other parts of the Indies. The records of the Council from 1678 to 1683 indicate a growing suspicion of the designs of Louis XIV in America. The situation in Santo Domingo continued to excite the greatest anxiety. Frequent reports from that island told of the rapid growth of the French settlements on the northern coast, and of the danger that the whole island would soon be lost to Spain.⁹ The voyage of the French admiral d'Estrées to America aroused much alarm. It was believed that he had been sent to investigate conditions in the Spanish colonies, and to make a report as to the feasibility of their conquest. The Spanish ambassador in Paris, the Count of Fuentes, reported the return of d'Estrées from a recent voyage in 1681, and gave an alarming account of rumored French designs. The Council of the Indies, in discussing the letter of Fuentes, agreed with him that the frequent voyages of French squadrons to America foreshadowed some attack upon Spain's colonies.¹⁰ In 1683 it was reported that a French engineer had made two voyages to the West Indies, and had visited several Spanish ports under various pretexts. Upon his return to France, he had announced, it was said, that France could easily conquer any island belonging to Spain with a fleet of twenty ships and an army of six thousand men.¹¹ Many rumors also reached Spain during these years of increased activity in the French naval yards at Brest, Rochefort, and Havre. All of these reports merely served to confirm the general conviction that

⁹An excellent report on conditions in Santo Domingo was made by Governor Francisco de Segura on April 15, 1679 (MS. in the Archivo General de Indias, Santo Domingo, 53-6-6).

¹⁰Consultas of the Council of the Indies, May 8, May 20, and May 29, 1681 (Indiferente General, 141-3-3).

¹¹Consulta of the Council of the Indies, Feb. 20, 1683 (Indiferente General, 141-3-4); consulta of the Junta de Guerra, Nov. 2, 1683 (Indiferente General, 147-5-27).

France was preparing for some aggressive move in America. Spain was kept in a constant state of alarm, and yet feared to take any conspicuous steps to guard against an invasion of her colonies, lest such action might lead to a renewal of war with France. The most that she could do was to send a few additional troops to the more important posts in the Indies, endeavor to maintain a scant number of ships for the punishment of pirates, issue repeated warnings for vigilance, and give orders for the prompt remission of subsidies and supplies to the points that were most likely to be attacked. While the Council of the Indies realized that the only sure safeguard against foreign aggression was the maintenance of a strong naval force in America, the impoverished condition of the royal treasury made such a measure out of the question.¹² In spite of Spain's efforts to maintain peaceful relations with France,¹³ however, the aggressive policy of Louis XIV in Flanders led to a declaration of war by the Spanish king in October, 1683. The resumption of open hostilities now brought to their height the fears of French aggression in America, and a revival of the rumors concerning the designs of Peñalosa upon the northern frontier of New Spain.

The new rumors reached Spain by way of England, and came from no less an authority than the king of England himself. The Spanish ambassador, now Pedro Ronquillo, was informed by the king that Peñalosa was again trying to persuade Louis XIV to undertake the conquest of certain portions of New Spain, this time with apparent success.¹⁴ The renegade was said to be

¹²Consultas of May 8, May 20, and May 29, 1681; and of February 20, 1683. Many other references to the French menace may be found in *Indiferente General*, 141-3-3 and 141-3-4.

¹³Spain tried hard to avoid hostilities. In the summer of 1683 the ambassador to England was instructed to propose a general arbitration to the king of England for a settlement of all difficulties. Louis XIV refused to join in such a move (Ronquillo to the king, July 5, 1683: *Archivo de Simancas*, Legajo 3959).

¹⁴On January 18, 1682, Peñalosa had presented a memoir to the French king, proposing to establish a colony at the mouth of the Rio Bravo, and to advance upon the mines of Nueva Vizcaya. He planned to utilize the corsairs of Santo Domingo for this enterprise. In January, 1684, he submitted another proposal, offering to proceed straight to Pánuco with an army of filibusters, and conquer the northern portion of New

in possession of a considerable sum of money, and it was known that a formidable naval squadron was being fitted out at Brest. The English king advised Ronquillo to warn his government of these reports, and to urge that some precautions be taken against the French, at least in the chief ports of the Indies. Ronquillo also stated that the French ambassador in London had openly threatened him with an invasion of America.¹⁵

On August 9, 1684 the danger was discussed by the Junta de Guerra¹⁶ and the Council of the Indies. The proceedings of these two bodies clearly reveal the impotence of Spain. The Junta frankly admitted that it could see **no remedy for the situation**. If the reports from England were true, it was too late to prevent the invasion. The available naval forces in America were not strong enough to cope with the French, and it was too late to send reinforcements. The Junta contented itself with advising that an agent be sent to Brest to learn the destination

¹⁵Consulta of the Junta de Guerra, Aug. 9, 1684 (Indiferente General, 147-5-28, p. 1).

¹⁶The Junta de Guerra was a special body entrusted with the supervision of important questions concerning the defence of the Spanish colonies. Although in existence as early as 1586, it does not seem to have been given a definite status until 1600. By a decree of August 25 of that year Philip III created a "junta de guerra in the Council of the Indies." It was composed of four councillors from the Council of the Indies and four from the Council of War. The meetings were presided over by the president of the former Council. Sessions were usually held on Tuesday and Thursday of each week. The respective spheres of jurisdiction of the Council of the Indies and the Junta de Guerra do not seem to have been clearly differentiated. Both bodies frequently reported on the same matter. In general, however, the Junta seems to have been practically an expert committee of the Council on military and naval affairs concerning the colonies, reporting directly to the king. The following legajos contain much material for a study of the Junta de Guerra: Indiferente General, 141-5-6, 141-5-7, 141-5-8, and 141-6-4. Transcripts of many of these documents are in the collection of the University of Texas.

Spain. It was the latter project, doubtless, to which the king of England referred in his conversation with Ronquillo. The memoirs of Peñalosa referred to above are printed in Margry, *Découvertes et Etablissements des Français*, vol. III, 44-55; and in Shea, *The Expedition of Don Diego Dionisio de Peñalosa*, etc. (New York, 1882).

of the French squadron, and that the usual warnings should be issued to colonial officials in America.¹⁷ The Council of the Indies repeated substantially the opinion of the Junta, and pointed out in unmistakable terms the helplessness of the empire in the presence of the threatened danger. In regard to Peñalosa's designs, the Council now repeated the advice which it had given in 1678, and urged that that persistent trouble-maker should be gotten out of France before he succeeded in his treacherous plans.¹⁸

Such was the situation in Spain when the war with France was brought to an end by the conclusion of the humiliating truce of Ratisbon on August 15, 1684. Once more Spain had been forced to bow to the will of the French monarch. The cessation of hostilities, however, did not remove the tension between the two countries. Indeed, all Europe continued to be an armed camp, and the violation of the truce was expected at any time. Spain now feared with even greater anxiety than ever before that Louis XIV, having made good his latest aggressions in Europe, would attempt to put into execution his long-deferred plans of conquest in America. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the Spanish government was willing to give serious consideration to a project which had as its object the defence and development of the unoccupied territory between Florida and New Mexico, believed to be threatened by the schemes of the spurious Count of Peñalosa.

The Echagaray project.—Early in 1684, probably in February, a lengthy memorial was presented to the king of Spain by one Martín de Echagaray, for many years a pilot and naval captain of the presidio of St. Augustine, Florida, and only recently arrived in Spain from that province.¹⁹ Echagaray told first of

¹⁷Junta de Guerra, Aug. 9, 1684 (Indiferente General, 147-5-28, 3 pp.).

¹⁸Consulta of the Council, Aug. 9, 1684, *ibid.*, 4 pp.

¹⁹Martín de Echagaray entered the services of the king at St. Augustine on Jan. 31, 1671, serving in various capacities, until he reached the rank of pilot and captain. On April 18, 1678 he was given permission to retire to private life, and became commander of a ship called Nuestra Señora de Regla. In 1678 he was commissioned by the viceroy to go out from Vera Cruz to meet the incoming fleet, which was threatened by pirates. In 1679 he aided in recovering a quantity of treasure on a

the dangerous proximity to Florida of the settlement of St. George²⁰ (Carolina), which, he said, had been founded by French and English adventurers in 1670. An expedition had been sent against the settlement shortly after its establishment, but the attack was a failure, and the intruders had continued to grow in strength since that time. It was from the French, however, Echagaray said, that further aggression was most to be feared. As early as 1675 a report had been made by the governor of Tortuga to the French king, setting forth the great fertility and resources of the region of Florida between twenty-five and thirty-three degrees. Such was the productivity of the country, the governor had said, that even the children there grew to unusual size.²¹ Echagaray then enumerated various attacks that had been made by the French in Florida. In 1679 a force of two hundred disguised men, either French or Indians, had attacked the settlements of Santa Catalina, in the province of Guala, and had forced the Indians to abandon their missions. In 1682 the French had made three assaults upon San Martín and Apalache, burning the fort at the latter place.²² In the following

²⁰The Spaniards almost invariably referred to Carolina as "San Jorge" until well into the eighteenth century, if one may judge by the documentary sources.

²¹Echagaray said that he had learned of this report while in Havana the document in question having been intercepted from the French and taken to that port. He thought that an account of the matter had been sent to Spain at the time.

²²A rude fort was constructed on Apalache Bay in 1677 by Governor Pablo de Hita Salazar, who was very anxious for the government to found a colony in that region. The fort was garrisoned by a detachment of thirteen men (Hita Salazar to the king, Sept. 6, 1677; Santo Domingo, 58-1-26, 2 pp.; same to same, March 6, 1680, *ibid.*).

sunken vessel near the Bahamas. He re-entered the royal service in July, 1680, being appointed pilot-major of St. Augustine. In May, 1681 he was sent to Cuba on an important mission. On Aug. 11, 1682 he was recommended for the rank of *capitán de mar y guerra* by the Council of the Indies. He sailed from Florida in July, 1683 for the port of Garachico in the Canary Islands, and proceeded thence to Spain, arriving probably in January, 1684. (*Relación de servicios de el Capitán Martín de Echagary*, in *Echagaray Expediente*, pp. 57-60, México, 61-6-20; memorial of Echagaray, *ibid.*, p. 66; consulta of the Council of the Indies, Aug. 11, 1682, *Indiferente General*, 147-5-27.

year they had attempted to capture St. Augustine itself, but fortunately had been repulsed. The raiders had gone on to the province of Guale, however, and had ravaged the missions of that district. As final and conclusive evidence of the hostile designs of the French, Echagaray told of a conversation that he had held with two French sailors in the Canary Islands while on his way to Spain. One of these men reported that when he had left France, about a year before, five ships were preparing to sail to the town of St. George, bearing settlers for a new colony in that region. In view of this information and of the report that had been made by the governor of Tortuga, it could easily be inferred, Echagaray said, that the French intended to found a colony in Florida. If they did so, they would soon gain possession of that entire province, and eventually of all New Spain.

Echagaray then stated the means by which he proposed to guard against the French menace, and strengthen Spanish dominion in Florida. In order to increase the scanty population of the province and develop its latent resources, he offered to transport thither fifty industrious Spanish families from the Canary Islands, and twenty-four Indian families from Campeche. Similar measures to this end had been approved by the government, he said, but had never been carried out because of lack of funds. He also agreed to take to Florida the fifty soldiers that had been promised for the garrison of St. Augustine. By such means the province would be materially strengthened, and rendered capable of providing for its own defence. Echagaray then offered to explore the unknown Gulf coast between Apalache and Tampico. Within this region, he said, were many great rivers and the Bay of Espíritu Santo, well known to be one of the best harbors shown on the navigation charts. He then gave a short description of this famous bay, so long the subject of myth and conjecture. According to the reports that he had received from certain Indians in the mission at Apalache who lived near the bay, he said, two great rivers flowed into it, one leading to the region called Movila, and the other to New Mexico. The surrounding country, of course, was very fertile. It produced fruits similar to those of Spain, and abounded in cattle of various kinds, including one variety which produced as good

wool as that gotten from a sheep's back.²³ Such was Echagaray's faith in the general excellence of the bay that he suggested that Vera Cruz be abandoned, and Espíritu Santo made the staple port for the fleets sailing to New Spain. It was obvious, he said, that if the French should gain possession of such a wonderful harbor, they would be in an ideal position to harass all New Spain.

Having pointed out the two important services which he proposed to render, Echagaray then explained the conditions on which he would undertake to put them into execution. In order that he might be compensated for the expenses that he would incur in transporting the Spanish families and soldiers to Florida, he asked to be given the privilege of sending with the next galleons a ship of two hundred tons' burden, laden with goods for the consumption of the garrison of St. Augustine. The officials of Florida were to be ordered to receive such goods at the same prices paid for those secured from Mexico delivered in the province. The cargo was to be exempt from all duties, and he was to be allowed to sell any residue in Havana and Campeche.²⁴ He was also to be given the title of captain of infantry, with the corresponding salary, for the duration of the voyage. For his services in transporting the Indian families from Campeche, he asked to be given the contract for carrying the usual cargo of flour from Yucatán to Florida. If all of these conditions were complied with, Echagaray said, he would then undertake the proposed exploration of the Gulf coast and Espíritu Santo Bay. With the aid of ten soldiers and two Indian guides to be furnished by the governor of Florida, he agreed at his own expense to explore, draw a map of, and describe in detail the three hundred leagues of unknown country that lay between Apalache and Tampico.²⁵ Such were the chief points in the pro-

²³The buffalo, of course.

²⁴Echagaray cited a royal cédula of 1673 as precedent for his request. On June 5, 1673 the king had decreed that one registered ship of 200 tons could be sent annually to Florida, and similar privileges had been granted to one Tomás de Arzú in that year.

²⁵A final condition was that his salary as pilot-major and naval captain should be paid during his life time for the support of his family in Florida.

posals of Echagaray, which were again to bring to the attention of the Spanish crown the much-heralded Espíritu Santo Bay, and the unoccupied region to which it was supposed to constitute the natural gateway.²⁶

Since the project of Echagaray constitutes an important chapter in the early history of the Gulf region of the United States, and since it throws much light upon the workings of the central administrative organs of the Spanish colonial system, it seems worth while to trace in some detail its progress through the governmental routine. The memorial was first taken up by the Junta de Guerra on March 23, and was promptly referred to the royal *fiscal*.²⁷ As it concerned colonial trade and the sale of registered goods, the *fiscal* advised that it should be submitted to the *Casa de la Contratación* (House of Trade) and the *Consulado* of Seville for their report.²⁸ It was not until July that the latter body found time to consider the matter. With its usual opposition to any infringement upon the established commercial system, the *Consulado* showed itself quite hostile to Echagaray's plan. It questioned the truth of some of the statements that he had made, and belittled the danger to Florida from the French and the English. It was probable, the *Consulado* said, that the settlement of St. George referred to by Echagaray had already been abandoned; if it had not been, it could be destroyed at any time with little effort. It doubted, as well, whether the French were responsible for the various attacks that had been made upon Florida.²⁹ The immediate transportation of families from the Canary Islands was regarded

²⁶Memorial of Echagaray in the "Echagaray Expediente," pp. 64-73. The document is undated, but by a study of the accompanying papers the date may be fixed approximately as February, 1684. It was certainly not later than March 23, when the petition was considered by the Junta de Guerra.

²⁷Echagaray Expediente, p. 63.

²⁸Respuesta fiscal, April 27, 1684, *ibid.*, 73-74.

²⁹The Consulado pointed out that the fact that the assailants of Santa Catalina had been disguised was good proof that the French had not been involved, for the latter always attacked openly, while the hostile Indians of Florida had been known to make use of a disguise on previous occasions.

with frank disfavor. Until a suitable site should be selected for their colony, and all necessary arrangements completed, it would be unwise to take such families to Florida, where they would only be a heavy burden upon the royal treasury. In regard to the exploration of Espíritu Santo Bay, the *Consulado* expressed its surprise that Echagaray had not already effected its discovery before presenting his petition. If the bay could be found as easily as he indicated, it would be better for the governor of Florida to report as to whether it should be occupied. In the opinion of the *Consulado*, the whole proposition was simply a scheme on the part of Echagaray to sell goods, free of all duties, in Florida, Havana, and Campeche. The most objectionable feature of his proposal, however, was that he wished to secure permission for his ship to accompany the galleons, which were to sail in the autumn of 1684. Such a privilege would be in violation of the agreement made between the crown and the merchants³⁰ that no registered ship should be allowed to go to New Spain in the interval between the sailings of the regular fleet. It would be unjust to the merchants, would hurt the fair at Jalapa, and would therefore result in serious injury to the royal treasury. The *Consulado* thought, therefore, that the proposition of Echagaray was most undesirable, and recommended its rejection.³¹

In view of the hopelessness of securing permission for his ship to sail with the galleons, Echagaray, who had gone to Seville himself to promote his enterprise, did not press the matter further at this time,³² and the *Casa de la Contratación*, evidently shunning useless labor, did not trouble itself in making a report to the Council of the Indies. After the departure of the galleons in September, however, Echagaray again became active, and asked that his vessel be allowed to sail with the next regular fleet.³³ He now appealed to the Council of the Indies for

³⁰The *asiento de avería*.

³¹Report of the *Consulado*, July 10, 1684, *ibid.*, 24-27.

³²From a complaint made by Echagaray some months later, there are indications that the authorities at Seville had simply neglected to consider his petition, but this point is not clear.

³³The fifty soldiers for Florida were sent on the galleons.

some decision in his case. On November 28 the Council wrote to the *Casa de la Contratación*, expressing its surprise that the report asked for so many months before had not yet been made. In extenuation of its failure to reply, the *Casa* explained that Echagaray himself had temporarily dropped the matter. The *Consulado* was now asked for a second report. This it made on February 6, 1685. While it still believed that Echagaray's scheme embodied many undesirable features, since he now desired to accompany the regular fleet and not the galleons, it saw less inconvenience in acceding to his request.³⁴ The question was next considered by the *Casa de la Contratación*. That body took issue with the *Consulado*, and supported Echagaray's proposals quite enthusiastically. It believed that not only would his enterprise result in no injury to the king's interests, but that, on the contrary, it would be a veritable blessing to the poorly defended province of Florida.³⁵

According to the regular routine, the whole *expediente* of accumulated reports now returned to the hands of the *fiscal*, who was at last in a position to draw up his opinion in the matter. His lengthy recommendations were dated April 11, 1685. With his broader knowledge of the affairs of the empire at large, the *fiscal* at once saw the importance of Echagaray's proposals, and their close connection with various measures that had been under consideration by the government. He recalled the many efforts that had been made in previous years to strengthen the province of Florida, develop its resources, and ameliorate the condition of its miserable inhabitants. He confirmed Echagaray's statements in regard to the attacks that had been made on the province by foreign enemies, and told of measures that had been recommended to protect the threatened districts. On account of the failure of colonial officials to send in the reports that had been asked for in this connection, no definite action had been taken by the government.³⁶ The *fiscal* next referred to the alarm

³⁴*Ibid.*, 27.

³⁵Report of the *Casa de la Contratación*, March 13, 1685, *ibid.*, 21-23.

³⁶The facts cited by the *fiscal* were the following: In 1673 a petition had been received from the citizens of St. Augustine, telling of the deplorable condition of the Indians. Although cotton was produced in abundance, the natives were without clothing because no one in the

that had been felt in Spain in 1678, when the news of Peñalosa's activities in France had become known, and recalled the *cédula* that had been issued in that year asking for a report on Quivira and Teguayo, and the proposed occupation of Espíritu Santo Bay as suggested by Father Benavides. No reply, he said, had been received to this order.³⁷

³⁷The fiscal evidently ignored a letter written by the governor of Florida in 1679 in answer to the *cédula* in question. The governor stated that he had already reported all he knew of the region lying to the west of Florida in a letter and map sent to the king on November 10, 1678, and that he had been unable to acquire any further information (Santo Domingo, 54-5-11).

province knew how to weave cotton cloth. As a result of this petition, an order had been sent to the governor of Campeche to make arrangements to send to Florida twenty-four Indian families skilled in weaving. Nothing further was done in the matter. In 1675 the governor of Florida, Pablo de Hita Salazar, had reported that it was very important that these Indian families be sent to the region of Apalache, together with a number of Spanish families, who would engage in agricultural pursuits. With such settlers, the governor said, the district of Apalache would soon rival Flanders in prosperity. In consequence of this letter, instructions were sent to the governor of the Canary Islands for a report as to the possibility of sending a number of families from those islands to Florida. No answer had been received to this order. In 1678 Governor Hita Salazar again set forth the desolate condition of Florida, due chiefly, in his opinion, to the lack of industries. He suggested that it would be well to allow certain families of the garrison at St. Augustine to remove to Apalache. Some financial aid would have to be given them, but the expense would be much less than that which would be incurred in importing families from the Canary Islands. It would be advisable, however, to make an effort to send at least twelve families from the Islands and an equal number of Indian families from Campeche to serve as instructors for the inexperienced inhabitants of Florida. The whole question had been considered by the government, but no definite action was taken. In 1680 reports were received from Florida in regard to various attacks that had been made upon the province of Guala. It was suggested that Santa Catalina should be colonized in order to prevent such incursions. Still another order was therefore sent to the governor of the Canary Islands to endeavor to send a number of families to Florida. The governor of Florida was notified of this action, and was asked to send in a detailed report in regard to suitable sites for colonies. He was to take no definite action, however, until receipt of further orders from Spain.

All of the foregoing facts, the *fiscal* said, clearly proved the timeliness of Echagaray's project. There could be no doubt that Florida was very much exposed to the assaults of foreign enemies. Echagaray's proposed measures to protect that province were virtually identical with those which had been attempted in vain by the government. The *fiscal* believed that the exploration of the Gulf region was equally as important. Although he realized that the monarchy was not in a position to undertake the discovery of new territory and provide for its defence, he believed that the importance of the region which Echagaray offered to explore warranted an exception being made. Experience had shown that the regular colonial officials were neglecting the king's interests, and could not be depended upon to guard against foreign aggression. The French were losing no opportunity to secure new territory, and there was little doubt that they would take steps to establish settlements in the region north of New Spain as soon as they were in a position to do so. This fact was proven by the reply of the king of France to Peñalosa in 1678, to the effect that as soon as the war was over, the conquest of Quivira and Teguayo would be favorably considered. Echagaray's offer to explore Espíritu Santo Bay and the Gulf coast should therefore be most welcome. Even if it were found inadvisable to occupy the region at once, the king would have the satisfaction of knowing something definite about it, and would be in a better position to take proper steps for its defence in case of foreign invasion. From whatever angle Echagaray's proposals were regarded, said the *fiscal*, he could see nothing but benefit to the crown resulting from them, and he therefore formally advised that they should be accepted,³⁸ upon

³⁸Respuesta fiscal, April 11, 1685, Echagaray Expediente, 76-92.

The *fiscal* objected to a few minor details of the plan. He was unwilling for Echagaray to be exempted from the tax levied for the benefit of the school of navigation at Seville. He thought that it should be made clear that the contract to carry flour from Campeche should be given only on condition that the Indian families were willing to emigrate voluntarily. He advised that fifty more soldiers should be sent to Florida with Echagaray, in addition to the fifty that had recently been sent. Echagaray should be required to give a bond to insure the execution of his agreement.

practically the same conditions that Echagaray had stipulated.

With the *fiscal's* stamp of approval on his project, Echagaray's success was practically insured. The Junta de Guerra adopted the recommendations without change on June 19.³⁹ On August 2 the king's formal *cédula*, announcing the acceptance of Echagaray's offer, was promulgated. Copies of the royal dispatch were ordered sent to the viceroy of New Spain and to the governor of Florida. By way of introduction and explanation, the document repeated the contents of the *cédula* of December 10, 1678. It then recited the chief points in the agreement that had been made with Echagaray. The viceroy and governor were ordered to coöperate to the fullest extent, the latter being instructed to furnish Echagaray with the necessary men for the exploration of the Gulf coast. In spite, also, of the new arrangements that had been made, the king repeated the order for a report on Quivira and Teguayo as originally given in the *cédula* of 1678.⁴⁰

The adoption of Echagaray's plan marks the second step in the development of royal interest in the Gulf region of the United States. The fears that had been aroused by the activities of Peñalosa in 1678 had been confirmed by the continued reports of French designs that had been received in Spain since that time. The proposals of the obscure pilot were instrumental in crystalizing the interest that had been faintly aroused by the first rumors of Peñalosa's proposed conquest. They directed the attention of the Spanish crown in a definite way to the Bay of Espíritu Santo. The discussion aroused by the project caused the royal government to realize the necessity for abandoning its policy of inaction and procrastination, if Spain was to retain

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁴⁰The copy of the *cédula* sent to the viceroy is in the Archivo General y Público, México, D. F., Reales Cédulas, Vol. 20, ff. 272-276. Another copy is contained in Testimo de los Autos, y diligencias fechas, pp. 156-159 (México, 61-6-20). The copy addressed to the governor of Florida is in the "Delgado Expediente," pp. 55-58 (México, 61-6-20). Juan Marquez Cabrera, governor of Florida, acknowledged receipt of the *cédula* in St. Augustine on August 20, 1686, and promised obedience in the customary terms (*ibid.*, 58-59).

her claim to the vast stretch of territory that lay between Florida and New Mexico.

Although, as will be seen, Echagaray's ambitious plan was never carried out, the interest which it had aroused in Espiritu Santo Bay and the region of the Gulf of Mexico was not to abate. While the slowly-moving organs of Spanish colonial administration had been discussing his proposals, the menace which he had warned against had finally materialized. It came, however, from an entirely unsuspected source—not from the discredited Peñalosa, not from the pirate hosts of Santo Domingo, but from a man of whose threatening activities the Spaniards seem to have been almost wholly heedless. For in the summer of 1684 La Salle had sailed from La Rochelle to colonize for France the vast unoccupied region of the Mississippi Valley.

CHAPTER II.

LA SALLE'S COLONY, 1685-1686

The founding of Fort St. Louis.—The story of La Salle's ill-fated colony on the Gulf of Mexico has been told again and again by a host of writers from Parkman down to the present day. In none of these accounts, however, has the subject been treated from the Spanish viewpoint. It will be the purpose of the present chapter to present this neglected phase, and to show how the secret of the French colony within the forbidden region of the Gulf of Mexico was revealed to the Spanish government, as well as the first measures of defence that were called forth by the menace to Spain. For the sake of a clear understanding of the measures adopted, however, it will be necessary to give first a brief summary of the essential facts of La Salle's last venture.

While Spain slumbered, French explorers had been preparing the way for the extension of the sovereignty of France over the great interior region of the Mississippi Valley. The high water-mark of French enterprise was reached in 1682, when La Salle descended the Mississippi River to its mouth, and took possession in the name of Louis XIV of the vast territory drained by its waters. La Salle returned to France in the following year, and presented his first memorial for the colonization of Louisiana shortly after the renewal of hostilities with Spain.¹ In order, doubtless, to make his plan of colonization more acceptable to the king, he combined with it an impracticable scheme to utilize the savage tribes along the Mississippi in the conquest of the rich mining region of Nueva Vizcaya, on the northern frontier of New Spain. He pointed out that, even if peace should be made before he was able to put this part of his enterprise into execution, the colony on the Mississippi would afford a base for an invasion of the Spanish colonies whenever the king might wish to effect their conquest. At the same time that La Salle was presenting

¹See p. 18, *supra*.

his proposals, Peñalosa had again become active in his intrigues against the Spanish colonies, and offered to lead an expedition to conquer a large portion of New Spain. While there was doubtless some idea at first of combining the two enterprises, La Salle's plans were finally adopted by the crown as preferable to those of the Spanish renegade. In April a royal patent was issued to La Salle as governor of the indefinite region extending from Fort St. Louis on the Illinois to the Spanish settlements of Nueva Vizcaya on the south.

Preparations for the expedition were in progress throughout the spring and summer of 1684. The plans of La Salle were enveloped in the most profound secrecy. Even Beaujeu, the naval officer who had been appointed to accompany the expedition, knew nothing definite about the route to be followed, although La Salle seems to have given the impression that he intended to return to Louisiana by way of Canada. The extreme reticence of La Salle was very annoying to Beaujeu, and the latter came to form a very poor opinion of La Salle's ability and of the ultimate success of the expedition. Not until the voyage was under way was it known that the Gulf of Mexico was the first destination of the colony.

The fleet of four vessels, bearing almost three hundred colonists, set sail from La Rochelle in July, 1684, some three weeks before the short-lived war with Spain was brought to an end by the conclusion of the truce of Ratisbon. The course was directed first to the French settlements on the northern coast of Santo Domingo, where La Salle expected to obtain information and assistance for the next stage of the voyage. Shortly before reaching the port of Petit Gouave, the first serious mishap occurred when the ketch St. Francois, which bore most of the provisions for the colony, was captured by Spanish corsairs. The greed of the Spaniards was evidently greater than their devotion to their country's interests, for no report of the capture of the vessel seems to have been made to the Spanish authorities and La Salle's designs were not revealed. The expedition was detained at Petit Gouave for two months, on account of La Salle's illness and the necessity of replenishing the stock of supplies. The voyage was resumed in the latter part of Novem-

La Salle's Camp on Matagorda Bay, 1686. (Tracing from photograph of original in A. G. I., Mexico, 61-6-20.)

ber. For several weeks the vessels sailed toward the west through the open waters of the Gulf, until at the end of December the first land was sighted. They had gone several hundred miles past the Mississippi River, and were now off the coast of Texas. After examining the coast for several days, La Salle decided to make a landing at the present Matagorda Bay, being firmly convinced that he was at the outlet of one of the mouths of the Mississippi. In piloting the ships into the inner waters of the bay, another serious misfortune was suffered in the loss of the *Aimable*, which was run aground, and most of its cargo destroyed. As La Salle persisted in his intention to remain at the bay, Beaujeu soon returned to France, having carried out the instructions that had been given him. After a short time the temporary encampment of the colony on the shore of the bay was abandoned for a site about five miles up the course of one of the small streams in the vicinity—the present Garcitas Creek.² Here a rude post was built, which was christened Fort St. Louis. The rest of the story may be told in a few words. The inexperienced colonists met with one disaster after another. Their numbers were steadily reduced through sickness and hardships. Early in 1686 the one remaining ship was wrecked through carelessness, and the last chance of escape by sea was lost. La Salle made three fruitless attempts to find the Mississippi, and secure aid from his Illinois fort. His first journey lasted for five months, the party wandering far into the interior of the country in search of the elusive river. The second journey carried the explorers to the territory of the Texas Indians, with whom the Frenchmen remained for several weeks before returning to the fort, as unsuccessful as before. On the last journey, in January, 1687, La Salle was treacherously assassinated by one of his own men near

²Parkman and practically all other writers who have dealt with the subject have identified the stream on which La Salle built his fort with the Lavaca River. Professor Bolton has recently established the fact that it was on the Garcitas, and has found the exact site after a personal inspection of the locality. See H. E. Bolton, "The Location of La Salle's Colony on the Gulf of Mexico," in the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, ii, 165-182.

the Brazos River in Texas.³ A few weeks later the rest of the colonists, except for a few deserters and some of the children who were spared, were massacred by the hostile coast Indians. Such was the disastrous outcome of the first attempt of Louis XIV to obtain a foothold on the mainland of the Gulf of Mexico.⁴

If La Salle's hesitant attitude and apparent indecision in the midst of the preparations for his expedition were deliberately assumed in order to deceive the world in regard to the real purpose of his enterprise, his efforts to that end were completely successful as far as Spain was concerned. There is a conspicuous absence of any contemporaneous reference in Spanish archives to La Salle and his activities before his colony was actually established. And yet the general nature of his plans must have been known in Spain in a vague fashion, just as in other countries of Europe. Indeed, there are later indications that the Spanish government was aware of his activities. So wide-spread was the opinion that La Salle was a dreamer and that his schemes were impractical, however, that Spain seems to have paid little if any attention to his plan of colonization. If any thought was given to the matter at all, it was merely supposed that he was planning to return to Canada to continue his efforts to colonize a region which was too remote from Spanish settlement to warrant apprehension. Spain was to be taken totally unawares. It was not until many months after La Salle had planted his colony that the Spanish government realized the menacing nature of his designs, and learned that he had established his settlement within the region which had been brought so prominently to the attention of the king through the pro-

³The mistake of older writers in stating that La Salle was killed on the Trinity River was first corrected by Professor Bolton, who has placed the scene of the tragedy near the Brazos River. (Cf. Bolton, *op. cit.*, 168.) This conclusion has been confirmed by the present writer's investigations.

⁴Parkman's *La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West*, in spite of minor inaccuracies, still constitutes the most fascinating and most authoritative account of La Salle's enterprise. The chief French sources are printed in Margry, *Découvertes et Etablissements des Français, etc.*, Vols. II and III.

posals of Martín de Echagaray. The way in which the secret came to light, hitherto only vaguely and incorrectly stated, was as follows:

The first news in Mexico.—While returning from a fruitless treasure hunt to South American waters in the summer of 1685, Admiral Gaspár de Palacios, pilot-major of the Indies, encountered a large fleet of corsairs off the coast of Yucatan. He was pursued for some distance, but succeeded in escaping to Vera Cruz, whence he notified the viceroy, the Marquis of Laguna, of the proximity of the pirates, and of the threatened danger to the coast towns. On July 6 the corsairs, led by the notorious Grammont, entered Campeche, and sacked and burned the town. They remained there for almost two months, until forced to retire by a relief expedition sent by the viceroy. On September 10 one of the pirate ships was captured by the windward squadron (*armada de barlovento*), and taken to Vera Cruz, with one hundred and twenty prisoners on board.⁵ It was during the course of the examination of these prisoners that the Spanish officials received the first evidence that a French colony had been established on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico.⁶

The most detailed information was given in the declaration of a young Frenchman, who claimed to have been a member of the colony that had been founded. On October 27 this individual was subjected to a special examination. In reply to the usual preliminary questions, he said that his name was Denis Thomas; that he was a native of Longueville, near Dieppe; twenty-two years old; and lately page in the service of the

⁵The date of the capture of this vessel has usually been given as September, 1684 instead of September, 1685, and this mistake has caused several writers to assert that more than a year elapsed after the report of La Salle's colony was received in Mexico before an expedition was sent out to search for it (Cf. Bancroft, *North Mexican States and Texas*, i, 399; Clark, "The Beginnings of Texas," *Bulletin of the University of Texas*, No. 98, p. 14; Bolton, *op. cit.*, p. 169).

⁶Gaspár de Palacios to Pedro de Oreytia, president of the Casa de la Contratación, Nov. 17, 1685; Antonio de Astina to the king Nov. 18, 1685; auto of Astina, Oct. 27, 1685, in Testimo de los Autos, y diligencias fechas, 4-5; Joseph de Murueta Otálora and Francisco García de Arroyo to the viceroy, Oct. 29, 1685, *ibid.*, 2-3; all in A. G. I., México, 61-6-20).

Marquis de Greville. About a year before, he said, he had sailed from France on a royal frigate under command of a Captain Bonchiut (Beaujeu), in company with three other vessels, which carried all necessary supplies for the founding of a colony at a place called "Micipipi." The colonists numbered about two hundred and fifty persons, including two companies of infantry, seven priests, and men of various trades and professions. On October 28, 1684, they had arrived at Petit Gouave, on the northern coast of Santo Domingo. Shortly before reaching that port, a ketch laden with provisions was captured by the Spaniards, and the expedition was forced to remain at Petit Gouave for more than two months in order to secure additional supplies. During this delay, Thomas said, he had decided to abandon the colony, and return to France, as he had heard that the voyage to Mississippi would be a very long one. Finding himself without means of livelihood he had embarked on the corsair which had been captured and taken to Vera Cruz. Such was the fairly accurate explanation given by the youth in regard to his presence in Spanish waters.

These personal details having been disposed of, the Spanish officials endeavored to learn something more definite concerning the French colony itself. Upon being asked who had discovered the place called Mississippi, and when, Thomas replied that a man named Monsieur de Salas had found it, after a search of eighteen years, having made his way from New France to a large river, which he had descended for five hundred leagues until he reached its mouth and the open sea. He had then returned to France, where the king, as a reward for his success, gave him the title of marquis, and made him viceroy of the country he had discovered. Thomas said that he had heard that M. de Salas had left a number of men in a fort on the large river, and that he planned to conquer some rich mines not far from Mississippi. All of these facts, the witness stated, had been given him by a servant of La Salle's, but his informant had refused to reveal the exact location of the place that had been chosen for the settlement. Many other questions were asked the prisoner, and further alarming details were elicited. As the general facts of his story were corroborated by the de-

larations of several other prisoners, the officials at Vera Cruz were forced to conclude that he was telling the truth, and that a French colony had actually been established within territory claimed by Spain.⁷

Maps were hurriedly consulted, and attention fixed upon the unfamiliar region north of the Gulf of Mexico. There was clearly only one river leading from New France to the Gulf, along whose course one could travel for five hundred leagues. This was the river shown on the maps of the time as the "Rio del Espíritu Santo," flowing into the famous bay of the same name. Admiral Palacios,⁸ experienced pilot and navigator, was not long in concluding that the probable site of the French settlement was on this very river and bay. When he estimated the distance from Espíritu Santo to the various ports of Mexico and Florida, finding that it was only one hundred and twenty leagues from Apalache, one hundred and sixty-five from Tampico, and one hundred and ninety from Vera Cruz, the dangerous proximity of the invaders was immediately realized. From Espíritu Santo Bay the French would be able to attack the fleets of the Indies, and threaten the whole kingdom of New Spain. Palacios thought that immediate and vigorous action was imperative. He therefore drew up a report to the viceroy, suggesting that steps be taken to ascertain the exact location of the settlement, and that armed forces be sent out to destroy it. Two fishing boats manned by twelve men each would suf-

⁷Declaration of Denis Thomas, Oct. 27, 1685, in Testimo de los Autos, y diligencias fechas, 5-13. The complete testimony of the pirates examined at Vera Cruz may be found in México, 60-2-4, 668 folios. This voluminous document gives full details concerning the attack upon Campeche.

⁸Gaspár de Palacios was a veteran sailor, and one of the most noted pilots of his time. He had been in the continuous service of the king of Spain for fifty-six years, having served in the following capacities: *capitán de mar y guerra* since 1657; governor and chief in command of a fleet in Santo Domingo in 1666; pilot-major of galleons in 1671; and in 1684 he was made admiral, with the pay of pilot-major in addition. A few years later he drew a map of the Gulf region, which was said to have corrected more than two hundred and fifty old errors (Consulta of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, Nov. 10, 1689; Indiferente General, 147-5-28, 2 ff.).

fice to examine the Gulf coast. Such an expedition could easily be made from Vera Cruz, and even with more facility from Havana, as the officials at the latter place were more familiar with the region in question.⁹

The report of Admiral Palacios, and letters from other officials at Vera Cruz who concurred in his opinion, were sent to the viceroy by special courier, reaching the capital on November 3. The documents were immediately sent to the *fiscal*, and a council extraordinary summoned to meet as soon as that official should make his report. The *fiscal* was at once impressed with the gravity of the situation. The facts disclosed in the declarations of the prisoners at Vera Cruz, he thought, left little doubt that the French had occupied Espíritu Santo Bay. He recommended, therefore, that the suggestion of Palacios should be adopted without delay, and that an expedition should be sent out from Havana to reconnoiter the French settlement. In the meantime, all available naval forces should be made ready for action. The *fiscal* made no recommendation in regard to an expedition from Vera Cruz, as he understood that Palacios had suggested one from Havana as preferable.¹⁰ On the following day the special session of the viceroy's advisory council was held, and the recommendations of the *fiscal* adopted.¹¹ The viceroy accordingly ordered, on the same day, that Admiral Palacios should select a suitable person to proceed to Havana, where a vessel and all necessary supplies would be furnished for the proposed expedition. All arrangements were left in the hands of Palacios, and the other officials at Vera Cruz were instructed to coöperate with him to the fullest extent.¹²

A week later the order of the viceroy had reached Vera Cruz and preparations were begun. Two pilots of the windward squadron were called upon to make the expedition. Juan Enríquez Barroto, chief pilot of the frigate Nuestra Señora de la Soledad, was chosen as leader. He was an experienced draughts-

⁹Palacios to the viceroy, Oct. 27, 1685, in *Testimo de los Autos, y diligencias fechas*, 14-16.

¹⁰Respuesta fiscal, Nov. 4, 1685, *ibid.*, 18-21.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 21-24.

¹²Decree of the viceroy, Nov. 5, 1685, *ibid.*, 24-29.

man as well as a practical pilot, and a man of excellent ability. Antonio Romero, associate pilot of the flagship of the squadron, was appointed to accompany Barroto, as he had made many voyages from Havana to Apalache, and was personally familiar with that portion of the route to be followed. With instructions from Palacios for their guidance, the two pilots left Vera Cruz in a private vessel on November 21, bearing orders from the viceroy to the governor of Havana for the fitting out of a ship for the voyage. Palacios continued to urge the necessity for sending out another expedition from Vera Cruz, as he had originally suggested, but he was unable to find a suitable person to place in command of it, and nothing was done in the matter. Instead it was decided to supplement the expedition from Havana by a search by land from the northern frontier of New Spain. It was chiefly upon the efforts of Barroto and Romero, however, that the viceregal authorities based their hopes for a speedy discovery of the colony that had been founded by La Salle.¹³ Leaving the situation in New Spain at this point, it will be necessary to make a lengthy digression in order to note the effect produced in Spain by the news of the French intrusion, and to describe the measures that were taken by the home government to guard its colonial dominions from the new peril.

Action in Spain.—The first reports from Mexico reached Spain about the middle of March, 1686. They were conveyed by the special ship (*navío de aviso*) despatched by the general of the galleons from Havana, and consisted of letters from Admirals Palacios and Astina¹⁴ and the governor of Havana. These letters related briefly the facts brought out in the declarations of the pirates at Vera Cruz, and told of the arrangements that had been made up to December 31 for the expedition that was to search for the French.¹⁵ The matter first came before the Coun-

¹³*Ibid.*, 48-76, *passim*.

¹⁴Astina had succeeded to the command of the *armada de barlovento* upon the death of Andrés de Ochoa y Zárate.

¹⁵Palacios to Oreytia, Nov. 17, 1685, 8 pp.; Astina to the king, Nov. 18, 1685, 3 pp.; Munibe to the king, Dec. 31, 1685, 2 pp. (all in México, 61-6-20). The viceroy apparently made no report until the following April after the return of the first reconnoitering expedition.

cil of the Indies at its meeting of March 27, but action was delayed, in accordance with the usual routine, until a *relator* could examine the documents, and present a summary of them to the Junta de Guerra, to which body the question was naturally assigned.

The news of the invasion of Espíritu Santo Bay reached Spain at a time when relations with France were again in a critical state, and added a fresh complication to a situation that was already strained almost to the breaking point. The immediate difficulty between the two countries at this time had come as an aftermath of the brief war of 1683-1684. Shortly after the declaration of hostilities in October, 1683 the king of Spain, following the usual custom of reprisals, had issued a decree confiscating the property of French subjects throughout the Spanish dominions, including goods belonging to French merchants in the incoming fleet from America to the value of five hundred thousand pesos.¹⁶ After peace was restored by the truce of Ratisbon, Louis XIV had continued to demand the restitution of this amount, and his threats to collect the money by force had kept Spain in a constant state of alarm. In the general atmosphere of suspicion and distrust, there was little disposition on the part of Spanish officials to doubt the truth of the reports that had been received from Mexico, showing that the French had carried out their old plans of seizing some portion of the mainland in the Gulf region. It seemed most logical to officials in Spain, as it had to those in Mexico, that such a desirable locality as that of Espíritu Santo Bay should have been chosen by the French as the scene of their new aggression. At first it seems to have been the general impression in Spain that the reported colony must have been the work of the French corsairs, headed by Grammont, for it was expected that Louis XIV would follow the same secret policy that he had adopted in the case of Santo Domingo. A few days after the arrival of the

¹⁶The order for the embargo was issued on Nov. 28, 1683 (consulta of the Council of the Indies, Dec. 1, 1683; *Indiferente General*, 141-3-4). The cédula ordering the confiscation of the property of all Frenchmen in America was dated Dec. 13, 1683 (Guadalajara, 66-6-6).

official reports from Mexico, however, the Council of the Indies received a letter from a trustworthy person in Cadiz, who stated that he had received private advices from Paris to the effect that about a year before one thousand families had been sent out by the king of France for the purpose of founding a new colony in America. This additional news threw new light upon the reports from Mexico, and left little doubt in the minds of the royal officials that an open invasion of Spain's colonies had been inaugurated by the French crown itself, the first move of which was the founding of La Salle's colony on Espíritu Santo Bay.¹⁷

The great alarm felt in Spain is clearly shown by the proceedings of the Junta de Guerra at its session of April 2. The occupation by the French of such an important place as Espíritu Santo was characterized as a menace which threatened the safety of the Indies and of the whole Spanish empire. Although the Junta was confident that the viceroy, Marquis of Laguna, had already done all in his power to protect the royal dominions, it feared that the forces at his disposal were not sufficient to enable him to expel the French in case they had fortified their settlement. It was necessary, therefore, that reinforcements should be sent from Spain without a moment's delay in order to "pluck out the thorn that had been thrust into the very heart of America."¹⁸ The Junta then proposed that two frigates should be fitted out with the greatest possible number of troops and arms, and sent to New Spain. In order to allay the suspicion of the French, these vessels should go in the guise of convoys for the annual fleet that was soon to sail, bearing the new viceroy, Count of Monclova, who had recently been appointed to the government of New Spain. The Junta fully

¹⁷Consultas of the Junta de Guerra, April 2 and 8, 1686; México, 61-6-20.

¹⁸"Por todas estas consideraciones, y otras muchas que se ofrecen a la Junta y porque prepondera la ymportancia deste negocio como el más crítico y en el que se abentura la Conserbacion de las Yndias y de toda la Monarquia de V. Magd. en cuyo pronto remedio conviene ganar las horas, para desarraygar esta Espina que se a Yntroducido en el Corazon del Cuerpo de la America." (Consulta of April 8, 1686, p. 7; México, 61-6-20).

realized that the dispatch of even this meager aid would seriously strain the resources of the monarchy, and would necessitate the postponement of an expedition that was on the point of leaving for the Isthmus of Darien to relieve that region from the ravages of pirates and hostile savages. It believed, however, that the expulsion of the French from Espíritu Santo Bay was a matter of paramount importance, and that all other plans should be subordinated to its success. The Junta recommended, in concluding its report, that the new viceroy should be authorized to use all available forces to destroy the French colony, even delaying the return of the fleet if necessary, and that a fort should be built at Espíritu Santo if such a step seemed necessary in order to maintain the just rights of Spain.¹⁹

While the Junta de Guerra was drawing up its recommendations for the king, the Council of the Indies was endeavoring to ascertain the whereabouts of Martín de Echagaray, whose project to explore Espíritu Santo Bay had suddenly taken on still greater importance.²⁰ The pilot was located in Cadiz, and was at once summoned to Seville to make a report as to the status of his enterprise, and to give any information that he might possess concerning the bay which the French were believed to have occupied. Echagaray was obliged to confess at the outset that he had been unable to carry out his agreement with the crown. His failure, he explained, was due to the omission from the draft of the royal *cédula* of the clause exempting his goods from duties in Florida and Mexico, and the consequent refusal of his financial supporters to supply the funds for the undertaking. He was still willing to carry out his project if the necessary money could be obtained. In regard to the Bay of Espíritu Santo, he stated that he had never visited it personally, but had learned all that he knew concerning it from various Indians in the mission at Apalache. From his general knowledge of the region, however, he undertook to draw a map showing the general situation of the bay. An examination of this

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 1-9.

²⁰The secretary of the Council of the Indies to Pedro de Oreytia, president of the Casa de la Contratación, April 2, 1686 (México, 61-6-20).

rude sketch, which is reproduced on the opposite page, will show concretely the meager knowledge possessed by the Spaniards concerning the interior of the North American continent. The two branches of the "Rio de Canada" or St. Lawrence River are made to take their rise in one large inland lake. Two rivers are shown leading southward from this lake to the Gulf of Mexico, both emptying into Espiritu Santo Bay, also called, according to Echagaray, "Misipipi." Echagaray said that La Salle had probably reached the great interior body of water, had discovered the channel of one of the rivers flowing toward the south, and, following its course, had inevitably emerged in the Gulf at Espiritu Santo Bay. If the French had settled in that region, he said, it was readily apparent that they would soon make themselves masters of the whole Gulf of Mexico, and destroy the commerce of the Indies.²¹

This supposedly expert advice was to be the only direct benefit resulting from Echagaray's ambitious scheme. The pilot's peniless condition made it clear that nothing further was to be expected from his efforts, and that any measures taken to clear up the question of the French colony would have to be carried out by the crown itself. Although Echagaray made further efforts to raise money for his undertaking, he met with failure, and soon fell back into the obscurity that had enveloped him before he made his proposals to the king.²² His opinion in regard to the menacing location of the French colony at Espiritu Santo Bay, however, served to confirm the conclusions of the royal officials, and it was decided that no chances should be taken in the matter, but that reinforcements should be sent to New

²¹Report of Echagaray, accompanied by his map, dated April 20, 1686, 3 pp.; Echagaray to Oreytia, April 22, 1686, 3 pp.; Oreytia to Otálora, April 9 and 22, 1686, (all in México, 61-6-20).

²²The latter history of Echagaray is not known to the writer. One reference has been found to him, however, a few years later. On the margin of a report of the Council of the Indies recommending Echagaray for the rank of *capitán de mar y guerra* for the duration of his voyage, there is an annotation, which reads as follows: "This captain went to Cadiz, and up to this time, Sept. 6, 1691, he has not taken out the patent; it is not known whether he is dead or alive (Consulta of Aug. 23, 1685, Indiferente General, 147-5-28).

Spain, as had been suggested, to drive out the foreign intruders. This action might be taken, it was pointed out, without violating the terms of the truce of Ratisbon, for the French had no rights whatever in territory that belonged to the king of Spain.²³

No reasons having been found to alter the plans recommended by the Junta de Guerra as embodied in its formal report of April 8, the king duly adopted the suggestions made, and issued orders to send the proposed reinforcements to New Spain. Formal instructions were drawn up for the new viceroy, Monclova, on June 25. Upon arriving at Vera Cruz he was to consult with the pilots who had been sent out to reconnoiter the Gulf coast, and in view of their report was to take immediate steps to expel the French, building a fort at Espíritu Santo if such action seemed necessary.²⁴

In the meantime, while the foregoing measures had been under discussion, the controversy with France over the restitution of the five hundred thousand pesos had reached an acute stage. The offer of the Spanish government to compromise the difficulty by the payment of half the value of the confiscated goods had been rejected by Louis XIV, and a powerful fleet had been despatched to Cadiz. This fleet, the French ambassador declared, would be kept before Cadiz until the money was paid, and until French merchants were admitted to the same privileges in regard to Spanish colonial trade as those enjoyed by the English and the Dutch. Spain was in a practical state of blockade, and once more was forced to bow before the demands of the French monarch. A satisfactory agreement was reached in May, and a promise was given by the French ambassador that the fleet would be withdrawn. In spite of this adjustment of the difficulty, the French still maintained their threatening attitude, and the Spanish government decided to suspend the sailing of the regular fleet for that year. Instead only three vessels were made ready to bear the new viceroy to his post, and to carry

²³Juan Cruzado de la Cruz, pilot-major of Seville, to Oreytia, April 20, 1686, 2 pp. (México, 61-6-20).

²⁴The king to the Count of Monclova, June 25, 1686 (Indiferente General, 140-2-S, 5 pp.); Monclova to the king, Dec. 30, 1686 (México, 61-6-20).

the quicksilver indispensable for the operation of the mines of New Spain. Two of these vessels were frigates, and their ostensible purpose was to serve as convoys for the unarmed sloop. Their real mission, however, was to reinforce the armada which the Count of Monclova was instructed to send forth against La Salle's colony at Espíritu Santo Bay.²⁵

²⁵Copia de memoria q. D. Pedro Ronquillo presentó al Rey Británico dandole cuenta de lo q. ha pasado en orden al ajustamto, de los 500,000 pesos del indulto, etc., June 30, 1686 (Archivo de Simancas, Legajo 3961); Consulta of the Council of State, April 26, 1686 (*ibid.*); consulta of the Junta de Guerra, June 18, 1686 (A. G. I., México, 61-6-20).

CHAPTER III

SPANISH DIPLOMACY IN ENGLAND, 1686

Having adopted the only measures of defense which the meager resources of the monarchy permitted, Spain next resorted to diplomacy in an effort to frustrate the newly-revealed designs of Louis XIV in America. In her extremity, it was to England and the Catholic James II that she turned for aid.

As long as the mercenary Charles II had remained on the English throne, Louis XIV had succeeded in keeping England aloof from the growing European opposition to his aggressive policy. The accession of James had seemed to offer no obstacle to the continued predominance of French influence. The change of monarchs, however, had brought a ray of hope to Spain, for it was believed that the religious beliefs of the new king would cause him to regard with favor the nation which had always stood as the greatest champion of Catholicism. The Spanish ambassador to England, Pedro Ronquillo, had therefore been instructed to cultivate the friendship of the king, and assure him of Spain's close alliance and support.¹

At the beginning of his reign James had shown a marked determination to be independent of France, and had manifested a very favorable attitude toward Spain.² Throughout the course of the controversy over the 500,000 pesos' worth of confiscated goods, he had condemned the aggressive methods of the French,

¹Consulta of the Council of State, March 20, 1686 (Archivo de Simancas, Legajo 3960).

²Ambassador Ronquillo reported a number of incidents to show the independent attitude of James. He said the story was told that Louis had sent an envoy to warn the English king that, if he (James) did not accept the friendship that was offered him, great sums of money would be spent in stirring up trouble in England. James was reported to have stopped the speech of the envoy, telling him that he feared no one. The refusal of James to give the French ambassador precedence at the coronation ceremonies was regarded by Ronquillo as another indication of the waning French influence (Ronquillo to the king, April 2, 1685, *ibid.*).

and had used his influence with Louis XIV to dissuade the latter from attempting to execute further designs at the expense and humiliation of Spain.³ Ronquillo had apparently succeeded in securing a considerable degree of intimacy with James, and the latter had assumed the pose of a staunch friend of the Spanish sovereign. Upon one occasion, Ronquillo reported, the king became almost angry at the idea that any one should suspect him of being capable of doing anything to injure the interests of Spain.⁴

In spite of the friendly attitude which James had manifested toward Spain, the Spanish government was extremely uneasy lest the continued intrigues of the French monarch and the influence of some of the English ministers might cause a change in his policy.⁵ The beginning of negotiations between England and France for a treaty which concerned their respective possessions in America increased the anxiety of the Spanish court. In January, 1686, Ronquillo had reported the prolonged stay in England of the first intendant of marine of France, M. de Bonrepans, and had expressed his fear that Bonrepans's mission was to try to disturb the good relations of England and Spain. Although, Ronquillo said, he had been assured that the sole motive of the intendant's visit was to secure some agreement in regard to the commerce of the French and English colonies in America, he had learned that the proposed treaty was intended to insure peace between the two countries in America even though they might be at war in Europe. Ronquillo feared that the negotiations forebode some aggressive move by the French in America.⁶ This treaty had been made the subject of several audiences between Ronquillo and the king of England. James had assured the ambassador that England had no alliance with France; that the proposed treaty dealt only with boundaries in America, peace between their colonies there, and adjustment of disputes in colonial trade. It contained nothing

³Consulta of the Council of State, Aug. 12, 1686 (Simancas, Legajo 3961).

⁴Consulta of the Council of State, April 30, 1686, *ibid.*

⁵Ronquillo to the king, Jan. 21, 1686, *ibid.*

⁶*Ibid.*

whatever, he said, detrimental to the interests of Spain.⁷ In spite of repeated assurances to this effect, the Spanish government still feared that the treaty was merely a cloak to hide the designs of the French upon Spain's colonies, and believed that its real object was to insure the neutrality of England, leaving Louis XIV unhampered in his plans of aggression in America. Such were the general relations between Spain and England in the spring of 1686, when the Spanish court turned to James II in its endeavor to stem the tide of French encroachment revealed by the news of the founding of La Salle's colony at Espíritu Santo Bay.

On May 24, 1686, a dispatch was drawn up for Ronquillo, notifying him officially of the occupation of Espíritu Santo by the French. He was instructed to complain to the English king of this new act of violence on the part of France, and at the same time to protest once more against the conclusion of the so-called treaty of commerce, which the Spaniards believed was designed to insure the success of such an invasion as had just been reported from Mexico.⁸

Before these instructions reached England, Ronquillo had already received independent advices from America, which confirmed his opinion that the French were planning some move in that quarter. His information came from one Mateo Guarín, an adventurous privateer in the service of Spain, who had been made a prisoner in Jamaica. Guarín had forwarded to Ronquillo certain intercepted correspondence intended for the French governor of Tortuga and Santo Domingo. These documents revealed a plan for the conquest of the whole island of Santo Domingo. They consisted of letters from Seignelay, the French minister of marine, to Governor De Cussy, and of other private correspondence. In the official dispatches of Seignelay, De Cussy was notified of the king's desire that the French corsairs should cease their attacks upon the Spanish fleets and galleons. Their depredations, the minister explained, reacted

⁷Ronquillo to the king, April 15, 1686; consultas of the Council of State, April 30 and May 16, 1686 (Archivo de Simancas, Legajo 3961).

⁸Ronquillo to the king, June 24, 1686, summarizing royal order of May 24, p. 12 (México, 61-6-20).

severely upon the interests of French merchants, and must be stopped. If they could be controlled in no other way, De Cussy was to mobilize them for the conquest of the Spanish settlements in Santo Domingo. To this end he was ordered to send in a report of Spanish defences, and the number of men that could be raised for such an invasion. No definite action was to be taken, however, until further orders should be sent from France, and a commander-in-chief appointed to direct the operations. The king was unwilling for anything to be done just at that time in contravention to the terms of the truce of Ratisbon.⁹

Ronquillo lost no time in acquainting James with the receipt of this alarming intelligence, and furnished him with an extract of the correspondence sent by Guarín. The king read the extract in Ronquillo's presence with great interest, and then asked the ambassador if he believed the report to be true. Ronquillo quietly replied that the extract had been made from the intercepted correspondence of the French government itself. At this statement, the king's eyes took on fire, and he told Ronquillo that the integrity of the Spanish possessions in America was just as vital to the interests of England as to those of Spain herself. If the French should gain possession of the whole island of Santo Domingo, he said, the safety of the fleets would be endangered, and commerce ruined. Ronquillo took advantage of this opening to refer once more to the treaty of commerce then being negotiated. Although, he observed, the king of Spain would of course believe the king of England when the latter declared that the treaty contained no provisions injurious to the interests of Spain, it was nevertheless impossible not to be affected by the general suspicion that it harbored some hidden design on the part of the French. If the treaty really dealt with nothing more than matters of trade and the adjustment of boundaries in America, it should be made public, if for no other reason than to quiet the anxieties of those merchants whose interests were involved in the matter. The king hesitated for an instant at these remarks, and then replied that there was nothing more to the treaty than he had already stated, but that

⁹Translated copies of this correspondence may be found in *Testimo de los Autos, y diligencias fechas*, pp. 122-127 (México, 61-6-20).

the negotiations were not far enough advanced to warrant any public announcement being made. Ronquillo need have no fear, he said, that the treaty would favor any designs of the French in America, for any advance by Louis XIV in that quarter would be the signal for an immediate declaration of war. James then read again, in very bad humor, the extract concerning Santo Domingo, and said to Ronquillo:

I am going to church now. Understand, and write thus to my nephew, that I shall never be willing for the king of France to possess anything more in America than he has today; and tell him, for the love of God, to try to raise forces enough to compel the king of France to keep his promises. You see that I am trying to do the same thing, as well as to quiet my dominions. I realize how greatly I am hindered by the continual intrigues of the French, but it is necessary to make every effort to overcome such difficulties.¹⁰

Shortly after this audience, which was held early in June, Ronquillo received the official dispatches from Spain notifying him of the French occupation of Espíritu Santo Bay. Ronquillo seemed to have some doubt as to the truth of the report, for he evidently shared the generally prevalent opinion in regard to the impracticability of La Salle's schemes. He also believed that La Salle had returned to America by way of Canada, and planned to reach Louisiana from the north. On June 24 Ronquillo wrote his government that he had been unable to secure any confirmation of the report that the French had occupied the "Island" of Espíritu Santo, although he himself had foreseen, he said, that La Salle's exploration on the Mississippi, or Seignelay, River would eventually reach that region. According to the available French accounts of his activities, reaching up to 1682, it appeared that La Salle had advanced a distance of five

¹⁰Ronquillo to the king, June 10, 1686, pp. 6-10 (México, 61-6-20), enclosing copy of the extract concerning Santo Domingo; consulta of the Junta de Guerra, Aug. 9, 1686, 4 pp. (*ibid.*).

Ambassador Ronquillo was sorely embarrassed at this time by lack of funds, and sent in every letter to his government a constant appeal for money. In the letter of June 10 he said that, if the amount he had asked for did not arrive soon, he would be forced to abandon the court, and would find difficulty in maintaining himself even in the meanest village in England.

hundred leagues, but much of the journey had been possible only in small boats, which had to be carried over portages at frequent intervals. When La Salle had left Paris, Ronquillo said, a year and a half before, it was reported that the frigate in which he had embarked had left him at the port of Montreal, the most advanced outpost of the French settlements in Canada. From Montreal to Espiritu Santo, it was believed that the seas were very dangerous, and that the rivers were navigable only in small boats. There seemed little to be feared, therefore, from his activities. Since the "Island" of Espiritu Santo was such an important place, however, Ronquillo suggested that all details concerning its occupation should be sent to him, so that he might be in a better position to prove to the English king that the treaty with France was very undesirable, and that the activities of La Salle were useless to the French and of no danger to the dominions of Spain.¹¹ These statements of the Spanish ambassador throw much light upon the indifferent attitude of Spain toward La Salle and his schemes before the real nature of his enterprise was known. They show how successful La Salle had been in concealing his plans from the outside world. They also explain to a great extent the failure of Ronquillo to share the anxiety of his government in the matter, although he was to spare no efforts to carry out the instructions that had been sent him to enlist the aid of England against the French.

On June 30 Ronquillo presented a memorial to the king of England, formally notifying the latter of the news that had been received in Spain in regard to the seizure of Espiritu Santo Bay. He asked for the support of England against this new proof of French perfidy, and stated that he was instructed to transmit the reply of the king to his sovereign without delay.¹² A few days later he obtained a personal interview with James. In emphatic terms Ronquillo pointed out the danger that would fol-

¹¹Ronquillo to the king, June 24, 1686, pp. 12-14 (México, 61-6-20). Ronquillo's request for fuller information was granted. On August 9 the Junta de Guerra ordered an extract of all documents relating to La Salle's colony to be sent to Ronquillo (México, 61-6-20).

¹²Copia de memoria q. D. Pedro Ronquillo presentó al Rey Británico, June 30, 1686 (Simancas, Legajo 3961).

low from the occupation by France of such a strategic region as Espíritu Santo. The French would be in a position to threaten not only all of New Spain, but the English possessions in America as well. The king apparently was much impressed by Ronquillo's arguments. The conversation was then brought around to the inevitable subject of the treaty between England and France. The ambassador endeavored once more to show the king that the treaty was merely an artifice on the part of France to further her schemes in America, as she would doubtless maintain that it covered all of her possessions on that continent, whether justly or unjustly acquired. Ronquillo then went into a lengthy discussion of Spain's attitude toward foreign nations in America. The king well knew, the ambassador said, that all territory possessed by foreign monarchs in America had been acquired by virtue of treaties made with the king of Spain. Anything not covered by such treaties was a usurpation.¹³ If some nation should effect the discovery of regions yet unknown, there might be some grounds for alleging a claim to them.¹⁴ But to

¹³Spain had recognized the legality of the English possessions in America by the treaty of 1670.

¹⁴The Council of the Indies later took serious exception to this statement by Ronquillo. It thought that the words were very injudicious, for according to the papal bull of Alexander VI issued in 1493, it said, all lands west of the line of demarcation had been ceded to the Spanish crown. The French king had no right to enter any territory in America under any pretext whatsoever. No treaty had been made with him, as had been done with the English king in 1670, and his subjects were even forbidden to trade in the Indies. The Council thought that Ronquillo should be notified of the error he had made, and should be instructed to correct any wrong impression that he might have given to the king of England. A copy of the papal bull and an extract of Ponce de León's discoveries in Florida were sent to Ronquillo as evidence of Spain's rights in America and in the region of Florida (which included Espíritu Santo Bay). The Council thought that the bull would have some weight with James, in view of his Catholic faith. (Consulta of the Council of the Indies, Sept. 16, 1686, México, 61-6-20; Cópia de consulta hecha por el Consejo de Indias de 22 de Sepre. de 1686, Simancas, Legajo 3961; Consulta of the Council of State, Oct. 22, 1686, *ibid.*) In this connection, Ronquillo replied on December 9 that there must have been some mistake in his cipher message, as he fully understood the provisions of the papal bull (Ronquillo to the king, Dec. 9, 1686, México, 61-6-20, 3 pp.)

put forth a claim to a region that bordered directly upon Spain's settled territory, and which belonged to Spain by all just rights, even though its occupation had been deferred because of more pressing matters—such a claim, Ronquillo asserted, was entirely contrary to justice and reason. The French claim to Espiritu Santo Bay, he continued, had no justification whatever. That region had been explored repeatedly by Spanish subjects, and could not be claimed by any foreign nation on the pretext of discovery by its own subjects or of abandonment by Spain. In the light of these facts, Ronquillo concluded, the English king would be better able to perceive that the purpose of the French in making the proposed treaty with England was merely to insure the latter's neutrality in America, for the chief regions included in the negotiations were New France, New England, and Louisiana.¹⁵

After listening attentively to the ambassador's remarks, the king made his reply. In regard to the rights of Spain in America, he said, he fully agreed with Ronquillo. As far as the treaty with France was concerned, there was no cause for alarm. It was not yet concluded or signed. Nothing had been done except to agree in a general way that it would be a good thing to adjust the commercial interests of the French and English colonies. The king said that he would take especial care to protect the interests of Spain and that, before he would agree to any provision in the treaty, he would exact a promise from the king of France to refrain from any measures that would prejudice Spanish rights in America. The interests of England and Spain, he said, were identical on that point. Ronquillo, having instructions to prevent the signing of the treaty by all possible means, pressed the matter still further, but the king merely repeated his previous assurances that Spain had nothing to fear from the negotiations. In Ronquillo's report to his government, made on July 8, he expressed the hope that his conversation with the king, even if it did not prevent the signing of the treaty, would at least cause it to be confined to the territory that France already occupied in America, and would exclude that which might be acquired at a later time.¹⁶

¹⁵Ronquillo to the king, July 8, 1686, pp. 5-8 (México, 61-6-20).

¹⁶*Ibid.*

Although Ronquillo failed to gain his point in reference to the treaty, his efforts to induce James to use his influence to prevent the French from encroaching further upon the Spanish colonies were apparently to bear fruit.¹⁷ The ambassador evidently had difficulty, however, in convincing the king of the seriousness of La Salle's reported settlement. He reported on July 22 that the king had said, although he realized the importance of Espíritu Santo Bay, he did not believe that the French had occupied it; that even if they had done so, their meager forces could easily be expelled. Ronquillo took this as a hint that it was necessary to drive out the French by force of arms, and the Council of State, in commenting upon the matter some weeks later, said that it would be well to remember the king of England's remark in case an excuse were needed to justify the vigorous measures that had been authorized to dispose of La Salle's settlement.¹⁸ In spite of the king's belief that La Salle's activities were sure to result in failure, he apparently made good his promise to warn Louis XIV against any attempt to extend his possessions in America at the expense of Spain, especially where Santo Domingo was concerned, and it was said that the French king had agreed to make no further move in that direction.¹⁹ This exchange of royal notes, if actually made,

¹⁷The treaty was signed in December. On December 23, 1686, Ronquillo wrote to the king, enclosing a copy of the treaty. As he had feared, it contained several provisions which were objectionable to Spain. He suggested that the only way to remedy these matters was to make another treaty with England covering the points in question (Ronquillo to the king, Dec. 23, 1686, cited in consulta of the Council of State, Jan. 21, 1687, Archivo de Simancas, Leg. 3962). The Council of the Indies thought that the treaty was very prejudicial to Spain, and contrary to the treaty made between Spain and England in June, 1680. Articles two and seven of this treaty obligated England to aid Spain in case of war, not only in Europe, but also in America. Ronquillo was instructed to notify James II of the dissatisfaction of Spain in the matter, and to proceed at once to negotiate another treaty which would dispose of the question of England's neutrality in regard to America. The Council of State supported the recommendations of the Council of the Indies in their entirety (Council of State, Aug. 16, 1687, *ibid.*).

¹⁸Consulta of the Council of State, August 12, 1686, enclosing Ronquillo's letter of July 22 (Simancas, Legajo 3961).

¹⁹Ronquillo to the king, Aug. 19, 1686, 2 pp. (México, 61-6-20).

may have had much influence upon the attitude of Louis XIV toward La Salle's enterprise, and may explain in part the failure to extend any further aid to the unfortunate colonists. There seems to be no good reason to doubt Ronquillo's claim that his diplomaey had been successful, and that the real safeguard against further French encroachments for the time being had been found, as Spain had hoped, at the court of the English monarch.

Ronquillo continued to be active in securing all possible light on La Salle's expedition. On July 6 he had sent to Spain a copy of a relation which told of La Salle's early activities in America, his return to France, and his departure for the Mississippi in 1684. On August 19 he forwarded another account, which described La Salle's misfortunes up to the time of Beaujeu's return to France. From this latter document, Ronquillo said, one could easily perceive the little hope that was entertained in France for the success of La Salle. It led him to believe more firmly than ever in the reports current in England to the effect that La Salle had not occupied Espíritu Santo Bay, and in the assurances that had been given by the king of France that no further aggressions would be made against the Spanish colonies. La Salle's enterprise, Ronquillo said, had already cost Louis XIV more than the discovery of America had cost Ferdinand and Isabella, and he believed that the French monarch had no desire to invest further in the scheme.²⁰ In December Ronquillo secured still another relation concerning La Salle's activities, together with a map showing his explorations and last voyage. In February, 1687 he forwarded to the viceroy of New Spain a copy of an official French relation which told of La Salle's vicissitudes on the Texas coast. It was to reach Mexico in good time to throw needed light upon the French colony. All of these additional sources of information seemed to corroborate the oft-expressed assurance of the king of England that La Salle

²⁰Ronquillo to the king, Aug. 19, 1686, 2 pp.; Ronquillo to the king, Oct. 28, 1686, 2 pp.; *Copia de relacion hecha al Rei Xpmo tocante a la Bahia del Spiritu ssto, etc.*, which is probably the same relation that was sent to Spain on August 19 (all in México, 61-6-20).

had met with disaster, and that nothing further was to be apprehended from his colony.²¹

In spite of the reassuring reports sent by Ronquillo from England, the Spanish government was not at ease as long as the slightest doubt remained in regard to the fate of La Salle and his followers. Indeed, further rumors that were received from America from time to time, confirmed the fact of the continued existence of his colony. Spain, therefore, took no chances in the matter. Repeated orders were sent to the officials of New Spain during the ensuing three years to spare no efforts to find the site of the French settlement and exterminate the invaders. This anxiety on the part of the king was to cause a revival of Spanish activities in America that had been unparalleled since the wrath of Philip II was visited upon the Huguenot colonists of Florida. As a result, no fewer than eleven distinct expeditions were to be sent out from Mexico and Florida to locate the elusive settlement on Espíritu Santo Bay. It will be the purpose of the following chapter to trace in some detail the course of these expeditions, which were to effect the re-discovery of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, and of the greater portion of the vast territory that lay between the Spanish settlements in Florida and those in New Mexico.

²¹Ronquillo to the king, Dec. 9, 1686, 3 pp.; same to same, Jan. 20, 1687, 1 p.; Copla de relacion hecha al Rei Xpmo tocante a la Bahia del Spiritu sscto, que remitió el Sor D. Pedro Ronquillo . . . al Conde de la Monclova, etc. (México, 61-6-20).

CHAPTER IV.

THE SPANISH SEARCH FOR LA SALLE'S COLONY,
1685-1687¹

The first maritime expedition.—Before the Count of Monclova arrived in Mexico, bringing reinforcements and the direct authorization of the king for the expulsion of the French from Espíritu Santo Bay, the viceroy of New Spain, as will be remembered, had already begun the search by land and sea for La Salle's settlement.² The pilots, Juan Enríquez Barreto and Antonio Romero, who had been chosen to reconnoiter the Gulf coast, left Vera Cruz on November 21, 1685, with orders from the viceroy to the authorities at Havana for the equipping of a vessel for their voyage. They arrived at Havana on December 3, and steps were immediately taken by Andrés de Mmibe, acting military governor, to carry out the viceroy's instructions. As no royal vessel was available, it was found necessary to charter a private ship. After an inspection of all of the shipping in the harbor, a frigate with the lengthy name of "Nuestra Señora de la Concepción y San Joseph" was selected as being most suitable for the proposed voyage. It was not in seaworthy condition, however, and a delay of several weeks ensued while the necessary repairs were being made. Provisions were taken on board for ninety days, several additional cannon were se-

¹The substance of this chapter and the following one were published in the *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, xix, 323-369, under the title, "The Spanish Search for La Salle's Colony on the Bay of Espíritu Santo, 1685-1689." Considerable revision has been made in them since that publication. Previous to that article, very little had appeared in print on the events here related. Bancroft, in his *North Mexican States and Texas*, Vol. I, devotes less than a page to the search for La Salle, and his brief account is almost wholly incorrect. Clark's *Beginnings of Texas*, hitherto the most exhaustive study published in this field, adds little to Bancroft, and repeats most of the latter's errors. Fragmentary and inaccurate accounts of the maritime expeditions are given in Barcia, *Ensayo Cronológico de la Florida: Decada 18*; and Cavo, *Los Tres Siglos*, ii, 70-73.

²*Supra*, p. 38.

cured, and a canoe was purchased, to be used in examining shallow places along the coast. The governor furnished a crew of forty-two men, but this number was swelled to fifty-two by the voluntary enlistment of a number of adventurous characters, who offered to accompany the expedition without pay. Among these patriots was a well-known pilot, named Juan Jordan de Reina, who some years later was to play a prominent part in the establishment of the presidio of San Carlos de Austria on Pensacola Bay. He kept a diary of the voyage, which up to the present time is the only one that has been brought to light.³

It was no ordinary voyage upon which Barroto and Romero were about to embark. The readiness of private individuals to enlist without remuneration is sufficient proof of this fact. For more than a century the Gulf coast between Tampico and Apalache had been practically unfrequented by the Spaniards, and the little information that had once been possessed concerning it had long since been forgotten. Within that unknown gap lay the prospect of a sturdy fight with a foreign foe, and perhaps rich booty for those who dared search for it. Everything finally being in readiness, the vessel set sail on January 3, 1686. Detailed instructions had been drawn up by Admiral Palacios for the guidance of the pilots. They were ordered to proceed first to Apalache, where native pilots should be secured. Every indentation in the coast west of Apalache should be carefully examined, sounding should be made, and the position of the vessel noted at frequent intervals. Upon reaching the Apalachicola River, they were to question the Indians in regard to a settlement of white men at the mouth of the Mississippi River, on Espíritu Santo Bay. As the Apalachicola was supposed to be only about forty leagues from this bay, great caution should be exercised after passing that river. They should proceed only at night, seeking the shelter of the land by day, in order to escape observation, as well as to question the natives concerning the French. Care should be taken to arrive at Espíritu Santo

³The complete autos concerning the preparations for the voyage, both in Vera Cruz and in Havana, are contained in *Testimo de los Autos, y diligencias fechas*, pp. 77-105 (México, 61-6-20). In them the most minute details are preserved.

Bay under cover of darkness. Drawings should be made of the topography of the region, and every useful detail noted for the benefit of the attacking squadron that was to follow. The usual diary was ordered to be kept of each day's occurrences.*

These instructions were adhered to as closely as possible. On January 17 the vessel was anchored in Apalache Bay, the passage having been delayed by stormy weather. A few days later the acting lieutenant-governor of that region visited the ship. He warned the pilots not to place any confidence in the Indians at Apalachicola, as the latter had been angered by the recent action of the governor in driving out a number of English adventurers, who had been trading in that region. Two native pilots, said to be familiar with the coast, were taken on board, and on January 30 the voyage was continued. The Apalachicola River was soon reached, but a convenient squall prevented the explorers from entering the river, and treating with the hostile inhabitants. On February 6 a bay was reached which was described by our diarist, Juan Jordan, as "the best bay I have ever seen in my life." This was the broad expanse of water known as Pensacola Bay. Its re-discovery by Barroto and Romero was to cause a revival of interest in this bay, which was eventually to result in its occupation by Spain. Here the pilots made their first attempt to obtain information from the Indians. A visit was made to the village of the Panzacolas, who received the Spaniards with great friendliness. In reply to the inquiries made, the Indians said that they knew of no settlement of white men in that region, although a large ship had entered the harbor for a short time in the previous year. They complained of the war that was being waged upon them by the Mobilas, and warned the Spaniards to be on their guard when reaching the territory of those Indians.

On February 8 leave was taken of the Panzacolas. Two days later Mobile Bay was reached. It was found to be very capacious, but shallow and unsuitable for the navigation of large vessels. Here the expedition seems to have remained for several weeks, but no details of the sojourn are available. On

*Instrucción y derrota que han de observar y guardar Juan Enríquez Barroto y Antonio Romero, Nov. 13, 1685 (*ibid.*, 40-43).

March 4 a large river was discovered, but it could not be entered on account of the great quantity of trees and driftwood which choked its mouth. It was called the Río de la Palizada for this reason. A prominent landmark in the vicinity was christened Cabo de Lodo (Mud Cape). Little did the explorers realize that they had discovered the river for which they were seeking, but such was the case. They were now at the mouth of the Mississippi River. Their failure to recognize it as such, however, is not surprising. That great stream was supposed to empty into the excellent harbor of Espíritu Santo Bay; but no bay was to be seen, and a river whose channel was obstructed by debris was not imagined to be the one which La Salle would have chosen as the site of his settlement. Thus the Mississippi, or the Palizada, as it was thenceforth to be known to the Spaniards for many years, was passed by as unworthy of examination. Just at this point, moreover, further exploration was interrupted by a severe storm, which drove the vessel out into the Gulf as far south as latitude twenty-two degrees. As food was running low, it was thought unwise to attempt to return to the Río de la Palizada to continue the search, and the ship was accordingly directed toward Vera Cruz, where it arrived on March 13. Seventy days had elapsed since the departure from Havana. A large portion of the Gulf coast had been re-discovered, but in all of the distance traversed, no trace had been found of the French settlement and Espíritu Santo Bay.⁵

Although the voyage had failed to accomplish its object, Barroto and Romero were exonerated of any neglect of duty by Admiral Palacios, who assured the viceroy that they had followed their instructions, and had done all that was possible under the circumstances. In his report to the viceroy, Palacios stated that he believed that the expedition had approached very close

⁵The foregoing account is based chiefly on the diary of Juan Jordan de Reina, dated March 16, 1686, and addressed to Governor Munibe of Havana (México, 61-6-20, 10 pp.). The official diary kept by Barroto has not been found, although it is known that he kept one. General accounts of the voyage are given in letters of the viceroy and of Palacios to the king, dated April 3 and Sept. 6, 1686, respectively (*ibid.*).

to the French colony, for if the voyage had not been interrupted, the Mississippi River and Espíritu Santo Bay would doubtless have been reached some thirty leagues west of the Rio de la Palizada (!) He thought it advisable, therefore, to send out another expedition to complete the exploration of the Gulf coast. As it was very difficult for ordinary vessels to navigate the shallow waters along the coast, he recommended that special boats, equipped with sails and oars, should be constructed for the next attempt.⁶

These suggestions of Palacios were favorably reported by the *factor* and the *fiscal*.⁷ In the meantime, however, the whole situation had been changed by the arrival of the king's *cédula* of August 2, 1685, announcing the acceptance of Echagaray's proposal to explore the Gulf coast, and asking again for the long-delayed report on the provinces of Quivira and Teguayo.⁸ The *cédula* reached México early in February. Incorporated with it, as has been seen, was the earlier order of 1678, which had first given warning of Peñalosa's activities in France. A copy of Benavides's memorial was also enclosed for the information of the colonial officials. The facts brought out by these documents from Spain seemed to furnish further corroboration of the recent revelations made by the pirates at Vera Cruz. It was naturally assumed that La Salle's settlement at Espíritu Santo was merely the logical culmination of the designs of Peñalosa.⁹ The news that the king had asked for information concerning the region of Quivira and Teguayo soon became known, and it was to call forth the famous report of Father Alonso de Posadas, a high dignitary of the Franciscan order then living in the capital. Posadas had formerly served as missionary in New Mexico for many years, having been in that province during Peñalosa's term of office. He was therefore

⁶Palacios to the viceroy, March 15, 1686, in Testimonio de los Autos, y diligencias fechas, 161-162 (México, 61-6-20).

⁷Informe de Sebastián de Guzman y Córdova, March 21, 1686, *ibid.*, 162-164; respuesta fiscal, March 26, 1686, *ibid.*, 164-168.

⁸*Supra*, p. 29.

⁹Proof of this statement is furnished by a study of the general tenor of the documentary sources, and especially by the opening paragraphs of Father Posadas's report mentioned above.

well qualified to draw up the memorial which he presented to the viceroy. In this well-written document he gave an account of the nature and extent of the kingdoms of Quivira, Teguayo, and Texas, of the Indian tribes that inhabited those regions, and of efforts that had been made from time to time to penetrate to their territory. While necessarily vague in many respects, the report furnished the best description that had yet been written of the unoccupied region lying to the north and east of the settled areas of New Spain, just as it is today one of the most important sources available for the early history of the south-western portion of the United States. It was of great value to the viceregal officials in their deliberations concerning the unknown northern country.¹⁰

In order to settle the various questions that had been raised by the arrival of the royal *cédulas*, as well as to take some action in regard to the proposal of Palacios for another exploration of the Gulf coast, a junta general was called for March 28. After a careful consideration of the voluminous documents that had accumulated, the junta decided that, in view of the fact that the king had made arrangements with Echagaray for the exploration of Espíritu Santo Bay, no further action should be taken toward a second maritime expedition until a report could be received from the governor of Florida in regard to the status of Echagaray's enterprise. Should it be necessary to complete the exploration of the Gulf coast without delay, the junta suggested, the windward squadron, if not otherwise engaged, might be given instructions to make a cruise for that purpose. By this means it might be possible to locate and destroy the French settlement, and avoid the costly expedition proposed by Palacios. The junta, in obedience to the second part of the royal *cédula*, also recommended that further efforts be made to secure additional information concerning the provinces of Quivira and Teguayo along the lines of Father Posadas's report.¹¹

¹⁰A transcript of the Posadas memorial is in the collection of the University of Texas, copied from Historia, Vol. III, Archivo General y Público, México, D. F. A copy is also to be found in A. G. I., Papeles de Estado, Guadalajara, Legajo 1.

¹¹Junta general, March 28, 1686, in Testimo de los Autos, y diligencias fechas, 1688-174; the viceroy to the king, April 3, 1686, 8 pp. (México 61-6-20).

All of the junta's recommendations were carried out, with the exception of the suggestion in regard to the windward squadron. The vessels of that fleet were not in a fit condition for the proposed cruise. A dispatch was sent to the governor of Florida on March 30, ordering him to report on the progress made by Echagaray. No further action was to be taken in regard to a second maritime expedition during the remainder of the term of Viceroy Laguna. Orders had already been issued, however, for searching expeditions by land, and an account of these journeys will now be given.¹²

The search from the northern frontier.—The first suggestion for an expedition by land to discover the French settlement came also from Admiral Palacios. He had felt from the first that it would be unwise to depend solely upon the voyage from Havana, and when his efforts to secure a competent leader for a supplementary expedition from Vera Cruz proved unsuccessful, he conceived the plan of sending out a searching party along the coast north of Tampico. His persistence finally bore fruit, and the viceroy, on November 19, 1685, ordered the au-

¹²Shortly after the events related Admiral Palacios returned to Spain. While in Cadiz he made a statement in which he told of the results of the voyage of Barroto and Romero, and reported the latest rumors from Havana regarding the French colony. The examination of Palacios was due to the suggestion of Ambassador Ronquillo. Ronquillo had sent copies of various journals of French explorations on the Mississippi River, including Marquette's journal, to the president of the Casa de la Contratación, asking him to examine the pilots from America in reference to La Salle's colony. Palacios summed up the results of the first maritime expedition in these words: "Today the whole coast of the Gulf of Mexico has been discovered and explored, with the exception of the strip from the mouth of the Rio de la Empalizada [sic] . . . to that of the Rio de Tampico. In this distance of about one hundred leagues lies the Bay of Espíritu Santo, and west of it, the Rio Bravo and other rivers which may form sand banks [as mentioned by Marquette]." Palacios told of an attack that had been made by pirates upon St. Augustine, but which had been repulsed. The leader of the pirates had confirmed the news of La Salle's settlement, declaring that it was located about forty leagues up the Mississippi River, and that it was strongly fortified. (Statement of Palacios, Sept. 6, 1686, remitted by Oreytia to the Council of the Indies with letter of Sept. 28, 1686 (México, 61-6-20.)

thorities at Vera Cruz to offer suggestions in regard to such an expedition.¹³

In obedience to this order, the group of officials at Vera Cruz, including Admiral Palacios, the governor, and the revenue officials of the crown, began to study the matter. They were unable to find any one at Vera Cruz sufficiently familiar with the northern coast to lead an expedition. In the course of their investigations, however, they learned that on the northern frontier certain salines had been discovered which were said to be situated on tributaries of rivers flowing into Espíritu Santo Bay, and that the town of Monterey, in the province of the Nuevo Reino de León, was reported to be only a few days' journey from this bay. They reported to the viceroy, therefore, that the logical person to undertake the exploration by land was the governor of Nuevo León.¹⁴ The suggestion was adopted by the viceroy, and on January 20, 1686, the governor of Nuevo León, the Marquis of San Miguel de Aguayo, was instructed to send out an expedition to search for the French. In order to aid the governor in his quest, orders were given to remit to Nuevo León the documents relating to the discovery of the salt deposits referred to by the officials at Vera Cruz, together with the instructions drawn up by Palacios for the voyage of Barroto and Romero. In this indirect fashion were the inhabitants of the distant province of Nuevo León to be enlisted in the search for La Salle's colony, thereby beginning a movement which was eventually to result in the colonization of the region known as Texas.¹⁵

The viceroy's dispatch was not to reach Nuevo León until the summer of 1686. In the meantime a proposal was made to seek the French by way of the El Paso region. It came from Captain Juan Domínguez de Mendoza, a noted soldier and explorer of New Mexico, who was then in México endeavoring to interest the authorities in a project for the occupation of new territory

¹³Palacios to the viceroy, Nov. 14, 1685, in *Testimo de los Autos, y diligencias fechas*, 48-50; decree of the viceroy, *ibid.*, 59-60.

¹⁴Auto de acuerdo, Dec. 3, 1685, *ibid.*, 61-63.

¹⁵Respuesta fiscal, Dec. 20, 1686, *ibid.*, 76; junta general, Jan. 20, 1686, *ibid.*, 77; auto de la junta de guerra en Monterey, June 11, 1686 (México, 61-6-20).

on the northern frontier. In 1684 Captain Domínguez, in company with Father Nicolás López, one of the founders of the missions of La Junta, at the junction of the Conchos and Rio Grande, had made an *entrada* into the Jumano country, on the plains of what is now western Texas. They had penetrated as far eastward as the "Nueces" River, probably the modern Concho of Texas, and had heard much of a great tribe of Indians known as the Texas, living a few days' journey beyond the Jumano. Both Domínguez and López were enthusiastic over the spiritual and temporal returns to be derived from an occupation of that region, and had gone to Mexico immediately after their expedition to promote the enterprise. Just at this time the northern country was in a critical condition on account of the great uprising of the pueblo Indians of New Mexico, who had forced the Spaniards to abandon that province in 1680. The petitions of López and Domínguez were coldly received by the viceregal authorities, who regarded their proposition as fantastic and inexpedient.¹⁶ The arrival of the king's *cédulas* of 1678 and 1685, and the consequent desire of the viceroy to learn more about the northern regions, afforded Domínguez an opportunity to renew his proposals, which he was now to couple with an offer to seek for the French.¹⁷ Some time in April, it seems, he drew up a memorial for the viceroy. Domínguez said that Peñalosa had not been mistaken in regard to the wealth of the "lands of the East and North," for he himself could testify to their richness. He believed that, if Peñalosa should carry out his plan of conquest, the king would not only lose the chance of adding a valuable territory to his dominions, but would also be threatened with the loss of the mines of Parral. Domínguez therefore offered to lead a force of two hundred men to discover the "Sea of the North," explore the kingdoms of Quivira and Texas, pacify the natives, build forts, and, finally, learn whether the French had actually established themselves in the

¹⁶Bolton, "The Spanish Occupation of Texas, 1519-1690," in the *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, xvi, pp. 20-23; "The Jumano Indians in Texas," *Texas State Historical Quarterly*, xv, pp. 71-74.

¹⁷Father Posadas had referred to Domínguez in his report as a man who could doubtless give much information concerning Quivira and the adjoining regions.

northern country as had been reported. As security for the fulfillment of his promise, he pledged his own head.¹⁸ This attempt on the part of Domínguez to further his own plans by appealing to the prevailing anxiety in regard to the French did not meet with success. The viceroy, beset by many problems of an urgent nature, manifested no interest in the occupation of the Jumano country or of the kingdom of the Texas. And as far as Domínguez's offer to find the French settlement was concerned, the authorities were evidently content to rely for the time being upon the results of the expedition that had been ordered made from Nuevo León.

The viceroy's order to the Marquis of Aguayo, together with the accompanying documents, did not reach Nuevo León until June 8, almost six months after the original decree had been issued.¹⁹ Due to some oversight, the instructions given to Barroto and Romero were not enclosed, but only the documents concerning the discovery of the salines. The latter dealt with an *asiento* that had been granted to Alonso de León, a prominent soldier and explorer of Nuevo León, for the opening up of certain salt deposits, which he had discovered on the Gulf coast north of Tampico.²⁰ They threw no light whatever on the location of Espíritu Santo Bay. As Governor Aguayo could find no one at Monterey who knew anything about the bay in question, he resolved to call a council of the leading settlers of the province to discuss the viceroy's order. Couriers were despatched to the neighboring *haciendas*, and on June 11 some twenty-five or thirty frontiersmen assembled in the "royal houses" at Monterey. Although most of the settlers were supposed to be familiar with the surrounding country through the frequent campaigns that had been made against the hostile Indians, it soon became clear that none of them knew anything about Espíritu Santo Bay. It was decided that the bay must

¹⁸Memorial de Juan Domínguez de Mendoza, no date, Guadalajara, 67-3-32, 5 pp. The memorial is printed in Fernández Duro's *Peñalosa*, pp. 74-77.

¹⁹The order was repeated on May 1 (Auto de la junta de guerra en Monterey, June 11, 1686 (México, 61-6-20)).

²⁰The *asiento* is given in Testimo de los Autos, y diligencias fechas, 64-74.

lie toward the north or northeast, in an unknown region, inhabited by fierce tribes of hostile Indians.²¹ The members of the council felt, however, that the danger from the French was too serious to admit of inaction, and they patriotically agreed to raise and equip a force of fifty men to make an expedition to the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. It was decided to assemble at the town of Cadereita on June 25, by which time the governor promised to name a competent leader. The route to be followed was also discussed. The expedition was to proceed directly to the junction of the Rio San Juan and the Rio Grande, and descend the latter river to the sea. In case the first expedition proved unsuccessful, it was agreed to make another attempt in October, when the autumn rains should be over.²²

The troops were reviewed by Aguayo at Cadereita on June 27. Alonso de León was appointed commander-in-chief. On the same day the expedition, numbering some seventy-five persons in all, set out on the march. A diary was kept by Captain León, showing the daily progress of the party. It proceeded first to the junction of the Rio San Juan and Rio Grande, and followed the latter river to the Gulf, as had been planned. Several days were spent in exploring the coast toward the south, but no signs of civilized habitations were seen. On July

²¹According to the records of the council, the Rio Grande had barely been crossed, at a point near the town of San Gregorio, thirty-five leagues from Monterey.

²²Auto de la junta de guerra en Monterey, June 11, 1686 (México, 61-6-20); "Un Autor Anónimo," in León's *Historia de León*, pp. 296-293 (reprinted in *Documentos para la Historia de México*, xxv, Genaro García, editor). The proceedings of the junta were sent to the viceroy with letter of June 15. The governor added that just after the council had adjourned, an Indian from a nearby hacienda had reported that a number of white men were living near the Rio Grande. Their settlement, the Indian said, was only ten day's journey from Monterey, and he promised to guide the Spaniards thither whenever they wished to go. Aguayo expressed the hope that he would soon be able to send definite information in regard to the French (Aguayo to the viceroy, June 15, 1686, 10 pp. (México, 61-6-20). These documents were forwarded to the king with letter of the viceroy, dated July 20, 1686.

18 the return trip was begun, and on the 27th Cadereita was reached again without incident of note.²³

The Marquis of Aguayo was sorely disappointed at the fruitless results of the expedition, and in the following February sent out another party under León to explore the Gulf coast north of the mouth of the Rio Grande. The Spaniards reached the Gulf coast, and followed it toward the north until further progress was barred by a great arm of the sea. They again returned to Nuevo León without a trace of the French settlement. Aguayo was forced to report to the viceroy that all of his diligence had been without avail.²⁴

The second plan of the viceregal government to locate La Salle's settlement had thus resulted in failure. But at the same time that the search from Nuevo León was in progress, efforts were also being made to find the French by way of Florida. This attempt will next be considered.

The search from Florida.—Although no definite instructions seem to have been given by the viceroy for a reconnoitering expedition from Florida, the governor of that province, Juan Marquez Cabrera, resolved to undertake one upon his own responsibility. The immediate incentive for his action came as a result of fresh confirmation of the reports concerning the existence of a French settlement in the Gulf region. In May, 1686, a force of French corsairs made an attack upon the presidio of St. Augustine. They were taken prisoners by the Spaniards, and forty-five of their number summarily executed, among them their leader, Nicolás Brigaut. Before being put to death, Brigaut made a "confession," in which he declared, among other things, that the French had really established a

²³Derrotero diario y demarcacion del viaje que yo, el General Alonso de Leon . . . hice al descubrimiento de la costa del Mar del Norte y boca del Rio Bravo, etc., (in *Historia de Nuevo León*, 297-310). Massanet's account of the route taken by the expedition is incorrect (Cf. Carta de Don Damian Manzanet á Don Carlos de Sigüenza, translated in the *Texas State Historical Quarterly*, ii, p. 281; reprinted in Bolton, *Spanish Exploration in the Southwest*, 353-354) Clark's *Beginnings of Texas* follows Massanet in this matter.

²⁴*Historia de Nuevo León*, 310-311; the viceroy to the king, Dec. 30, 1686 (México, 61-6-20).

fortified settlement on the Mississippi River, near Espíritu Santo Bay. The town, he said, was situated about forty leagues above the mouth of the river; was garrisoned by three hundred soldiers; and protected by twelve cannon and a coasting vessel of twelve guns. Brigaut's statement seemed to corroborate quite conclusively the declarations of the pirates who had been examined at Vera Cruz, and Cabrera decided to send out an expedition to search for the town that had been described.²⁵

This determination on the part of Cabrera was strengthened by the recent activities of the English colonists of Carolina among the Indians of Florida. Led by one "John Henry," said to be the founder of the settlement of "St. George," English traders had penetrated as far west as the Apalachicola River, and, according to Cabrera, were trying to reach Espíritu Santo Bay themselves. Two retaliatory raids had been made by the Spanish garrison at Apalache in the winter of 1685-1686, and the intruding traders had been forced to retire. Governor Cabrera believed that an exploring expedition toward the west would be useful, not only to effect the discovery of the French settlement, but also to strengthen the hold of Spain upon the unoccupied territory that lay between Florida and México, now threatened by the English as well as by the French. He also hoped to realize the old dream of opening up an overland route to the capital of New Spain, the distance to which he believed to be greatly exaggerated.²⁶

Preparations for the expedition were begun in June. Marcos Delgado, a veteran soldier of St. Augustine, well versed in the language of various Indian tribes, was selected as leader. He was given instructions to explore carefully all "provinces, lakes, rivers, and bays between Florida and México." He was warned to take especial precautions against falling into the hands of the French. In the event of such a misfortune, he was ordered

²⁵Cabrera to the viceroy, July 22, 1686, in the Delgado Expediente, p. 85 (México, 61-6-20); statement of Palacios, accompanying letter of Oreytia to Otálora, Sept. 28, 1686 (*ibid.*). *Supra*, page 65, note 12.

²⁶Cabrera to the viceroy, March 29, 1686, Delgado Expediente, 17-20; same to same, June 28, 1686, *ibid.*, 60-61; Cabrera to the king, Oct. 6, 1686, *ibid.*, 100-101.

to destroy all of his papers except a letter from Cabrera to the viceroy, representing the expedition to be merely an innocent exploring enterprise. This letter was written for the specific purpose of deceiving the French. Cabrera evidently had some hope of opening up an overland route to the city of Mexico, for he offered a liberal reward to any of the soldiers who would actually deliver the letter to the viceroy.²⁷

Up to this time, according to the available evidence, no official notification had been received in Florida of Echagaray's proposed exploration. Shortly after Delgado had departed for Apalache, however, in the early part of July, Governor Cabrera received the viceroy's dispatch of March 30, asking for a report on the progress made by Echagaray, and requesting any information that he (Cabrera) might have been able to acquire concerning the French. Cabrera replied that nothing had been heard of Echagaray, and that he had little confidence in the latter's ability to carry out his proposals. He then told of his own action in sending out Delgado, and expressed the hope that he would soon be able to report something definite in regard to the settlement of the French.²⁸

Delgado left Apalache, the starting point of his expedition, on August 28, with a force of thirteen soldiers and forty natives. A diary was kept of each day's journey, the details of which, although of much importance for the local history of Florida and Alabama, need not concern us here. The party traveled toward the northwest, through an unknown country, being compelled to blaze a trail before them. After passing through several Indian villages, and receiving their submission, on September 17 they reached Miculasa, the first town of the Tabasa²⁹ tribe, more than one hundred leagues from Apalache. They were well received by the cacique, and on the

²⁷Instructions to Delgado, June 28, 1686, *ibid.*, 62-63; Cabrera to the viceroy, June 28, 1686, *ibid.*, 60-61; same to same, July 22, 1686, *ibid.*, 84-87; Cabrera to the king, Sept. 24, 1686, *ibid.*, 98-99.

²⁸Cabrera to the viceroy, July 22, 1686, *ibid.*, 84-90. The king's *cédula* of August 2, 1685, ordering the governor of Florida to furnish Echagaray with the necessary men for his exploration, was not received by Cabrera until August 20, 1686 (*ibid.*, 58-59.)

²⁹I have retained the Spanish spelling of Indian names.

following day six other chiefs assembled to meet the Spaniards. Delgado presented them with gifts, and told them that he was on a mission of much importance for the service of the king. He asked them for provisions, but the Indians said they had none to give on account of the long drought. Following the advice of the chiefs, he despatched messengers to the Mobilas, giving notice of his approach, and asking for a supply of provisions. Already the scarcity of food was beginning to endanger the success of the expedition. In a letter to Governor Cabrera, written from Miculasa on September 19, Delgado gave an account of his operations up to that date, and expressed the fear that he would be unable to complete the exploration. He pointed out, however, that the expedition would have been well worth while if it accomplished nothing more than to prove to the Indians that it was not necessary to flee upon sight of Spaniards. Four villages, he said, had already promised obedience to the king, and treaties of friendship had been made through his mediation between several hostile tribes.³⁰

While awaiting the return of the couriers from the Mobilas, Delgado sent a number of soldiers to the territory of the Tiquipache, and succeeded in securing a small quantity of maize. He then proceeded westward, through a region "never before seen by Spaniards or Christians." He was soon joined by the couriers, accompanied by the chiefs of the Mobilas and of five other tribes.³¹ These Indians at once endeavored to dissuade the Spaniards from continuing their journey. The chief of the Mobilas said that it would be impossible to proceed further on account of the lack of food. For many days, he said, his own people had been subsisting entirely on shell-fish. In addition to this difficulty, he doubted whether the Spaniards would be able to pass through the territory of the Chatas, as a large number of that tribe had heard of the expedition, and were waiting to attack it. With his food and gifts exhausted, and his men suffering from fever, Delgado decided to give up the attempt to reach Espíritu Santo Bay and México. He turned over Ca-

³⁰Delgado to Cabrera, Sept. 19, 1686, *ibid.*, 68-70. The pueblos "reduced" up to this time were Miculasa, Yaimamu, Pagna, and Cusachat.

³¹These were the Thome, Ysachi, Yqusta, Canuca, and Guasa tribes.

brera's letter to the Mobile chief, who promised faithfully to forward it to the viceroy. Before beginning the homeward march, Delgado made a final effort to obtain some information concerning the French. In reply to the questions of Delgado, the chief of the Mobilas, who was the chief spokesman for the Indians, said that he had never heard of any settlement of Spaniards, English, or other foreigners in the regions beyond his territory. Upon one occasion a ship had descended the river which flowed into Espíritu Santo Bay. A party went ashore, and were exploring the bay, when they were attacked by the Chatas, and more than half their number killed. The survivors retired to a small island in the mouth of the river, and had remained there until rescued by a ship which came in from the open sea. But all of this, the chief said, had happened many years before. Except for this uncertain tale, Delgado was unable to obtain any evidence of the presence of foreigners in that region. He wrote Cabrera again on October 16, telling him of his fruitless quest. He stated, however, that he felt that the expedition had not been in vain. He had opened up a safe road as far west as the Mobilas, and had secured the submission of eleven tribes of Indians, thus extending Spanish influence over a wide region which had previously been unknown. The return trip was made in the latter part of October.³² The expedition had lasted for more than two months, and had approached within a short distance of Mobile Bay. It constituted the first extensive exploration made by the Spaniards in the western region of Florida during the seventeenth century, and marked the revival of Spanish activity among the tribes of that district. For these reasons Delgado well merits a place among the early explorers of the southern portion of the United States.

As soon as Governor Cabrera learned of Delgado's failure to find the French, he began to make arrangements for another expedition to continue the search from the Mobilas. The opposition of the revenue officials, however, and the consequent development of a feud which practically plunged the province into

³²Delgado to Cabrera, Oct. 16, 1686, *ibid.*, 80-83; "derrotero" of the expedition, dated Oct. 30, 1686, *ibid.*, 24-31.

civil war, put a stop to further steps in this direction.³³ The suspension of Cabrera's plans may have also been due in part to the fact that the search had again been renewed from Mexico, following the arrival of the Count of Monclova.

The second and third maritime expeditions.—The Count of Monclova arrived at Vera Cruz on September 13, 1686,³⁴ bringing the reinforcements that had been sent by the king to aid in expelling the French. As will be remembered, the new viceroy had been instructed to spare no efforts to locate their settlement, and to build a fort at Espíritu Santo if he deemed such action necessary.

Monclova began at once to manifest that energy and zeal which characterized his whole term of office. Upon reaching Vera Cruz he summoned the pilots, Barroto and Romero, and obtained from them full particulars of their unsuccessful voyage. At about the same time word arrived from the Marquis of Aguayo, telling of the failure to find the French by way of Nuevo León. After discussing the situation with the officials at Vera Cruz, the viceroy decided that it would be highly advisable to complete the exploration of the Gulf coast. Since it was generally agreed that the coast line could not be thoroughly explored with any of the vessels available, orders were given for the construc-

³³Cabrera to the king, Jan. 4, 1687, *ibid.*, 15-16; Cabrera to the viceroy, Jan. 4, 1687, *ibid.*, 32-34; the oficiales reales of Florida to the king, Feb. 20, 1687, 3 pp. (México, 61-6-20); Pedro de Aranda y Avellaneda to the king, June 22, 1687, 15 pp. (*ibid.*)

The oficiales reales were opposed to Cabrera's activities, they said, because of the arrangements that the king had made with Echagaray for the exploration of the Gulf coast without expense to the royal treasury. They accused the governor of squandering money uselessly for this purpose. Some time later Cabrera temporarily abandoned his office, and during his absence the government was assumed by Pedro de Aranda y Avellaneda, without any authorization from the king. When Cabrera returned, he was imprisoned by Aranda, and treated with great indignity. He was afterwards restored and exonerated, and Aranda was banished from Florida for a number of years (Consulta of the Junta de Guerra, Aug. 31, 1692, 12 pp., Indiferente General, 147-5-29; oficiales reales to the king, March 8, 1689, 2 pp. (México, 61-6-21.)

³⁴Oficiales reales of Vera Cruz to the king, Jan. 13, 1687 (México, 60-4-19).

tion of two pirogues, propelled both by sails and oars, as Admiral Palacios had suggested. Within an unusually brief time, the two boats were finished. Each was equipped with forty oars, carried six cannon, and was manned by a crew of about sixty-five men. The boats were christened respectively Nuestra Señora del Rosario and Nuestra Señora de la Esperanza. The former was placed under the command of Captain Martín de Rivas, with Barroto as chief pilot; the latter, under Captain Antonio de Iriarte, with Romero as pilot. Each vessel carried provisions for three months and a half. Nothing was overlooked in the equipment of this expedition, and it was probably the most carefully planned one of the series.⁵⁵

The instructions of Rivas and Iriarte ordered them to proceed from Vera Cruz to Tampico, where they were to secure two natives to serve as pilots and interpreters. They were to examine carefully all rivers and inlets along the coast from Tampico to latitude thirty degrees, within which distance, it was confidently expected, Espíritu Santo Bay would be found. Provisions should be used sparingly, as there was no source of supply after leaving Tampico, and the viceroy intimated that he would be sorely displeased if this expedition also failed on account of lack of provisions. Especial vigilance was enjoined, as usual, in the exploration of Espíritu Santo Bay, and a sharp watch was ordered to be kept for hostile vessels.⁵⁶

With the churches of Vera Cruz offering up prayers for the success of the voyage, the expedition set sail on Christmas Day, 1686. Tampico was reached three days later. Here the vessels were delayed for more than two months on account of stormy weather. Their supplies were replenished in the meantime by the

⁵⁵The viceroy to the king, Dec. 20, 1686, 7 pp. (México, 61-6-20); Antonio de Astina to the king, Jan. 12, 1687, 1 p. (*ibid.*) The dimensions of the *piraguas*, a list of the supplies, and other details are given in *Relación de las dos piraguas*, 2 pp., and *Razon de lo que lleuan las dos piraguas*, 2 pp. Drawings of the boats were even sent to Spain.

⁵⁶The instructions were drawn up by Admiral Francisco Navarro, commander of the fleet of three vessels which had brought Monclova and the azogues. They are dated Dec. 12, 1686 (México, 61-6-20, 4 pp.). Additional instructions were issued on Dec. 23 (*ibid.*, 2 pp.). See also Navarro to the viceroy, Dec. 25, 1686 (*ibid.*).

viceroy. On March 7 the voyage was resumed. Rivas and Iriarte proceeded very slowly, keeping close to the coast, and giving to many prominent landmarks the names which they were thenceforth to bear during most of the Spanish period. On March 30 while they were exploring the mouth of a river, which was named Rio de las Flores, the wreckage of a vessel was seen which bore signs of French make. A few days later, on April 4, a large bay was reached, nine leagues from the Rio de las Flores, to which the name San Bernardo was given. It was of course the present Matagorda Bay. Here the explorers found further and unmistakable signs of the French. Four leagues from the entrance of the bay, toward the northeast, a stranded vessel was found, which still bore the French coat-of-arms with the familiar fleur-de-lis. From the state of its rigging, it was judged that the ship had been lost for more than a year. A further search disclosed a few barrels of powder and a number of guns in the vicinity. An effort was made to question the Indians in regard to the ship, but the interpreters from Tampico were unable to make themselves understood. While it was surmised that the vessel had belonged to the French colony, it was not suspected that their settlement stood only a few miles away. The region was so low and swampy that the Spaniards seem to have been convinced that no sane person would attempt to settle there. A further examination of the vicinity of the bay was made, however, but no further clues were found. Yet just five miles up the Garcitas the disillusioned followers of La Salle were living out the brief span that yet remained of their monotonous existence. San Bernardo Bay was left behind by the explorers, and the voyage continued without incident of note until the Rio de la Palizada was reached. The gap left by the first maritime expedition had been completed, but no bay answering to the description of Espiritu Santo had been seen, nor indeed had any suitable location for a settlement been discovered. The leaders now concluded that the elusive bay must be further east, and that it had been passed unrecognized by the first expedition. Passing the Mississippi River once more as unworthy of examination, the voyage was continued to Mobile Bay, which was entered on May 22. Three days were spent in exploring its

waters. No great river corresponding to the Mississippi or Rio del Espíritu Santo was found flowing into the bay; instead six small streams were found, which could not be navigated even by such small boats as the pirogues. In spite of the absence of a large river, however, the Spaniards concluded that they must be at the bay which was shown on the maps as Espíritu Santo. No other body of water in that region offered any inducements for settlement, or corresponded so closely to the general description that had been given of Espíritu Santo Bay. In this uncertain fashion was the long-sought-for bay identified, but, no doubt, with entire correctness. There was no longer any reason for remaining on that deserted coast, and the vessels were turned toward Havana. Pensacola Bay was not examined again, as it was thought useless to look for a foreign settlement on its shores. After a short stop on the Florida coast for provisions, the vessels proceeded to Havana, that port being reached on June 17. The return to Vera Cruz was not made until July 3, more than six months after the departure of the expedition. There was much joy in New Spain at the safe return of the pirogues. The long delay had caused great anxiety, and just three days before their return, the viceroy had sent out still another expedition to search for the missing vessels, and to repeat the exploration of the coast.³⁷

The viceroy immediately summoned the leaders of the expedition to the capital for a personal report. Barroto took with him the diary and map of the voyage, and the viceroy was made acquainted with all of its details. By a fortunate coincidence, on the same day that the explorers arrived in México, the vice-

³⁷Although a detailed diary was kept of the second expedition, the writer has been unable to obtain any trace of it. The above account is based upon a number of general references, including the following: The viceroy to the king, July 15, 1687, 7 pp.; marginal annotations of Iriarte, Barroto, and Romero, July 22, 1687, made on "Copia de relacion hecha al Rei Xpmo tocante a la bahia del Spiritu ssto, etc., 7 pp.; Munibe to the king, Aug. 12, 1687, 1 p.; parecer of Pez and Barroto, June 12, 1689, in Autos y Diligencias q se an Executado pr, el Capu Alonso de Leon . . . sobre el descubrimto de Vna poblazon de franzeses, etc., pp. 67-69 (all of the foregoing in México, 61-6-20); consulta of the Council of the Indies, March 22, 1691, 2 pp. (México, 61-6-21).

roy received a letter from Ambassador Ronquillo in London, enclosing an account of La Salle's voyage taken from official French reports. This relation told of La Salle's failure to find the mouth of the Mississippi River, of his landing on the coast, of the wreck of one of his vessels, and of other incidents which had taken place up to the time of the departure of Captain Beaujeu. This document threw a great deal of light, of course, upon the voyage that had just been made. By comparing it with the diary kept by Barroto, the officials were able to arrive at rather definite conclusions in regard to the wrecked vessels that had been found at the Río de Flores and San Bernardo Bay. It seemed practically certain now that they had belonged to La Salle, and that the French colony had met its destruction from drowning, starvation, or at the hands of the natives.³⁸

Great satisfaction prevailed in the city of Mexico. While the second maritime expedition had not discovered the French settlement, it had brought news that was far more welcome, namely, that La Salle had met with disaster, and that nothing more was to be feared from his activities. This optimistic view was expressed by the Count of Monclova in a letter to the king, written on July 25:

The whole Gulf of Mexico has been examined with the most exact diligence possible, and no port, river, or bay along its entire coast has been found to be occupied by enemies, or Europeans, nor have any signs of settlement or fortifications of any kind been seen. . . . Wherefore Your Majesty's entire monarchy is to be congratulated; for, although this kingdom would never be endangered by a settlement of enemies along this coast (since they could be dislodged), it is much better that no such settlement should exist, and that the many plausible falsehoods that have been told concerning this matter both here and in Spain should be so felicitously disproved.³⁹

³⁸The viceroy to the king, July 25, 1687; *Copia de relacion hecha al Rei Xpmo tocante a la bahia del Spiritu ssto que remitio el Sor Dn. Pedro Ronquillo . . . al Conde de la Monclova . . . a 7 de Febro. deste año de 1687* (México, 61-6-20). Barroto, Iriarte, and Romero examined the latter document, and placed their comments on the margin opposite passages which had a bearing upon the voyage that had just been completed.

³⁹The viceroy to the king, July 25, 1687, p. 1 (México, 61-6-20).

As has been stated, the long delay in the return of the pirogues had caused the viceroy to become alarmed as to their safety, and on June 20 he had instructed Admiral Navarro to select two frigates from the squadron under his command to make a search for the missing vessels. Great haste was urged, as the summer was well advanced, and it was desired to take advantage of the few weeks of remaining good weather. Navarro selected Andrés de Pez and Francisco de Gamarra, both captains in the windward squadron, to make the voyage. The appointment of the former was to mark the beginning of a meteoric rise to prominence, until he reached one of the highest offices in the Spanish colonial service. ⁴⁰Pez in fact was destined to become a conspicuous figure in the history of the Gulf region of the United States.

The two captains bore the same instructions as the leaders of the preceding expedition. Such haste was made that the vessels were ready to sail ten days after the viceroy's order was received. Three days after the departure from Vera Cruz, the long-delayed pirogues entered the harbor. Fruitless efforts were made to detain Pez and Gamarra at Tampico. Alarming news had been received from the Indians in regard to the fate of the pirogues, and the two captains had been careful to make all haste, and explore the coast as thoroughly as possible. They found the same wreckage near San Bernardo Bay, but no other signs of French occupation. Mobile Bay was visited. An attempt to enter Pensacola Bay was frustrated by contrary currents. The two vessels returned to Vera Cruz early in September, bringing corroborative evidence to prove that the French colony had met with disaster, and that nothing further need be feared from it.⁴¹

⁴⁰Bancroft erroneously calls Pez, "Andrés de Pérez" (*North Mexican States and Texas*, i, 399).

⁴¹Few details of this voyage are available. The official diary has not been found. The above account is based upon the following documents: Navarro to the viceroy, June 24, 1687, 1 p.; the viceroy to the king, July 25, 1687, 5 pp.; same to same, March 20, 1688, p. 1 (all in México, 61-6-20); consulta of the Junta de Guerra, March 22, 1691, p. 3 (México, 61-6-21). A number of secondary writers refer to the voyage of Pez and Gamarra as the most important of the series, but give no details.

CHAPTER V.

THE OUTCOME OF THE SEARCH, 1687-1689.

The fourth maritime expedition.—In spite of the Count of Monelova's confident assertion that no foreign settlement existed on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, it is evident that he was not entirely at ease in the matter, for, upon the strength of the uncorroborated statement of an obscure English adventurer, a fourth maritime expedition was authorized. The responsibility for this fourth search by sea must be laid at the door of an individual named Ralph Wilkinson, who deserves to go down in the history of America in close company with such famous prevaricators as Hennepin and La Hontan.

In September, 1687, just when the colonial officials were beginning to breathe freely once more, Governor Munibe of Havana sent to Vera Cruz an Englishman named Ralph Wilkinson, accused of piracy, who claimed to have positive knowledge concerning a French town called St. Jean, situated near the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. Wilkinson was interrogated at Vera Cruz by Admiral Navarro, and was then remitted to the capital. On November 21 he was examined by the viceroy in the presence of a number of prominent officials, including Captain Pez and Barroto. The declarations made by Wilkinson in Havana and Vera Cruz were so conflicting that he was forced to confess that he had not told the entire truth; but upon being assured that he had nothing to fear, he promised to tell without reservation all that he knew about the French town. The substance of his story was as follows:

He declared that he was forty-six years old; a native of Newcastle, England; but resident for the past twenty-five years of Jamaica, where he had followed the trade of ship's carpenter, having embarked in that capacity on many voyages to various parts of the Indies. In June, 1685 he had contracted to sail on a French vessel, which had been forced to put in to Jamaica for repairs. He soon learned that the ship had been sent by the governor of Petit Gouave to warn the inhabitants of a French

town called St. Jean, located near the Bay of Espíritu Santo, that the Spaniards were planning to attack their settlement. After a voyage of several weeks, the ship reached the latitude of thirty degrees, and anchored without the mouth of a large river. The next day a canoe was seen approaching, containing three Indians and a Frenchman. When hailed in French, they came on board, and Wilkinson found, strange to say, that the Frenchman was an old friend of his by the name of La Fleur. The captain of the ship, Wilkinson, and La Fleur then proceeded up the river in the canoe until they reached the town, some thirty leagues away. The place was strongly fortified, Wilkinson said. The chief defense consisted of a fort of twenty-two cannon, garrisoned by fifty or sixty soldiers. A short distance from the fort was a redoubt of eleven guns. The wharf was protected by nine guns. The population of the town, he thought, was about four hundred, but there were many estates along the river, so that the total number of inhabitants would probably reach one thousand—all French. When asked by whom this town had been founded, Wilkinson replied that he thought that a certain Monsieur de Salas had founded it, but that he could not be sure on that point. He had remained in the settlement, he said, for more than six months, during which time he had become enamoured of a widow who owned a plantation on the river, and had married her. Being tired of wandering around, he decided that he had found at last the place where he could pass the remainder of his years in tranquility. He had therefore resolved to go to London to sell some property that he owned there, with the intention of returning to St. Jean to end his days. It was while on his way to London, he said, that he had been captured by the Spaniards, and taken to Havana, unjustly accused of being a pirate. Wilkinson gave the most minute details concerning the French colony, and showed remarkable ingenuity in answering the many questions that were propounded to him by the Spanish officials.¹

¹Declaration of Wilkinson, Nov. 21 and 22, 1687, in an expediente entitled, *El Virrey Conde de la Monclova da qta a V. M. de hauer embiado al Capn. Dn. Andrés de Pez . . . a repetir el reconozimiento del Seno Mexno, etc.*, pp. 5-23 (México, 61-6-20). Wilkinson's declaration in Havana is found in *ibid.*, 24-29; and that made in Vera Cruz, *ibid.*, 29-34. The first examination in the City of Mexico lasted for seven hours, and had to be suspended until the following day.

While the viceroy doubted the truth of the loquacious Englishman's story, he was unwilling to take any chances in a matter which had caused the king such great uneasiness. He therefore decided to send out another expedition, guided by Wilkinson, to search for the town of St. Jean. Wilkinson recklessly assured the viceroy that he would find the river and town again, or forfeit his head in the attempt. Captain Andrés de Pez and Juan Enríquez Barroto were again called upon, and were ordered to embark in one of the vessels of the windward squadron. They were instructed to explore only that region which lay within latitude thirty degrees, where Wilkinson had said the entrance to the river would be found.

Pez and Barroto left Vera Cruz in the early part of March, 1688. With them went many of the men who had taken part in previous expeditions. Wilkinson was very much in evidence, and regaled his companions with many stories concerning the French colony. The vessel proceeded first to Mobile Bay, where it was safely anchored, and a small boat (*chalupa*) was put into shape for the exploration. Slowly and carefully the rivers and indentations of the coast were again examined, but at no point did the Spaniards find a great navigable river. Doubt as to the truth of Wilkinson's tale grew day by day. Finally Cape Lodo, near the Rio de la Palizada, was reached, and Wilkinson, who had by this time been placed in irons, was scornfully asked where his town was. The Englishman replied that he did not know; that he had never been in the town himself, but had merely been told of its existence by certain Frenchmen whom he had met at Laguna de Términos in Yucatan. One can imagine the exasperation of the Spaniards when they realized that they had been duped by the mendacious Englishman. Wilkinson was forced to sign a sworn statement, confessing that all of his story concerning the town was based upon hearsay only.²

Although the Spaniards were for the fourth time in the very

²Declaration of Wilkinson at Cabo de Lodo, April 5, 1688, in expediente entitled, El Virrey Cde de la Monclova da qta. a V. M. de lo que resulto del viage q hizo Dn. Andrés de Pez calificando ser el ing. vn embustero, etc., 4-6 (México, 61-6-20); Pez to the viceroy, April 24, 1688, *ibid.*, 3-4; the viceroy to the king, May 27, 1688, *ibid.*, 1-2.

mouth of the greatest river on the continent, they ignored its existence completely. Never did it seem to occur to them that the Rio de la Palizada was the great river for which they were seeking. Wilkinson's declaration, moreover, showed that they were engaged in a wild goose chase, and there seemed nothing to do but return home. The expedition arrived at Vera Cruz on April 24. By this time Wilkinson had recovered his self-possession, and stoutly maintained that he had told the truth in the beginning. He was no pilot, he said, and had never claimed that he could find the town by his own unaided effort. All that he had agreed to do was to show the way to the town if placed in the mouth of the river on which it was located. When reminded of the confession that he had made at Cape Lodo, he said that he did not remember what he had said there; that all that he knew was that he had spent several months at St. Jean, and that his wife still lived there. Needless to state, he was no longer believed. Captain Pez, angry and exasperated, wrote the viceroy that Wilkinson was nothing but a great "embustero," incapable of telling the truth. Pez assured the viceroy with great emphasis that no foreign settlement existed on the Gulf coast. Such an idea was absurd, he said, for it was impossible for ships even of moderate size to navigate those waters with safety.³

It was very obvious that Captain Pez had correctly summed up the true character of Ralph Wilkinson. The *fiscal* in the city of Mexico, in discussing the matter, agreed with Pez that the Englishman was an extraordinary liar, and that he had concocted the whole tale of the French settlement in order to free himself from punishment for his piracies. There remained nothing to do save to punish Wilkinson as he richly deserved. Orders were therefore given for a full investigation into his past career, and the imposition of the severest penalty that his crimes would justify. He was later condemned to hard labor in the galleys.*

³Pez to the viceroy, April 24, 1688, *ibid.*, 3-4; declaration made by Wilkinson upon the return to Vera Cruz, *ibid.*, 6-8. The diary and navigation-chart of this voyage were sent by Pez to the viceroy, but have not been found.

*Respuesta fiscal, May 5, 1688, *ibid.*, 9-12; Cavo, *Los Tres Siglos*, ii, 72.

The town of St. Jean had been proven to be a myth, and the Spanish officials were inclined to believe that the whole tale of French encroachment had little better foundation than that imaginary settlement. The naval forces that had been brought over by the Count of Monclova were now sent back to Spain.⁴ Once again New Spain could rest at ease. But hardly had the humiliating Wilkinson episode been concluded, when information reached the region of Nuevo León, which indicated in unequivocal fashion that, notwithstanding the results of the repeated expeditions that had been made by land and sea, the French were actually settled within the territory bordering on the Gulf of Mexico.

The Capture of Jean Gry,⁵ and the Revival of the French Scare.—In the spring of 1688 Alonso de Len, who will be remembered as the leader of the two expeditions that had been made from Nuevo Len in search of the French, was busily engaged in a series of campaigns against the Toboso Indians and their allies, who had recently gone on the war-path. Len in the previous year had been made captain of a company of twenty-five soldiers, and had been given permission to found a presidio and villa in the region lying to the westward of Nuevo Len, and known as Coahuila or Nueva Extremadura. The title of governor of this province had also been bestowed upon him. The beginnings of the new settlement had been made under favorable auspices, but the completion of the founding had been interrupted by the outbreak of Indian hostilities. Governor Len was forced to abandon the site that had been chosen for his colony. He took up his headquarters at the Tlaxcaltecan pueblo of San Francisco de Coahuila, obtained reinforcements from his old province of Nuevo Len, and once more began his efforts to pacify the country. While he was engaged in this task, he was to be brought again into active participation in the search for the French settlement.⁶

⁴Consulta of the Council of the Indies, March 22, 1691, p. 4 (Mxico, 61-6-21).

⁵See p. 88, note 9.

⁶Len had been authorized to found a villa of thirty families in Coahuila by a decree of the viceroy, dated October 13, 1687. He had first

In May, 1688 Governor León sent a Tlaxcaltecan Indian by the name of Agustín into the region north of Coahuila to enlist the support of various friendly tribes against the hostile Tobosos. The Tlaxcaltecan crossed the Rio Grande in the course of his wanderings, and arrived at a large Indian camp or *ranchería* ruled over by a white chief. Agustín was taken into the presence of this personage, and made to kneel before him with great reverence. He found the chief to be a man of about fifty years of age, white like the Spaniards, but naked and painted after the fashion of his followers. He was seated on a bench covered with buffalo skins, which served him as a rude sort of throne. An attendant stood on either side in approved oriental style. The chief was able to converse with Augustín through the aid of signs and native interpreters. He said that he was not a Spaniard, but a Frenchman, sent by God to found pueblos among the Indians, and organize them for campaigns against their enemies. When told of the proximity of Alonso de León, he expressed a desire to see the governor, and gave Augustín

selected the "Mesa de los Catujanes" as a suitable site, but this had been rejected for a place known as the "Boca de Nadadores," on the river of that name. Here the work of founding had been begun, only to be interrupted by the uprising of the natives mentioned above. It was not until August 12, 1689 that the villa was finally to be established with the name of "Santiago de Monclova," in honor of the viceroy. The site was a quarter of a league from the Tlaxcaltecan pueblo, where León maintained his presidio temporarily, and constitutes today the modern town of Monclova, Coahuila (Auto de fundacion de la Villa de Santiago de Monclova, Guadalajara, 67-4-13, 4 pp.)

Dr. Clark, in his *Beginnings of Texas*, says that the presidio of Santiago de Monclova, containing a population of two hundred and seventy persons, was founded in 1687 by the viceroy in order to erect a barrier to French encroachment (*op. cit.*, p. 15). This statement, based upon Cavo's *Tres Siglos*, is obviously incorrect. The presidial garrison consisted of only twenty-five men, in 1687, and the villa itself, which was not actually founded until 1689, was to include only thirty families. It is doubtful whether there were so many at first. In studying a wide range of sources, I have found no indication that León's settlement was made as a result of the French alarm. It seems, rather, to have been merely a part of the general expansion activities on the northern frontier at this time.

some pages from a French book to carry back to the Spaniards as a message.⁷

Such was the story told by the Tlaxcaltecan upon his return to Coahuila. Governor León immediately concluded that the white chief must indeed be a Frenchman, who had been sent out from a French settlement to win the friendship of the Indians, and prepare the way for a formal invasion of the Spanish provinces. He therefore decided to try to capture the mysterious stranger, and learn his designs. On May 18 he set out from his presidio with a force of eighteen picked men, including Martín de Mendiando, captain of the detachment from Nuevo León. Father Buenaventura Bonal accompanied the party as chaplain. After a week's journey toward the northeast, the Rio Grande was reached, forty-two leagues away. Here five soldiers were left in charge of the camp, while León pressed on with the remainder of his force. About twenty leagues further, they encountered a large number of Indians engaged in a buffalo hunt. When the savages were questioned in regard to the presence of a "Spaniard" in that region, they said they knew him well, for he was their own chief. They then led the way to their *ranchería*. The Spaniards reined up their horses before the house of the chief, which was guarded by a number of Indians armed with bows and arrows. León, Mendiando and Father Bonal dismounted, and pushed their way through the guards into the presence of the chief. They found him just as the Indian Agustín had described. As the priest approached, the man knelt in his seat, and kissed the father's habit. He then shook hands very courteously with León and Mendiando, crying out again and again in broken Spanish, "Yo Francés, Yo Francés." After much persuasion and diplomacy, Captain León succeeded in spirited away the Frenchman, telling the Indians that their chief would be given the best of treatment,

⁷Auto of León, May 18, 1688, in Autos y Diligencias q se an Exeuntado, pp. 5-7 (México, 61-6-20); León to the viceroy, June 21, 1688 (*ibid.*, 1-2; *Historia de Nuevo León*, 314). The pages from the French book, were forwarded to the viceroy.

and soon brought back to the *ranchería*. The return trip was made without difficulty, and the presidio reached on June 6.⁸

Governor León had attempted to question the prisoner on the return trip, but had been unable to make himself understood. Upon the arrival at the presidio a formal examination was held. An Indian of the mission of Caldera, who knew the tongue of the tribe ruled over by the Frenchman, served as interpreter. The prisoner said that his name was Francisco, but that his countrymen called him "Captain Yan Jarri;"⁹ that he was a native of St. Jean de Orléans, in France; and that he had been sent by order of Monsieur Philip, governor of a town which had been built on a large river, to win over the Indian tribes to the allegiance of the king of France. He said that he had been among the Indians for more than three years, and had married into the tribe with which he had been found. He was asked how long it had been since his countrymen settled on the large river, how many families had come, and under what pretext they had invaded territory which belonged to the king of Spain. Replying by signs, the Frenchman was understood to say that the town had been founded about fifteen years before; but no answer could be obtained to the rest of the queries. He was then asked to describe the town. He

⁸The diary and derrotero of this early journey into Texas is in *Auttos y Diligencias q se an Executado*, 16-20. The list of soldiers is given *ibid.*, 16-17. A brief account of this *entrada* is given in the *Historia de Nuevo León*, 314. Some of these autos are also given in Portillo, *Apuntes para la historia antigua de Coahuila y Tóras* (Saltillo, 1888), 224-237.

⁹This name is given in the documents in a variety of forms, such as "Jarri," "Xarri," and "Xeri." Although the Frenchman was usually called "Juan Enrique" by the Spaniards, and has so been referred to by modern writers, there is good evidence for believing that his name was "Jean Géry." The form "Xeri" occurs in the declaration of Archevêque before the viceroy, and the statement is made that "the said Frenchman is named Juan Xeri." As is well known, the letter "X" in early Spanish often had the sound of the French "J," or "G" before "e" and "i". This is shown in the same document, where the name "Jaques Grollet" is written "Xaque Grole." "Xeri" therefore naturally becomes "Géry." (Declaration of Archevêque, June 10, 1689, in *Auttos y Diligencias q se an Executado*, p. 66.)

said that it was protected by two castles (*castillos*), one belonging to the French, and one to the Flemish. The French castle contained twenty cannon, and was garrisoned by six companies of soldiers. There was a Capuchin convent, and a church with ten bells in its tower. He said that he had been visited twice by his countrymen since leaving the town; the first time about a year before, when "Captain Monsieur Jarri" had come with sixteen men, and the second time by seven others, who wished to know what progress he was making with the Indians. Many other questions were asked him, but the facilities for examining him were so poor that it was impossible to secure any further information.¹⁰

In spite of the absurdity and contradictions of many of the Frenchman's replies, Governor León had no doubt but that he had finally obtained positive proof of the existence of the French settlement so long sought for in vain. He therefore decided to remit the prisoner to the capital, where he might be examined more thoroughly by the viceroy, and the exact location of the settlement perhaps ascertained. Jean Géry was therefore taken by León to Monterey, and sent from the latter place to the city of Mexico. From Monterey León wrote the viceroy, emphasizing the imminent danger from the French, and reminding him that the presidio of Coahuila had a garrison of only twenty-five men with which to withstand the threatened invasion. He advised that a formidable attack be made upon the French settlement at once both by land and by sea. He promised to send out spies upon his return to Coahuila in an effort to learn something definite about the location of the enemy's stronghold.¹¹

¹⁰Declarazion del frances Frco. alias Yan Jarri, June 8, 1688, in *Auttos y Diligencias q se an Executado*, 11-15.

¹¹León to the viceroy, June 21, 1688, enclosing autos and derrotero previously cited (*ibid.*, 1-20); *Historia de Nuevo León*, 315-317.

The story of the capture of Jean Géry, as drawn from the original sources cited above, differs materially from the account given in the *Carta* of Father Massanet, which has hitherto been the accepted authority for this episode. Fray Damian Massanet, or Manzanet, was a missionary at the time in the mission of Caldera, and later wrote an account of the whole matter. He makes it appear that the capture of the Frenchman was due chiefly to his own efforts. One of the Indians in

The prisoner reached the city of Mexico on June 12 in the custody of Captain Mendiando, and was immediately taken before the viceroy for examination. This time he declared that his name was "Juan Enrique"; that he was a native of Xeble in France. He said that when he was a youth he had been captured at sea by the English. When asked whither his captors had taken him, he made no reply, but merely laughed. He next said that he had come from France five years before, in company with Monsieur Philip and Monsieur Narri. When asked how far it was from the *ranchería* in which he had been found to the French settlement on the Gulf of Mexico, he replied at first that it was three leagues, but immediately corrected himself, and said that it was three hundred. When questioned further on this point, he remained silent, twisting a handkerchief which he wore around his neck, and shrugging his shoulders. When asked the same question again in a different form, he stated that it was a journey of thirty-two days from the settlement to the *ranchería*. Yet only a moment later, when asked how many days it had taken him to walk from the *ranchería* to the settlement, he did not answer, but merely struck his breast with his open palm, and remained in deep contemplation. He was then asked how he had happened to be among the Indians with whom he had been living. He replied that he had come with three ships to a certain bay, where all had embarked in seven small boats, and gone up the river to the place where the fort was built. From the fort he had made his way to the *ranchería* to rule over the Indians. A map was then shown the

his mission, he says, had told him of the Frenchman, and at Massanet's order had succeeded in inducing the Frenchman to go to a *rancheria* nearer Coahuila, where León had captured him without any trouble or danger whatever. (Carta de Don Damian Manzanet á Don Carlos de Sigüenza, in the *Texas State Historical Quarterly*, ii. 255-256; reprinted in Bolton, *Spanish Exploration in the Southwest, 1542-1766*.) León makes no mention of the part played by the priest, and his account of the capture is quite different, as has been seen. Massanet's *Carta* can no longer be accepted as a reliable authority in all of its details, as the writer has found to be the case in numerous other instances, where the original sources are now available. Clark's *Beginnings of Texas*, which relies almost exclusively upon Massanet for the early period of Texas history, is therefore inexact in several places.

prisoner, and he was asked to tell the number of men in the fort on the river that was pointed out to him.¹² He said that there were six companies of twenty-four men each in the fort, governed by Monsieur Philip. The fort was constructed of adobe, and had twenty pieces of artillery. The last time that he had visited the settlement, it consisted of seventeen houses near the fort, on the north side of the river. On the opposite side of the river, he said, were the fields of the settlers. He thought that the distance from the fort to the Bay of Espíritu Santo could be traversed in three days by land, and in one day by boat. When questioned further in regard to the distance from the fort to the *ranchería*, he said that he did not know how far it was; that it might be one hundred and fifty leagues, or that it might be three hundred. He did not remember the name of the river or bay on which the fort was located, but said that the fort itself was called "La Vérité" (La Verdad), and that the *ranchería* where he had lived had been named "Enjen" by his countrymen. There was no other settlement on the coast, he said, with the exception of a small unfortified town belonging to the Flemish.

At this point the examination was suspended, and was not resumed until July 16. At the second hearing the prisoner was confronted with the declaration he had made in Coahuila, and was asked to explain the various discrepancies that appeared between it and the statement he had made before the viceroy. The Frenchman said that he had evidently not been understood in Coahuila, for what he had told the viceroy was the truth. A few more details were secured from him now in regard to his personal history and the settlement itself. The three ships which he had previously mentioned, he said, had sailed from the port of the Virgin Mary, three leagues from his native town of Xeble, having been sent by the king of France to found a new colony. They had not gone directly to the place where the fort was built, but had first explored the coast, seeking a suitable site. They had finally found the bay and river mentioned before, and had been forced to land in seven small boats, the three

¹²Just what river was indicated is not clear; but it was probably that of Espíritu Santo, as shown on the current maps of the time.

large vessels having been wrecked in the bay. The old question in regard to the distance from the fort to the *ranchería* was now put again. The Frenchman replied that he remembered now that it had taken him twelve days to make the journey. He was sure that he could find the way again, as he had left many signs along the route. Many other questions of a personal nature were asked the prisoner, and various tests made of his sanity. He was asked to repeat the creed, the Ave María, and other bits of the catechism, all of which he knew very well. Nothing further could be learned however in regard to the location of the fort and colony, and the longer he was examined, the more incoherent his answers became. The officials were finally forced to desist, being firmly convinced that the man was demented.¹³

In spite of the conflicting nature of the prisoner's statements, of two facts there could be no doubt, namely: that he was a Frenchman, and that he had been found far within the limits of territory claimed by Spain. It seemed improbable, moreover, that he could have drawn upon his disordered imagination for all of the details he had given concerning the French fort. The Count of Monclova, therefore, remembering the imperative orders that had been given him, decided that it would be necessary to make a final attempt to find the French. At a junta general held on July 23 it was unanimously decided to send out an expedition from Coahuila, to be commanded by Alonso de León. It was not to be made ready until the following year.¹⁴

The Fifth Maritime Expedition.—Three days after the examination of Jean Géry was concluded, the viceroy wrote to Captain Martín de Rivas in regard to another maritime expedition to search for the town described by the Frenchman.¹⁵ Rivas was at Vera Cruz, and was preparing to make a voyage to Laguna de Términos to drive out the foreigners who were cutting the val-

¹³Declarazon del franzes ante el virrey, in Auttos y Diligencias q se an Executado, 20-34; Monclova to the king, Feb. 10, 1688 (México, 61-6-20).

¹⁴Junta general, July 23, 1688, in Auttos y Diligencias q se an Executado, 37-40; viceroy's decree, Aug. 9, 1688, *ibid.*, 43.

¹⁵Rivas had commanded one of the vessels of the second maritime expedition. *Supra*, p. 74.

uable logwood there. The viceroy ordered him to suspend this operation, and consult with Andrés de Pez in regard to another reconnaissance of the Gulf coast. According to the confused statements of the French prisoner, the viceroy said, the settlement appeared to be about one hundred leagues from the Indian village where the man had been found, and about five leagues from the sea. It did not seem necessary, therefore, to explore the whole coast again, but merely that portion from Tampico to the bay where the wrecked vessel had been found. Extreme care should be taken this time, the viceroy admonished, to explore every river and inlet, no matter how insignificant, and landing parties should be sent out for this purpose when it was impossible to make a thorough examination from the vessels. Monclova urged great haste in the matter, and authorized Rivas to send his reply by special courier.¹⁶

Captain Rivas lost no time in getting into touch with Andrés de Pez. On July 24 the two captains sent in a joint report. While they were absolutely certain in their own minds, they said, that there was no suitable site for a settlement on that portion of the coast indicated by the viceroy, yet in order to clear up any lingering doubts that might have arisen in consequence of the Frenchman's story, they were willing to make another voyage. They suggested that the Rio Grande should be explored more extensively than had been done before, and that the voyage should then be continued as far as San Bernardo Bay and the Rio de Cíobolas. If nothing were found in that distance, it would be useless to look further, as the remainder of the coast was swampy and unfit for settlement. They suggested that the two pirogues used on the second expedition should be put into commission, with supplies for about three and one-half months.¹⁷ The viceroy wholly approved of these suggestions, and gave orders for the vessels to sail without awaiting further instructions from the capital.¹⁸

Rivas and Pez left Vera Cruz on August 8, and proceeded directly to Tampico, where they remained for nine days. Six

¹⁶The viceroy to Rivas, July 19, 1688, 2 pp. (México, 61-6-20).

¹⁷Rivas and Pez to the viceroy, July 24, 1688, 3 pp. (*ibid.*)

¹⁸The viceroy to Rivas, July 28, 1688, 2 pp. (*ibid.*)

days were spent in exploring the Rio de Palmas or Maupate, just north of Tampico, as reports of white men in that region had been received through the Indians.¹⁹ On September 1 the pirogues were anchored opposite the mouth of the Rio Grande. The first exploring party sent out was forced to return on account of the hostile attitude of the Indians. Shortly afterwards two canoes filled with armed men were despatched to explore the river. For five days the explorers ascended the river, until, according to the report given, the water became so shallow that it was decided that the source of the stream could not be far distant, and that further progress was therefore useless. The party returned to the pirogues on September 9. San Bernardo Bay was next visited. The wreck of the French vessel was no longer to be seen, having finally been broken up by the wind and waves. Fourteen days were spent in exploring the vicinity of the bay. Most of the streams which flowed into the bay seem to have been dry of water, however, and were therefore not examined for any considerable distance up their channels. The whole region appeared so uninviting that once again it seemed absurd to imagine that foreigners would choose to establish a settlement there. An attempt was made to communicate with the natives, but only one band was seen, which fled in haste after expressing their enmity by a shower of arrows. The search was then continued to the Río de Cíobolas, which was also found to be without water on account of the unusually dry season. The negative results of the voyage bore out conclusively, it seemed, the previous convictions of both Rivas and Pez. The return voyage was begun on September 25, and Vera Cruz was made at midnight, September 29.²⁰

¹⁹This investigation was doubtless due to a letter written to the viceroy by Fray Juan de la Cruz Durango, stating that the Indians of Cerro Gordo had told their *capitán protector*, Francisco de Cárdenas, that 3000 "Spaniards" were settled in the region to the north. This letter had been considered in the junta general of July 23 (Auttos y Diligencias q se an Executado, pp. 34-36).

²⁰Diario del Viage que se va a ejecutar . . . con las dos Galeotas a efectos del real Servio. de S. M. siendo cayo de ellas el Capn. de mar y guerra Martin de Rivas. 11 pp.; the viceroy, Conde de Galve, to the king, June 14, 1689, 2 pp.; Monclova to the king, Feb. 10, 1689, pp. 5-6 (all in México, 61-6-20).

Upon their arrival at Vera Cruz, Rivas and Pez found there the new viceroy, the Count of Galve, who had been appointed to succeed Monclova, the latter having been promoted to the viceroyalty of Peru. The explorers turned over the diary and map of the navigation to the new viceroy, who soon assumed the duties of his office. The Count of Galve was of the opinion that it was manifestly useless to send out any more maritime expeditions, but that it was more logical to continue the search by land from the northern frontier. He did not therefore make any changes in the plans for the expedition from Coahuila under Alonso de León, and preparations to end this were continued during the winter of 1688-1689.²¹

The search from Nueva Vizcaya.—Several months before the apprehension of Jean Gry took place, rumors concerning the presence of foreigners on the Gulf coast had begun to penetrate to the far western region of Nueva Vizcaya, as a result of which the authorities of that province were to take an active part in the search for the French colony. The dissemination of these rumors affords an interesting example of the way in which information was carried by the Indians of the Southwest from tribe to tribe across great stretches of semi-arid country, and reveals more clearly the fact that the first channel of communication between Spanish settlements in Mexico and the region known as Texas was first opened up from the distant group of settlements along the upper Rio Grande, instead of from the contiguous provinces of Coahuila and Nuevo Len immediately to the southward. How well established was this line of communication will be shown by the following account of the series of events through which the officials of Nueva Vizcaya were made cognizant of the activities and final fate of La Salle's colony before the viceregal government, with all of its industry, succeeded in clearing up the mystery.

Among the Indians who were accustomed to make periodic visits to the straggling missions of La Junta, situated some two hundred miles below El Paso at the confluence of the Rio Grande and Conchos Rivers, were various migratory bands of the Ju-

²¹The Count of Galve to the king, June 14, 1689, pp. 1-2 (Mxico, 61-6-20).

mano and Cibolo tribes. These were the natives whom Father López and Juan Domínguez de Mendoza had wished to reach when they set forth their proposals for the occupation of the country to the eastward of New Mexico in 1684. The head chief, or *capitán grande*, of these allied tribes was the famous Juan Xaviata or Sabeata,²² who had been chiefly instrumental in inducing the padres to begin their work at La Junta in that same year.²³ In the spring of each year, this tireless traveler led his people on long journeys toward the east to hunt buffalo, and to participate in the annual fair that was held with the friendly tribes of the Texas or Hasinai confederacy and their allies. At this fair the plunder secured from the Spaniards all along the northern frontier seems to have been haggled over and bartered. The return trip to the Jumano country was usually made in the autumn, and the rest of the year spent in the vicinity of La Junta. In the latter part of 1687, apparently, a number of the Jumano and Cibolo had just returned from the Texas country, and were on one of their accustomed visits to the missionaries at Junta de los Rios. They brought news of "other Spaniards," who were living near the territory of the Texas, and asked the priests for a letter to carry to these people. One of the missionaries, Father Agustín de Colina, placing little confidence in the chatter of his savage friends, told them first to bring a letter from the other Spaniards in order to prove the truth of their statements. This the Indians promised to do. In September of the following year the advance guard of the returning Jumano and Cibolo began to arrive at the mission, bringing further confirmation of the presence of white men in the eastern country. They said that the Spaniards were carrying on a regular trade with the Texas Indians, but that they

²²I have found this name written as "Xaviata" or "Javiata" in the documents at my disposal. Other sources from the Mexican archives refer to this chief as "Sabeata." Bolton uses the latter form exclusively (See "The Spanish Occupation of Texas," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, xvi, 19-20; and "The Jumano Indians in Texas," *Texas State Historical Quarterly*, xv., 72-73.)

²³For brief accounts of the founding of the missions at Junta de los Rios, see the two articles last cited, and Hughes, "The Beginnings of Spanish Settlement in the El Paso District," *University of California Publications in History*, i, 330-333).

always returned to their wooden houses near the sea. One of their houses on the water had been lost. The strangers wore armor, they said, and had told the Indians that the Spaniards of Parral were "no good," and that they themselves would soon enter the western region in order to bring it under their subjection. The Indians also told of an individual, whom they described as a "Moor" (*Moro*), who was ruling over a tribe near the Texas, and leading them in their campaign.²⁴ All of these facts would be confirmed, they said, by one of their chiefs, who was then en route to the missions, bearing the promised letter, and full details in regard to the strangers.²⁵

The whole kingdom of New Spain had been too greatly stirred by the many efforts that had been made to find the reported French settlement for even the exiles at the isolated mission of La Junta to be ignorant of the significance and importance of the tales told by the Indians. The governor of the province, Juan Isidro de Pardiñas, was immediately advised of the reports. He at once resolved to make an attempt to gain for himself the credit that would come from solving the problem that had vexed the higher officials for so long a time. He therefore planned to send out a searching expedition, to be made in conjunction with a campaign to punish the hostile tribes which had again been harassing the northern outposts of his province. On November 2 he issued orders to Juan de Retana, captain of the presidio of Conchos, for the raising of a force of ninety men to make the proposed expedition. Captain Retana was instructed first to march to La Junta to subdue the troublesome Indians in that region. He was then to cross the Rio Grande, and penetrate as far as practicable toward the east in an effort to find the French

²⁴In these confused tales, one may recognize various incidents which have been brought out in the preceding chapters: the journeys of La Salle in search of the Mississippi, the wreck of his ships, the building of the huts on the Garcitas, and the presence of Jean Géry among the Indians north of Coahuila.

²⁵Declarations of various Indians, and of Fathers Colina and Hinojosa at the presidio of San Francisco de Conchos, Nov. 21-23, 1688, in *Autos fijos por el Sor Gour y Capn Genl de la Nueva Vizcaya . . . sobre las noticias q dieron los Yndios del Río del Norte de qe subian por él Naciones estrangeras*, pp. 2-9 (Guadalajara, 67-4-11).

intruders. The governor, of course, had no idea of the great distance that lay between his province and the Gulf of Mexico. In his instructions to Retana he stated that, according to the most reliable information at hand, the Rio Grande flowed into Espíritu Santo Bay, where the French were said to be settled. He referred to the ineffectual attempts that had been made by the viceroy to locate this bay. Retana should therefore endeavor to reach it, reconnoiter it carefully, and learn all that he could as to the strength of the French colony. He was to take especial pains to cultivate friendly relations with the Indians. If he should find any nation, such as the Texas, who had an organized form of government and were ruled over by a king or chief (*jefe*), he was to make a binding treaty of alliance with them, and give them to understand that the king of Spain was the rightful owner of all the western world. The expedition was ordered to set out from the presidio of Conchos on November 15.²⁶

The exact date of the departure of the expedition from Conchos is not clear, but it apparently did not take place until December or January.²⁷ Captain Retana first turned his attention to the work of pacifying the country. He attacked and defeated three of the tribes that had been most troublesome, and took a large number of prisoners, with much booty. He then proceeded to La Junta to carry out the second part of his instructions for the exploration of the Rio Grande and Espíritu Santo Bay. Upon arriving at the Rio Grande, he sent out scouts to select the best

²⁶Autos proveídos por el gouor con las primas noticias, Nov. 2, 1688, *ibid.*, 13-14; Orden para que se vaya a reconocer el Rio del Norte, Nov. 2, 1688, *ibid.*, 14-19.

²⁷While arrangements were being made for the campaign, the situation at La Junta had become so critical that the priests were forced to abandon their mission and retire to the establishments on the Conchos. When Retana learned of their arrival at the neighboring mission, he held a formal investigation to verify the first reports that had been brought by the Indians concerning the French. The two priests from La Junta, Father Agustín de Colina and Father Joaquín de Hinojosa, were examined, as well as several Indians who had accompanied them in their retreat. These declarations have been drawn upon for the foregoing account (Auto of Retana, Nov. 20, 1688, and testimony of various witnesses, *ibid.*, 2-9. Copies of the same documents are in Guadalajara, 66-6-18).

route for the expedition. Within a few days these scouts returned, reporting that the governor of the allied tribes of that region was en route to La Junta from the Texas, bringing letters for the Spaniards which would explain everything. Upon receipt of this news, Captain Retana decided to go forth to meet this important personage. Four days' journey from La Junta, the returning chief was encountered. He proved to be none other than Juan Xaviata, the old friend of the Spaniards. He expressed his pleasure at seeing the soldiers in his country, and asked Retana the motive for the expedition. Retana then explained that he was in search of the strangers who had been seen in the eastern country. Xaviata told him not to be alarmed; that the "Moros" had already been killed, and their settlement destroyed by the neighboring Indians. In order to prove the truth of his assertions, the chief then showed Retana some sheets of paper which contained French writing, and a piece of parchment on which the picture of a ship had been drawn, together with a poem in French. He said that he had secured the relics from some of the Indians who had taken part in the massacre of the French.²⁸ The story told by Xaviata seemed so plausible and well authenticated that Captain Retana decided to suspend further operations until he could communicate with the governor, and receive new orders. On March 3 he wrote Parodiñas, reporting the foregoing facts, and announcing that Xavia-

²⁸The documents that were preserved from destruction in this marvelous manner, and which today constitute, doubtless, the only known relics of La Salle's Texas colony, still exist in the Archivo General de Indias at Seville. Photographs of them have been made for the University of Texas. They consist of a portion of an original journal of La Salle's voyage from Santo Domingo to the Texas coast, unidentified as yet by the present writer, and a venerable looking piece of parchment, upon which is depicted what must have been one of La Salle's ships. The drawing is probably the work of Jean de l'Archevêque, who was implicated in the murder of La Salle, for his name is signed to the poem inscribed on the parchment. The presence of these interesting mementos in a bundle of documents relating to petty Indian uprisings in western Mexico no doubt explains the failure of previous investigators to identify them, and explain their significance. The parchment has long been known to the authorities of the archive, but its connection with La Salle was not realized.

ta and other chiefs would continue their journey to Parral to pay their respects to the governor, and deliver to him the "letters" and parchment in their possession.²⁹

Retana's letter reached Parral on March 30, and the delegation of chiefs arrived soon afterwards. The Indians were examined thoroughly in regard to the whole matter of the French settlement, and gave, incidentally, much valuable and interesting information concerning the country of the Texas Indians and the surrounding regions. Their story left no reasonable doubt that the French colonists had been killed by the hostile coast Indians. Pardiñas accordingly resolved to recall Retana, and give up the proposed expedition. Orders to this effect were issued on April 12. This action meant that the well-established avenue of approach to Texas by way of the west was to remain for a long period unfrequented by the Spaniards, and that a new line of communication was to be opened up from the region of Coahuila and Nuevo León.³⁰

None of the foregoing facts were of course known to the central authorities until several weeks later. Preparations for Alonso de León's expedition from Coahuila had in the meantime been completed, and the final search for the French was already under way. It now remains to give an account of León's important expedition, which was definitely to solve the mystery of La Salle's colony, and lead to the first extension of Spanish colonization into the region threatened by the French invasion.³¹

The discovery of La Salle's settlement.—The viceroy's order for a third expedition by land from the northeastern frontier had

²⁹Retana to Pardiñas, March 3, 1688, *ibid.*, 19-22.

³⁰The valuable declarations of Xaviata and his fellow chiefs at Parral, made on April 11 and 12, 1688, are to be found *ibid.*, 22-41. Many interesting facts relating to the vicissitudes of La Salle's colony are contained therein.

³¹The action of Governor Pardiñas in suspending Retana's expedition was doubtless due also to the fact that he was well aware of the *entrada* to be made from Coahuila. Orders had been sent by the viceroy for the dispatch of fifty men from the presidios of Nueva Vizcaya to accompany León's force, and these troops had already reached Coahuila some time before the news of the fate of the French was brought by the Indians.

reached Alonso de León while that energetic pioneer was endeavoring once more to found the oft-interrupted *villa* which had first been authorized in 1687. Again he was forced to suspend his work, and devote his attention to the search for the French.³² In accordance with the viceroy's orders, fifty soldiers were to be secured from the presidios of Nueva Vizcaya,³³ and fifty more were to be recruited in Coahuila and Nuevo León. More than seven hundred horses and mules were provided for the use of the troops, and abundant supplies of provisions and gifts for the Indians were gathered. Two priests were enrolled among the volunteers. They were the *Bachiller* Toribio García de Sierra, curate and vicar of the province of Coahuila, and Father Damian Massanet, minister in the mission of Caldera. The half-witted Frenchman, Jean Géry, was sent back from the city of Mexico to act as guide. An additional guide was secured in the person of a Coahuila Indian from Father Massanet's mission.

On March 24, 1689 the troops from Coahuila and Nueva Vizcaya set out from the presidio near the Tlaxcaltecan village of San Francisco. Four days later they arrived at the Sabinas River, where they were joined by the detachment from Nuevo León. A general inspection and review was now held before Governor³⁴ León, after which the combined forces proceeded toward the northeast.³⁵ Just before the Rio Grande was reached, a band of Indians was encountered, who were evidently old friends of the French prisoner. They manifested great joy at seeing him again, and gave him marked attention and honor. The Indians were feasted by León, and gifts distributed among

³²Auto de fundacion de la Villa de Santiago de Monclova, Guadalajara, 67-4-13.

³³The presidios of Conchos, Cerro Gordo, El Gallo, Cuencamé, and Casas Grandes were ordered to send ten men each.

³⁴Really General León now, for he was given that rank during the expedition.

³⁵The names of the soldiers are given in the *Historia de Nuevo León*, pp. 320-321. The total number of individuals, including the priests and servants, reached 115. Massanet says that there were only eighty soldiers, forty from Nueva Vizcaya, and forty from Nuevo León (*Carta*, Bolton, *op. cit.*, 284-285).

them.³⁶ At the Rio Grande the expedition was fortunate in securing a more trustworthy and competent guide than it had previously possessed. Little confidence had been placed in the old Frenchman, and his intimacy with the Indian guide from Coahuila caused the latter to be regarded with equal suspicion. The new guide was an Indian of the Quems tribe called Quen-Coquio, who claimed to have spent several days in the French settlement. He was to prove an invaluable acquisition to the exploring party.³⁷

The Rio Grande was crossed without difficulty on April 2, and the march continued into the unknown country toward the northeast. Several rivers were passed, and names bestowed upon them, including the Nueces, the Sarco (Frio), the Hondo, and the Medina. On April 15 a large river was reached, which was named Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, in honor of the patron saint of the expedition. As the Quems Indian had announced that the French town was situated not far from this river, a council of war was held to decide upon future plans. It was resolved that Governor León should advance with sixty men to reconnoiter the settlement, leaving the rest of the troops encamped near the Guadalupe. The governor and his men had proceeded only a short distance when an Indian was captured, who gave the first definite information in regard to the French. He said that in his *ranchería*, only a short distance away, were four white men, who had come from the settlement near the coast.

³⁶These Indians were the Apes, Jumanes, Mescales, and Ijiaba tribes. Out of curiosity León counted them, and found that they numbered 490 persons. (*Historia de Nuevo León*, 322; *Derrotero of León*, translation by Elizabeth H. West, in the *Texas State Historical Quarterly*, vol. viii; reprinted in Bolton, *Spanish Exploration in the Southwest*, p. 389).

³⁷The Quems Indian had stumbled upon the French fort, it was said, while roaming the country in search of his runaway wife. He had later visited the mission of Father Massanet, and had told the priest of his adventures. Nothing more had been thought of him, until the expedition reached the Rio Grande, when Massanet remembered that the Indian lived nearby, and suggested to León that he should be sent for (*Historia de Nuevo León*, 323-324). Massanet's account is in substantial agreement with this story (*Carta*, in Bolton, *op. cit.*, p. 358).

The Indian camp was soon reached, but to León's disappointment, was found deserted. At sunset another *ranchería* was found, containing more than two hundred and fifty Indians. Here the Spaniards obtained startling tidings. The Indians said that the people who had lived in the settlement were all dead. Many had died from an epidemic of smallpox, and the remainder had been killed by the Indians of the coast about three months before. The four Frenchmen who had been in that vicinity, the Indians said, had left several days before for the country of the Texas. This encouraging news was received on April 16. Four days before the identical story had been told to Governor Pardiñas in the far-away region of Nueva Vizcaya. As León and his men were already quite a distance from the main camp near the Guadalupe, they decided not to wander further away at that time in search of the four Frenchmen. Instead a letter was written to the strangers in French, to the effect that the Indians had told of the fate of the colony, and asking them to meet the expedition at the site of their old settlement. The letter was signed by León, and Massanet added a postscript in Latin, thinking that one of the men might be a priest. Blank paper was enclosed for a reply. The letter was entrusted to an Indian, who promised to take it to the Texas country.

León and his men then retraced their route to the main camp near the Guadalupe, and on April 2, the reunited forces were ready to take up the march again. After traveling for a distance of eight leagues, they arrived at a deep stream, the present Garcitas Creek, upon which the Quems Indians said that the settlement was located. What suppressed excitement now ran through the little army as the end of the long quest drew near, we can only imagine, as the sober records of the journey tell only of such prosaic details as might be given in the most commonplace *entrada*. On April 22, after having marched down the Garcitas for three leagues, the long-sought-for settlement finally came into view. Alonso de León seems to have been conscious of the dramatic interest of the moment. Halting the main body of his troops, he went forward with the priests and his officers to inspect the establishment that had kept New Spain in a state of unrest for nearly four years. The place was entirely

deserted. Six small huts, already falling into ruin, constituted the "stronghold" planted by La Salle. One of the structures served as the fort. Above the entrance was the following inscription:

1684 VSQUE AD 168—"

On all sides were evidences of a typical Indian assault. Scores of broken guns, shattered mission ornaments, the torn pages of French books—all were scattered in confusion within and without the wooden houses. A short distance away three skeletons were found, one of which was that of a woman. This gruesome sight so impressed one of the Spaniards that he wrote a poem lamenting the sad fate of the victims, taking care to point out, however, that God had been pleased to visit his wrath upon those who had intruded within territory that had been granted exclusively to the king of Spain.³⁸ About the only articles that had escaped the fury of the savages were eight pieces of artillery, and a number of iron beams. The latter were to be appropriated by Governor León for the laudable purpose of utilizing them in the construction of the church in his new town of Monclova.³⁹

After remaining in the ruined settlement for two days, León resolved to explore the Gulf coast, about five miles away. Taking thirty men with him, and guided by the old Frenchman, who

³⁸This poem is reproduced in the *Historia de Nuevo León*, pp. 336-337. A plan of the settlement, and a drawing of the inscription over the entrance to the fort is *ibid.*, 330 and 331.

³⁹The foregoing account has been drawn from a number of sources, including several that have never been utilized previous to the present time. Chief of these is an important letter written by León to the Bishop of Guadalajara, giving new details of the discovery of the fort, and an auto by León, of April 22, containing new material. León's letter to the viceroy, May 16, 1689 has only recently been brought to light in Spain (Antos y Diligencias q se an Executado, 44-47). The *Historia de Nuevo León* contains interesting details not else where available (*op. cit.*, 324-332). Reference should also be made to the well known *Derrotero* of León's expedition (translated in Bolton, *Spanish Exploration in the Southwest*, 388-404), and to the *Carta* of Massanet (*ibid.*, 353-364). From these combined sources a final and detailed account may be written of the discovery of the French fort.

now began to show some signs of familiarity with the country, the descent to the sea was begun. After a circuitous journey the party stood on the shores of the present Matagorda Bay. As León had heard the name of Espíritu Santo Bay associated so consistently with the French settlement, he now naturally applied that name to the body of water which he surveyed. The Frenchman pointed out the mouth of the bay, where he said that he had entered with "Monsieur de Sala." After a brief examination of the vicinity of the bay, the party returned to the camp at the fort. During their absence an answer had been received from the Frenchmen in the Texas country.⁴⁰ The letter stated in substance that two of the men were tired of living among the Indians, and would soon join the Spaniards at the settlement.

Governor León, however, decided not to wait for them, and camp was broken on the following day. The 27th was spent in exploring a large river three leagues to the northward. It was named the San Marcos. León then sent his main force back to the Guadalupe, and taking thirty men with him went toward the north in search of the Frenchmen. Twenty-five leagues away, two of them were found in the camp of the head chief or governor of the Texas tribe. They were Jean de l'Archevêque, the writer of the letter, and his companion, Jacques Grollet. Accompanied by the Texas chief, the whole party returned to the Guadalupe. On May 1 the two Frenchmen were submitted to a formal examination in which the full details of the tragic history of the colony were brought out. They explained their own escape by saying that on one of the early journeys of La Salle, they had remained behind among the Texas Indians. La Salle himself, they declared, had been killed by an English artilleryman,⁴¹ who accompanied him. They also told of a few other

⁴⁰The letter was written with red ochre, and bore the signature of "Jean de l'Archevêque de Bayonne." When the curate, Father García, saw this name, he at once jumped to the conclusion that it had been written by an archbishop; but the idea met with such ridicule that he soon gave up his theory. The French text is given in *Historia de Nuevo León*, 334.

⁴¹Referring doubtless to Hiens, who was often called an Englishman (Cf. Parkman, *op. cit.*, p. 421).

survivors who were scattered among the Indians of the surrounding country. Strangely enough, Archevêque and Grollet disclaimed any knowledge of Jean Gry, and said he must have wandered from La Salle's fort on the Illinois.⁴²

While the two Frenchmen were telling their harrowing experiences, the chief of the Texas tribe was the object of much attention, especially from the priests. Father Massanet seems to have been very favorably impressed with him from the start. He could hardly believe that an untutored native could be endowed with so many excellent traits. The chief showed a strange familiarity with the Christian religion. He had some idea of a Supreme Being, and pointed to the sky when the word "Dios" was uttered. He carried an ambulatory shrine with him, adorned with the figures of four saints, a cross with the Christ painted on it, and other religious emblems. A light was kept burning in front of this sanctuary night and day. Massanet at once came to the conclusion that the Texas were no other than the famous tribe called the "Titlas," who had been visited by the sainted Mother Mara de Jess, abbess of the convent of Concepcin de Agreda, during her supernatural journeys to New Spain many years before. The chief soon confirmed this belief. When the good father asked him if his people had ever been visited by a woman wearing a habit similar to that of the priests the Indian promptly replied that, while he himself had never seen such a person, he remembered that his ancestors had often told of the visits of a beautiful lady to their country many years before. No further proof was needed, and it came to be generally believed by the Spaniards that one of the nations described by the Venerable Mother Mara had once more been miraculously discovered. The chief was presented with many gifts, both by the priests and by Governor Len. He expressed a desire to visit the Spaniards in order that he might learn more of their faith. To this end he asked that a guide be left behind to show the way to several of his kinsmen whom he would send to Coahuila. Len promised that the viceroy would be informed of the chief's desire for missionaries, and Father Massanet

⁴²Declarations of Archevque and Grollet, May 1, 1689, in *Auttos y Diligencias q se an Executado*, 51-58.

assured him that he would himself return to teach them the mysteries of the true faith. Thus were sown the first seeds of missionary endeavor among the Indians of the Great Kingdom of the Texas.⁴³

The return to Coahuila was begun three days later. Upon reaching the Nueces River, Governor León hurried forward with

⁴³The story of Mother María de Jesús is one of the most fascinating of the myths of the Southwest. She was the young abbess of the convent of Concepción, in the town of Agreda, on the boundary of Castile and Aragon. During the years 1620 to 1631 she claimed to have been transported by angels to the unknown regions north of New Spain, where she had preached the gospel to the heathen tribes. According to her own statement, she had often made as many as three or four trips to America in a single day. The fame of her activities reached its height in 1630, when Father Alonso de Benavides, custodian of the Franciscan missions of New Mexico, arrived in Spain. Benavides was so much interested in the story of her wanderings that he paid a personal visit to the convent at Agreda, and made the acquaintance of the holy nun. She told him with marvelous detail of many incidents connected with his missionary work in New Mexico, some of which, as Father Benavides naively said, had even escaped his own memory. She told of her visits to the Great Kingdom of Quivira, to the Jumano country, and to other tribes unknown to the Spaniards. She described in particular her work among the Titlas, to whom, through her intercession, the Lord had taken two priests to aid her ministry. The king of the Titlas had been baptized, together with many of his subjects, and a large church had been erected in that country. The apostles, including the good mother herself, had suffered martyrdom at the hands of these Indians. The whole story, as spread by Benavides, aroused a sort of religious frenzy in Spain, and caused many persons to desire to visit the regions described by Mother María de Jesús. The legend was well known to Father Massanet, whose decision to work among the Indians of Coahuila seems to have been due to the inspiration of the sainted abbess. The facts related above are drawn chiefly from a small pamphlet published in 1631 by Father Benavides, containing an account of his interview with the nun, and a letter written by the latter to the priests of New Mexico in order to encourage them in their work. A copy of this pamphlet is in the possession of the author. For further references to the story, see Benavides's *Memorial* (Translated by Mrs. E. E. Ayer (Chicago, 1916); Vetancur, *Crónica de la Provincia del Santo Evangelio*, 96; *Texas State Historical Quarterly*, i, 121-124; Massanet, *Carta* (*ibid.*, ii, 311); James, *Palon's Life of Junípero Serra*, 327-333.

a few of his men to draw up the report of the expedition. On May 16 he remitted to the viceroy a general account of his journey, together with the diary, detailed *autos*, and map which had been made. Archevêque and Grollet were also sent to the capital in the custody of Captain Francisco Martínez, to tell in person the story of their luckless colony. Jean Géry was kept in Coahuila.⁴⁴

The two Frenchmen were examined by the viceroy on June 10, in the presence of Captains Pez and Barroto, who had searched in vain for the settlement which they had declared to be a myth. The declarations made by the survivors furnished additional details, which cleared up completely the history of La Salle's enterprise. Two days later Pez and Barroto definitely identified the bay which Captain León had called Espíritu Santo and the French, that of St. Louis, as the one which they had repeatedly explored and had named San Bernardo Bay.⁴⁵

After three and a half years of almost ceaseless agitation and suspense, the mystery of the French colony on Espíritu Santo Bay had finally been solved. Happily for Spain, no fortified stronghold had been found, but only the mute remains of the settlement planted by the luckless adventurer who dared intrude within the dominions of his Most Catholic Majesty. The threatened danger was not forgotten, however, and as a result two important movements were to be made by Spain in the Gulf region. The first one, which was to be carried out without delay,

⁴⁴León to the viceroy, May 16, 1689, *Autos y Diligencias q se an Executado*, 44-47; León to the Bishop of Guadalajara, May 12, 1689 (Guadalajara, 67-1-28, 6 pp.; *Derrotero* of León (translation in Bolton, *op. cit.*, 399-404); Historia de Nuevo León, 338-342; Massanet, Carta (Bolton, *op. cit.*, 363-364); Clark, *Beginnings of Texas*, 19-22.

⁴⁵Declarations of Archevêque and Grollet, June 10, 1689, in *Autos y Diligencias q se an Executado*, 59-67; parecer of Pez and Barroto, June 12, 1689, *ibid.*, 67-69; the viceroy to the king, June 14, 1689, 3 pp. (México, 61-6-20).

Archevêque and Grollet were taken to Spain a few months later by Captain Pez, and were confined in prison at Cadiz until the summer of 1692, when they were permitted to return to New Spain (Petitions of Archevêque and Grollet, with accompanying *autos*, June and July, 1692, in México, 61-6-21, 14 pp.) The later careers of the two Frenchmen in New Mexico has been told by Bandelier in his *Gilded Man*.

was the founding of missions among the Texas Indians. The second one, conceived at the same time, but not definitely undertaken until still another threat was experienced from the French, was the occupation of Pensacola Bay. The following chapter will treat of the first of these movements.

CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST DEFENSIVE MOVE OF SPAIN—THE FOUNDING OF MISSIONS AMONG THE "TEXAS" INDIANS, 1689-1694.

Early plans for missionary work among the Texas—The successful outcome of the expedition of Alonso de León produced a state of singular contentment in the minds of the viceregal authorities of New Spain. The happy deliverance of the kingdom from the long-standing peril of a French invasion quickened their religious zeal, and caused them to be imbued with a spirit of gratitude to the Almighty for the renewed proof of His divine aid and favor. In this pious atmosphere, the plans that had been conceived by the leaders of the recent expedition for the extension of the gospel into the newly-discovered region in the north were to meet with prompt and hearty approval. In the report which Governor León had made to the viceroy upon his return to Coahuila, he dwelt at length upon the superior qualities of the Texas Indians, and of the country which they inhabited. He described the land as fertile, well-timbered, and blessed with a good climate, and abounding in buffalo and other wild game. He believed that the Texas were fully as civilized as the Aztec tribes had been. According to the information received, they lived in nine permanent settlements, were skilled in agriculture, and already possessed some of the rudiments of the Christian religion, as taught them by the woman who had visited them in former times. The governor of the Indians had promised to communicate with the Spaniards in Coahuila, and had asked that missionaries be sent back to live among his people. Governor León informed the viceroy that Father Massanet was anxious to return to work among the Texas, and expressed his conviction that, with a little aid on the part of the government, a bountiful harvest of souls could be reaped in the new region.¹

¹León to the viceroy, May 16, 1689, in *Autos y Diligencias q se an Executado*, 44-47 (México, 61-6-20).

The interest of the Count of Galve was immediately aroused by the statements of Governor León. He had an extract made of that portion of the letter which referred to the Texas tribe, and asked the *fiscal*, Dr. Benito de Noboa Salgado, for an opinion in the matter. As a result of the latter's favorable recommendations, a council was convoked for July 5. The tone of this meeting was exceptionally devout. The members did not fail to recognize the workings of divine providence in the whole series of events connected with the search for the French colony. It seemed to them little short of miraculous that not only should the danger from that source have been dissipated, but that at the same time an unknown treasure of souls should have been revealed. The junta therefore rendered thanks to the Deity for having used the pretext of the French settlement as a means of opening up the way for the extension of the holy gospel. It was unanimously resolved that Father Massanet's offer to return to work among the Texas should be accepted with due thanks, and that all necessary supplies should be furnished from the royal treasury. Governor León was ordered to make a report, embodying his suggestions as to the best means of carrying out the proposed work of conversion, and was urged to make every effort to strengthen the bond of friendship with the Texas chief. The council closed its deliberations with this benediction to the viceroy:

May the grace of divine love dwell in the heart of Your Excellency, and fill your heart with spiritual consolation, and the health and strength necessary for the greatest success in all your undertakings, to the glory and honor of God our Lord, and the conversion of the souls of the many gentiles now living in darkness.²

However, one may question the relative importance of religious zeal as a factor in the general determination of Spanish colonial policy, there can be little doubt that the first definite steps taken by the viceregal government for the occupation of Texas were inspired largely by genuinely pious considerations.

²Respuesta fiscal, July 4, 1689, in Testimo. de autos de las dilixs para la Seg da. entrada qe se ha de Executar a la Provincia de los Texas, etc. pp. 4-5; junta de hacienda, July 5, 1689, *ibid.*, 6-11.

Shortly after the meeting of this junta, letters began to reach the viceroy from various individuals, urging that missionaries be sent to the Texas. The Bishop of Guadalajara, to whom León had sent the first word of his successful journey, promised to coöperate in the work. He suggested that the new mission field should be entrusted to the priests of the College of the Holy Cross, of Querétaro,³ since they had already proven their efficiency and zeal in other regions. He said that he had taken the liberty of writing to the superior of the College in regard to the matter.⁴ Both of the priests who had served as chaplains on the expedition from Coahuila expressed their desire to see missions established among the Texas. Father Massanet urged especially that great care be taken in the selection of the prelate who would have general supervision of the work, and at the same time delicately made known his own qualifications for leadership.⁵ These letters were followed by a formal request from Father Miguel de Fontenberta, guardian of the College of the Holy Cross, that his college be allowed to undertake the work of conversion among the Texas. He reminded the viceroy that the Querétaran convent had been founded for the express purpose of carrying the gospel to the heathen tribes of New Spain, although it had been given little opportunity to

³A Franciscan monastery *de propaganda fide*, founded in 1683.

⁴Juan, Bishop of Guadalajara, to the viceroy, Aug. 3, 1689, *ibid.*, 13-15. The bishop also wrote a long letter to the king, telling of the favorable prospects for the founding of missions among the Texas. He assumed that such missions would lie within the jurisdiction of his bishopric, and said that he would spare no efforts to insure their success (the bishop to the king, July 11, 1689, enclosing León's letter of May 12; Guadalajara, 67-1-28, 11 pp.) The fiscal of the Council of the Indies took issue with the bishop, and questioned whether or not the region of Texas was included within the limits of the Bishopric of Guadalajara. He thought that the choice of missionaries should be left to the viceroy, who had already taken the necessary steps in the matter (Respuesta fiscal, Sept. 10, 1690, *ibid.*, 3 pp.) The king had been advised of the action taken in New Spain through the letter of Noboa Salgado, written on July 11, and enclosing a copy of the respuesta given on July 4 (México, 58-6-1, 4 pp.).

⁵The Bachiller Toribio García de Sierra to the viceroy, Aug. 9, 1689, in Testimo. de autos de las dilixs para le Segda entrada, 11-13; Massanet to the viceroy, Aug. 6, 1689, *ibid.*, 10-11.

engage in such work. Since one of the sons of the College, Father Massanet, had been one of the first to treat with the Texas chief, it seemed only fitting, the guardian said, that the brethren of Massanet should be chosen to follow up his early efforts. The College did not ask for exclusive rights in the field, but merely desired that such action be taken as would lead to the greater glory of God, and the conversion of lost souls.⁶ While these representations reached the capital after the decision to institute work among the Texas had already been made, they doubtless served to confirm the authorities in the course of action which they had planned to follow.

On August 12 Alonso de León drew up the report which had been called for by the junta of July 5. With a wisdom born of long experience among the savage tribes on the northern frontier, he set forth an elaborate military program as the best means of insuring the success of the proposed "reduction" of the Texas. He advised that four new presidios should be established in the country beyond Coahuila. The first one, garrisoned by thirty men, should be located on the Rio Grande; the second one, of forty men, on the Rio Sarco (Frio); the third one, of sixty men, on or near the Guadalupe River, from which point a close watch could be kept on Espíritu Santo Bay; and the fourth one, of eighty men, in the principal town of the Texas, to be the residence of the governor of the whole region. Priests should be stationed in each of these presidios, and the Indians "taught" the elements of Christianity and civilization. By such a line of forts, future French invasions could be guarded against, communication with the Texas maintained without interruption, and the many nations of Indians living toward the north brought to a knowledge of the true faith. Governor León next gave his ideas in regard to the best way of carrying out the new *entrada* to the Texas country. The most suitable time for the journey, he said, would be in the following February or March. Only persons of good moral character should be enlisted. It would be impossible to obtain a sufficient number of such men from his own province, and recourse must be had to the neighboring districts of Zacatecas, Saltillo, San Luis Po-

⁶Fontcuberta to the viceroy, Aug. 28, 1689, *ibid.*, 16-19.

tosí, and Nuevo León. He assured the viceroy that he would carry out the instructions given him in regard to the treatment of the Texas chief. The promised visit had not yet materialized, but he still hoped that the Indians would come. León bestowed warm praise upon Massanet for the zeal which the latter had displayed, and said that he had urged the priest to go to México in order to lay the whole matter before the viceroy in person.⁷

Governor León's plan of compulsory conversion was not to meet with the approval of the idealists in México. The *fiscal* at once pointed out that royal ordinances provided that the gospel should be carried to heathen tribes, not by force of arms, but through evangelical preaching. The presence of a large number of soldiers among the Indians would only make their "reduction" more difficult. It seemed best, therefore, the *fiscal* said, for the priests to enter the Texas country as true apostles. If the natives were as docile as had been represented, a force of twenty-five men would be sufficient to insure the safety of the missionaries on the outward journey. Father Massanet should be allowed to choose these soldiers, however, as well as the priests who were to aid him in the work.⁸

Such were the pacific measures proposed by the viceroy's chief advisory official for the advance into the Texas country. Up to this point the enterprise was almost exclusively a religious one. But the situation was soon to be changed by the arrival of disquieting news from Coahuila, which again brought to the fore considerations of a political nature.

On August 28 Governor León reported the arrival at his presidio of a Mescal Indian, who had been living for more than a year among the Texas. The Indian declared, according to León, that as soon as the Spaniards had returned to Coahuila, a number of Frenchmen had arrived from a great river, and had begun to form a settlement not far from the place where the two Frenchmen, Archevêque and Grollet, had been captured. They had brought domestic animals with them, and two cannon. The Tex-

⁷León to the viceroy, Aug. 12, 1689, *ibid.*, 20-25. A list of articles most suitable for gifts to the Indians was enclosed (*ibid.*, 34-36).

⁸Respuesta fiscal, Aug. 30, 1689, *ibid.*, 25-27.

as were assisting them to build houses, three of which were already finished. Great haste was being made in the construction of others in order to shelter the families that were to be brought from other large settlements. The Frenchmen had presented the chiefs of the Texas and of several other tribes with patents as governor, and had bestowed many gifts upon the Indians. They had announced that on three different occasions they had attempted to settle near the coast, but each time had been attacked by the hostile natives; that now they intended to settle near the Texas, who were good people, and would not molest them. The Mescal said that, although the strangers had tried to disparage the Spaniards, the Texas chief had refused to believe any evil of his new friends. He added that the chief had sent word that some of his people would soon visit Coahuila, so that priests might be sent back to live among them. As soon as Governor León heard the remarkably detailed story of the Indian, he despatched a special courier to the capital to inform the viceroy of the new developments. He stated in his letter that he had sent Jean Géry to the Rio Grande to await the expected visitors, with instructions to treat them with all courtesy and consideration.⁹

Shortly before the courier reached México with these alarming rumors, news had been received from Spain announcing the renewal of hostilities with France. The long-expected violation of the truce of Ratisbon had been made by Louis XIV in the previous April, and had been followed immediately by a counter-declaration of war on the part of Spain. Formal notification of the rupture had been sent to the viceroys and governors of the Spanish colonies on May 24, accompanied by the usual instructions in regard to the adoption of proper precautionary measures for the defense of the king's colonial dominions.¹⁰ The changed international situation was to cause the high

⁹León to the viceroy, Aug. 28, 1689, enclosing the declaration of the Mescal Indian, *ibid.*, 27-34.

¹⁰The king first notified the Council of the Indies of the declaration of war by France on May 13, enclosing a printed translation of the French king's manifesto in justification of his action. This document stated in substance that France had sincerely desired to maintain the truce of 1684, but that Spain's threatening attitude had left no other recourse but a prior declaration of war by France. (MS. in Indiferente General, 141-3-7.)

officials of New Spain to regard with serious apprehension the vague reports of renewed French incursions, which were now transmitted by Governor León.

The fiscal's preliminary report was made on September 8. He believed that the new French settlement, if actually in existence, would be a source of much danger to the kingdom in view of the declaration of war with France, and advised that Governor León should be instructed to return to the Texas country with the troops he might deem necessary in order to investigate fully the activities of the French. The missionaries could accompany the expedition, and remain among the Texas, if the latter were still willing to receive them. The *fiscal* again manifested his opposition to any attempt to convert the natives by a display of military force, repeating his opinion that the Catholic faith should be spread only by peaceful methods.¹¹

A general council was called by the viceroy on September 10 to discuss the situation in the light of the new complications that had arisen. All previous action taken in regard to the conversion of the Texas was carefully reviewed, as well as the latest reports from Coahuila. The junta concluded, in accordance with the opinion of the *fiscal*, that since the news of renewed French activity seemed worthy of all credence, arrangements should be made forthwith for the proposed *entrada* to the Texas country. Governor León should be ordered, as chief in command, to send in detailed estimates of the troops and supplies that would be needed. Since the expedition could not be made before February or March, it should be understood that all orders issued would be subject to change upon receipt of later advices from the north. Preliminary arrangements, however, could be begun without delay. Governor León should first send out a number of soldiers and priests to visit the tribes near Coahuila, thus paving the way for the main expedition. He was to be informed that his plan of establishing a cordon of presidios, while very creditable to his loyalty and zeal, could not be adopted at that time, as all appearances of intimidation must be avoided. He was also to be instructed to send the Mescal Indian back to the Texas in

¹¹Respuesta fiscal, Sept. 9, 1689, in Testimo. de autos de las dilixs. para la Segda. entrada, 29-31.

order to find out why the Indians had failed to make their promised visit, and at the same time to secure further details concerning the new French settlement. When all reports were in, definite action could then be taken by the government. The various orders suggested in the junta were issued by the viceroy on the same day.¹²

If the reports sent in by Governor León had been deliberately fabricated in order to induce the central authorities to send another elaborate military expedition into the northern country, they were cleverly drawn up, and proved entirely successful. There can be little doubt that León's efforts to interest the government in the Texas had been prompted by motives of material gain rather than by zeal for the welfare of the souls of the natives. According to Father Massanet, the story of the new French settlement was a gross misrepresentation, with no foundation other than the statement of an Indian to the effect that six Frenchmen had lost their way, and were wandering among the Texas.¹³ The authorities in México, however, seem to have had no doubts as to the truthfulness of León's report. That the danger of renewed French incursions in the Gulf region was not a far-fetched phantasm will be readily perceived when it is remembered that Tonty's Arkansas post had been in existence since 1686, and that in the winter of 1689-1690 Tonty himself actually penetrated to the Texas country, with the design, in part, of leading a combined force of Frenchmen and savages against the Spanish settlements.¹⁴ While the weight of evidence seems to point to some duplicity on the part of Governor León, and a patent willingness to magnify the slightest rumors into a mass of plausible details, the fact that the French were really settled in the lower Mississippi region at the time may perhaps have given rise to the Indian tales as reported by León, and may well lead one to hesitate before declaring that his statements were entirely devoid of justification.

¹²Junta general, Sept. 10, 1689, *ibid.*, 36-41.

¹³Massanet, *Carta*, in Bolton, *Spanish Exploration in the Southwest*, 366. This statement was made after bad feeling had arisen between León and Massanet.

¹⁴Memoir du sieur de Tonty, in French, *Historical Collections of Louisiana*, Part 1, 71-78 (ed. 1846). See below, pages 123-124 and note.

Governor León made a comprehensive report on October 19, replying to all of the points that had been raised by the junta of September 10. He said that in obedience to the viceroy's orders he had endeavored to obtain more definite information about the French colony. The Mescal Indian had been questioned again, and stated that the Frenchmen who were living near the Texas were eighteen in number, but that others were expected to arrive from a large river ten days' journey away.¹⁵ As far as could be learned, León said, the attitude of the Texas Indians was still favorable. He said that he had sent out emissaries to meet the expected visitors, and had learned that some of the Texas had actually started to Coahuila, but had returned home again because two of their number had been killed by hostile Indians on the way. They had sent word, however, that they would await the priests in their pueblos.¹⁶ Although the French were only eighteen in number, and the Indians between Coahuila and Texas were friendly and docile, Governor León believed that it would be unwise to make the proposed expedition with less than one hundred and ten men; eighty of these to remain among the Texas with the missionaries, and thirty to return to Coahuila and report.¹⁷ He thought that twelve priests would be sufficient to start with. Father Massanet, who was on the point of leaving for the capital, would inform the viceroy in regard to the ecclesiastical side of the enterprise. León promised to make the preliminary expedition to conciliate the tribes nearest Coahuila, and to send the Mescal Indian on the mission suggested by the viceroy.¹⁸

The *fiscal* made no attempt to pass upon the important ques-

¹⁵León suggested that these expected settlers might be coming from the town from which Jean Géry had wandered.

¹⁶Massanet said that he found no knowledge of this incident among the Texas when he reached their country. (*Carta*, 366.)

¹⁷Fifty of these troops should be drawn from the presidios of Nueva Vizcaya, and the remainder from Zacatecas, Saltillo, and Nuevo León. León enclosed a list of supplies that would be needed. He recommended Diego Ramón as a suitable person to command the troops that might be left among the Texas.

¹⁸León to the viceroy, Oct. 19, 1689, in *Testimo. de autos de las dilixs. para la Segda. entrada* 42-45. The estimates of supplies and troops are *ibid.*, 41-42

tions that must be decided in connection with León's report, but advised that the whole matter be submitted to the viceroy's advisory council.¹⁹ A junta general was accordingly called in the latter part of November to take definite and final action. Father Massanet was present at this meeting. The proceedings were of a most voluminous nature. The junta first reaffirmed the necessity for sending a new expedition to the Texas country. It was argued that, since the king had spared no expense in investigating the truth of the reports of La Salle's colony, there could be no question but that further action was indispensable in order to clear up the new rumors that had been received. Whether the French were many or few, they must be expelled. Of no less importance, the junta thought, was the conversion of the Texas. The fact that these Indians had been brought to the attention of the Spaniards though a matter so remote from any idea of their conversion could only be due to the workings of divine providence.²⁰ Governor León was therefore to be given to understand that he was expected to accomplish two objects: First, he was to stamp out the last vestige of French occupation, so that no uneasiness whatever might be felt in the future. To this end, he was to penetrate to the site of La Salle's settlement, destroy it, and send out searching parties until every Frenchman in the region was found and taken into custody. Second, he should then proceed to investigate the possibility of founding the proposed missions. He should communicate with the Texas Indians, and learn whether or not they were willing for missionaries to reside among them. It could then be determined whether the priests should remain alone, or whether a force of soldiers should be left for their protection.²¹ The junta also passed upon the various routine matters connected

¹⁹Respuesta fiscal, Nov. 9, 1689, *ibid.*, 45-47.

²⁰This statement, as well as others of a like nature in the documents of the period, is in direct opposition to Professor Bolton's view that the Spanish occupation of Texas was due, not to fear of the French alone, but also to a long-standing desire to reach the Texas nation. (Cf. Bolton, "The Spanish Occupation of Texas," in the *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, xvi, 1-26, especially pp. 24-26.)

²¹In the latter event, Captain Diego Ramón was to be left in command of the troops, as León had suggested.

with the expedition. León was to be allowed to have the one hundred and ten men he had requested, twenty to be enlisted from the presidios of Cueneamé and El Gallo in Nueva Vizcaya, and the rest from Zacatecas, Sombrerete, Saltillo, and Nuevo León. Father Massanet was given a vote of thanks for the zeal that he had displayed, and was promised liberal supplies of necessities and luxuries for the use of himself and his associates.²²

The plans for the extension of Spanish influence into the region of Texas had thus passed beyond the realm of discussion into that of definite action. While the renewed fears of foreign encroachment had served to transform the new expedition from a peaceful missionary *entrada* into an avowedly aggressive campaign, the danger from the French was not considered sufficiently alarming to justify the military occupation of the northern country. The mission alone was to be employed as a means of maintaining Spanish claims. Through an alliance with the supposedly powerful Texas nation, a barrier was to be erected to further intrusions on the part of the French.²³

The León Expedition of 1690, and the founding of Mission San Francisco de los Tóras.—It was not until the latter part of March, 1690, that the expedition was made ready, and set out from Coahuila. Five priests had been secured from the College of Querétaro, in addition to Father Massanet, who served as ecclesiastical commissary. Two of the priests, however, did not

²²Junta general, in Testimo. de autos de las dilixs. de la Segda. entrada, 52-65. The exact date of the junta is not clear. Velasco in his "Dictamen Fiscal" of 1716 gives the date as November 18, but this is obviously incorrect, as the preliminary reply of the fiscal was not made until the 19th. The meeting was probably held on the 19th, or possibly the 20th. Massanet gives a brief account of the preliminary arrangements. As usual, he makes it appear that all action taken was due chiefly to his own solicitation and advice (*Carta*, 367-368). The viceroy reported the matter to the king on December 30, 1689. He said that since the enterprise was the Lord's, it was bound to result in success (México, 61-6-21, 6 pp.) Cf. Clark, *op. cit.*, 22-23, for an account based on Velasco's "Dictamen" of 1716. See also, *Historia de Nuevo León*, 380-381, for a brief treatment.

²³See the statement of the junta general to this effect, in Testimo. de autos de las dilixs. de la Segda. entrada, 59.

continue the journey to Texas, but were assigned to the new mission of San Salvador, an offshoot of Massanet's old mission of Caldera.²⁴ Among the new personages was Captain Gregorio de Salinas Varona, who had recently arrived in New Spain after a long period of service in Flanders.²⁵ He was soon to become a prominent character in the history of the northern frontier and Gulf region. One figure that had been conspicuous on the previous expedition was now missing. Old Jean Gry was no longer present to mystify the Spaniards with his disjointed tales.²⁶ The Quems Indian again served as guide. The personnel of the soldiers, in spite of Governor Len's desire to secure only those of good character, does not seem to have been very suitable for the enterprise under way. Many of them were raw recruits, drawn from the ranks of tailors, shoemakers, carpenters, and miners, with little knowledge of or respect for the discipline of military life. The twenty soldiers from Nueva Vizcaya were delayed, and did not join the expedition until several weeks after its departure from Coahuila.

Following approximately the same route as before, the company crossed the Rio Grande, and reached the old camp on the Guadalupe River after about a month's journey. Reports of straggling Frenchmen had been received from the Indians, but none had been seen up to this time. On April 25 Governor Len took a force of twenty men, and descended to the ruined settlement. The fort was burned, and the surrounding country then reconnoitered as far as Espritu Santo Bay. Two objects supposed to be buoys were observed in the bay near the mouth

²⁴These two were Fathers Hidalgo and Perea. Those who went on to Texas were Fathers Fontcuberta, the former guardian, Jess Mara, Bordoy, and Massanet.

²⁵Salinas had served more than twenty-four years in Flanders, and was retired with the rank of captain, and a pension of 25 escudos. He was sent to Mxico in 1687 to serve under Viceroy Monclova, in company with a number of other retired officers from Spain. Petition of Salinas, 1690. Guadalajara, 66-5-12; Relacin de servicios de Gregorio de Salinas Varona, June 20, 1701, in Testimonio de los meritos del Bachiller D. Eusebio Jos Salinas, 1788; Mxico; 89-6-8, 11 pp.)

²⁶Whether the Frenchman was ill or had already died, the writer is unable to determine. The latter was probably the case. At any rate, he appears no more in the events of the period.

of the San Marcos (Lavaca) River, but the party had no means of reaching them, and they were not investigated. While the main body remained in camp on the Guadalupe, León sent out searching parties in various directions, but no trace of foreigners was secured until May 4, when an Indian of the Texas tribe was encountered, who said that a number of Frenchmen were living among his people. He offered, for due remuneration, to notify his chief of the return of the Spaniards. A bargain was struck, and the Indian departed on his mission. Orders were now given for the whole company to proceed northward to the Texas country. A few days later two French boys, survivors of La Salle's colony, were captured near the Colorado River.²⁷ The expedition was met a few leagues below the Trinity River by the governor of the Texas, who manifested much joy at the return of his friends. Eighteen leagues northeast of the Trinity, the first settlements of his tribe were reached, and the company went into camp not far from the residence of the chief. The next few days were given over to religious ceremonies, and to the founding of a mission, which was formally dedicated on June 1, under the name of "San Francisco de los T́exas."²⁸ León wished to leave a garrison of fifty men in the pueblo, but as the Indian governor objected to the presence of so many unmarried men, and gave assurances that the priests would be safe, it was decided that only three soldiers should remain with the priests.²⁹

While the mission was being founded, Governor León had not forgotten the primary object of the expedition, and had been making inquiries concerning the French. The Indian governor informed him that on the very day that the courier had arrived

²⁷They were Pierre Talon and Pierre Mensnier, aged twelve and twenty years, respectively.

²⁸The mission was built in the center of the Indian settlement, and was about four miles west of the Neches River, near San Pedro Creek. For a detailed discussion of the site, see Bolton, "Native Tribes About the East Texas Missions," in the *Texas State Historical Quarterly*, xi, 263-265.

²⁹The vicious conduct of some of the soldiers toward the native women was responsible for the refusal of the chief to allow a garrison to be left. Even the wife of the chief himself was not immune from attempted insult.

with the news of the Spaniards' return, four white men had sent a message in which they asked for the friendship of the Texas, and announced their desire to establish a settlement near them. The chief said that he had immediately sent word to the strangers that he could not receive them, as he had just received notice that his friends, the Spaniards, were then en route to see him. This interesting news prompted León to request the chief to make a formal declaration, in which further details were brought out. The Indian said that the four men had not entered his pueblo, but had stopped at a place about three days' journey from another settlement of his people; that as soon as they had heard of the approach of the Spaniards, they had gone back with their guides, telling the Indians that they would return in the spring to establish the settlement. They had asked the chief to accept a certain document, and when he declined, had left it in a tree. They told the Indians to say nothing of their visit to the Spaniards, as the latter were bad people. Three of the men, the chief said, were survivors of the former settlement near the coast, and the fourth was reported to have only one hand, it being necessary for him to support his gun on his arm in order to fire it. According to common report, they had returned toward the east, crossing a large river in canoes, and continuing their journey until they reached their settlement, said to be located on another large river.³⁰

The convincing details of the Indian governor's story, in which one may readily recognize a description of La Salle's faithful lieutenant, the "Iron-Handed" Tonty,³¹ seemed to in-

³⁰Declaration of the Indian governor, May 28, 1690, in *Testimonio de Autos en orden a las dilixs y resulta de ellas pa la entrada pr. Tierra a los Paraxes de la Vahya del Spiritu sto.* 38-40.

³¹Tonty left Fort St. Louis on the Illinois in the autumn of 1689 on his second attempt to find the survivors of La Salle's colony. He also planned to lead a force of savages against the Spanish settlements in Mexico. He descended the Mississippi to the Arkansas, where he had left a post of ten men in 1686. He reached the Natchitoches village on Red River in February, and thence made his way to the Caddos. On April 6 he started southward to find La Salle's settlement. He went as far as one of the Nabadache villages, but had to turn back because the Indians refused to supply him with guides. He arrived at the Red

dicate that the French were settled in the Gulf region, and that they were still endeavoring to gain a foothold in the Texas country. Governor León came definitely to the conclusion that another settlement must exist somewhere toward the east. In the absence of specific information in regard to its location, however, no move was made to reconnoiter it. There seemed to be no immediate danger from the French, and the old uncertainty was to continue.

On June 2 leave was taken of the Texas and the six Spaniards who remained behind. Father Massanet returned with the expedition to promote the plans that he had formed for the extension of the missions. Four of the kinsmen of the chief started for the capital to visit the viceroy. Two of them persevered, and actually reached México.³² Upon arriving at the Guadalupe River, León learned that three French children were being held by the Indians of the coast. A few leagues south of La Salle's old fort, the captives were found—two boys and a girl. After the payment of a ransom and a sharp fight with the Indians León secured possession of the children. The company was delayed at the Rio Grande for several days on account of high water, and the time was utilized by Governor León in drawing up his final report of the expedition. On July 12 the complete *autos* were forwarded to the viceroy, in care of Captain Salinas. The Frenchman, Pierre Meusnier, was also sent to México at this time.³³

³²One of the Indians was killed at Querétaro. The other, who was the nephew of the chief, went on to see the viceroy. He was baptized, and given the name of Bernardino, returning to Texas in the following year.

³³The chief authority for the expedition of 1690 consists of an expediente entitled, "Testimonio de autos en orden a las dilixs. y resulta de ellas pa. la entrada pr' Tierra a los Paraxes de la Vahya del Spiritu sto. México, 61-6-21, 101 pp. It contains the diary of the expedition, the sworn autos and accounts, and many hitherto unknown letters of León, Massanet, and other officials. The diary has recently been made

River again on May 10. In view of the above facts, taken from Tonty's own account, it is seen that the story told by the Indian chief was approximately correct (Cf. *Memoir de Henri de Tonty*, translated in French, *Historical Collections of Louisiana*, Part I, 71-78; ed. 1846).

In his general report to the viceroy, Governor León claimed that he had successfully fulfilled the two main objects of the expedition. He had proven the falsity of the report that the French had established a new settlement near the Texas, and he had made it possible for the priests to begin their labors under favorable auspices. He again urged the viceroy, however, to undertake the military occupation of the country, and marshalled all available arguments to support his proposal. He referred to the activities of the four Frenchmen, and the possibility that another settlement existed somewhere toward the east. He now added a new detail, and said that two strange priests were said to be working among the tribes north of the Texas. He said that there was still danger that the French would invade the northern provinces of New Spain, and thought that no permanent success would be obtained among the many heathen tribes until Spanish settlements and presidios should be established.³⁴

New plans for the Texas mission field.—While the authorities in México were gratified at the favorable inauguration of missionary work among the Texas, they were by no means pleased to learn that Governor León had failed to run down the fresh reports of French activities. They noted particularly the allusion to the buoys in Espíritu Santo Bay, and Captain Salinas was called upon to explain why these signs of French occupation had not been removed, in accordance with the strict instructions of the viceroy to leave no trace of foreign domination. Captain Salinas said that the exploring party had been unable to reach the buoys because of the lack of boats. Both Salinas and the Frenchman, Pierre Meusnier, were questioned in regard to the rumored French settlement toward the east, but neither was able to throw any additional light upon its location. Salinas

³⁴León to the viceroy, July 12, 1690, in Testimonio de autos en orden a las dilixs, etc., 46-53. Massanet also sent in a brief account of the expedition on July 15 (*ibid.*, 6-8).

available by Professor Bolton, in his *Spanish Exploration in the Southwest*, 405-423. This testimonio was sent by the viceroy to the king with letter of Dec. 28, 1690, and was received in Spain in November, 1691. Other important sources are Massanet's *Carta*, 368-387, and *Historia de Nuevo León*, 380-394. Cf. also Clark, *op. cit.*, 23-27.

justified León for his failure to search for it, stating that, according to the best information available, it was a great distance away.³⁵

After the customary preliminary recommendations of the advisory officials,³⁶ a junta general was held on August 29 to discuss the various questions that had arisen. It was decided to postpone further action looking to the extension of missionary work among the northern tribes until more detailed reports could be secured from León and Massanet. The presence of the buoys in Espíritu Santo Bay, however, was deemed such a serious matter that the junta resolved that the viceroy should take the necessary steps for their immediate removal.³⁷ In consequence, a vessel under the command of Captain Francisco de Llanos was sent out from Vera Cruz to San Bernardo Bay early in October. Manuel de Cárdenas served as chief engineer, and Captain Salinas was in charge of the land operations. The leaders were instructed to remove the buoys, find out whether communication by water could be opened up with the Texas, and examine the bay with a view to the construction of fortifications. The buoys were found to be nothing more alarming than two logs that had been cast on end by the currents. No navigable river to the Texas country was discovered. More than a month was spent in exploring the bay and its vicinity, however, careful drawings were made of the topography, and much useful information acquired for future operations.³⁸

³⁵Declarations of Salinas and Meusnier, Aug. 19, 1690, *ibid.*, 54-57 and 57-63. The autos of the expedition and León's letter of July 12 were sent to the auditor de guerra on August 16 (*ibid.*, 53).

³⁶The auditor reported on August 20 (*ibid.*, 64-65); the fiscal, on August 29 (*ibid.*, 65-66).

³⁷Junta general, *ibid.*, 66-67. The auditor had suggested the sending of a maritime expedition from Vera Cruz to remove the buoys. The fiscal opposed this measure as being unnecessary, since the French had given abundant proof that they had no further interest in Espíritu Santo Bay.

³⁸Testimo. de las Dilixs executadas para quitar las Boyas, o Valisas en el Lago de San Bernardo que llaman Bahía del Espíritu Santo (México. 61-6-21, 34 pp.); Diario de la deRota que han echo para la Bahía de S. Bernardo . . . Dn. Frco. de Llanos, el Capan. Dn. Gregorio Salinas y Don Manuel de Cardenas . . . Sacado por dho Dn. Manuel Año de

Before the Llanos-Cárdenas expedition had gotten under way, Father Massanet had been asked to make a comprehensive report, embodying his recommendations for the development of the northern mission field. He was requested to give a general description of the country and the natives, and to suggest proper measures for the extension of missionary work among the Texas and other tribes. For the first time, as far as the writer has found, the idea of colonization in the true sense of the term now appears in the documents of the period. Massanet was also asked to give his opinion in regard to suitable sites for the establishment of Spanish settlements.³⁹

Massanet made the desired report in September. He first told in general terms of the various groups of Indians inhabiting the country north of Coahuila. From the last missions of that province to the Rio de la Santísima Trinidad (Trinity), the natives were divided into a large number of petty tribes. They had no fixed habitations, and did not remain in one place long enough to cultivate the soil. The establishment of missions among such Indians would necessarily entail more expense than would those founded among the more highly civilized tribes, such as the Texas. Toward the west was the great Auahe nation, enemies alike of the Texas and the Spaniards. North of the Texas were the friendly Cadodacho, a populous nation living in four large settlements, and possessing an organized form of government. Still further north were the tribes referred to by Mother María Jesús de Agreda.⁴⁰ Father Massanet expressed the hope that even these remote peoples might eventually be reached, and brought to a knowledge of the faith.

Massanet thought that it would be desirable to found seven new missions, in addition to the one already existing. Four of these should be placed among the Cadodacho, two additional

³⁹The viceroy's order is not available, but its contents are indicated by the opening paragraph of Massanet's report.

⁴⁰*Supra*, page 106, and note 43.

1690, 16 pp. (*ibid.*) For an account of this expedition in connection with the site of La Salle's fort, see Bolton, "The Location of La Salle's Settlement on the Gulf of Mexico," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, ii, 165-182. The map drawn by Cárdenas is reproduced in that article.

ones among the Texas, and one on the Guadalupe River. Fourteen priests and seven lay brothers would suffice to administer these new conversions. Supplies for the priests who had remained at San Francisco de los Texas, as well as for the others who were to go forth, should be made ready without delay. Massanet asked most earnestly that no presidio be placed among the Texas, and that none of the soldiers be allowed to enter the houses of the Indians, lest the outrages perpetrated on the last expedition should be repeated. He thought it would be well to provide the Texas with a Spanish *protector*, and that workmen be sent to teach them the most useful trades.

In regard to suitable sites for Spanish settlements, Massanet said that the Guadalupe River country would be an excellent place, and that a colony there would be the only one that would be needed for the time being. The region was about half way between Coahuila and Texas, it possessed all desirable qualifications for a colony, and was of strategic importance because of its proximity to Espritu Santo Bay. Massanet reminded the viceroy that the French were still to be feared, and that it would be folly to permit them to seize the bay again, as they might well attempt to do. If it were decided to establish a settlement, it should be placed at the entrance to the bay, and kept distinct from the mission, to be founded on the river. Soldiers could be sent as colonists, their salaries being paid in advance for one year, and the customary aid of two hundred pesos furnished them, as had been done in Coahuila. They should have a paymaster, and receive their salaries in actual money instead of supplies. A *protector* for the Indians of this region should also be provided. Such were the chief features of Massanet's plan for the planting of a Spanish colony in Texas; and for the occupation of San Bernardo Bay.⁴¹

Father Massanet's influence was paramount now, and his suggestions were favorably received, with the exception of his plan for a Spanish colony. The *fiscal* held that no action should be taken on that point until the success of the whole Texas pro-

⁴¹Massanet to the viceroy, September, 1690, in Testimonio de autos en orden a las dilixs, 75-83. The estimate of supplies for the new missions is *ibid.*, 84-87.

ject was assured, and the king could be informed of everything.⁴² At a junta de hacienda held on October 16, it was decided that the work should be continued along the lines suggested by Massanet. No presidios were to be established, and only such soldiers provided as the priests might desire to assist them. Alonso de León's military program was thus again pushed into the background, and ecclesiastical influence and ideas continued to be supreme.⁴³ Orders were now sent to Nuevo León for the gathering of the necessary supplies. The authorities did not forget, however, the last reports communicated by Governor León in regard to French activities. Since there might be some truth in these rumors, it seemed advisable to place a suitable person with military experience in charge of the expedition. Governor León could not be spared from his province, as on former occasions, and the enterprise had reached such proportions that a special official should be provided who could give his undivided attention to it. It was therefore resolved in another junta of November 28 that the viceroy should appoint a suitable leader, to be given the rank of governor and commander-in-chief (*cabo principal*), with a salary of 2500 pesos per year.⁴⁴ With this action, the connection of Alonso de León with the history of Texas practically comes to an end. There are some indications that he had already fallen into disfavor with his superiors, and had lost much of the influence that he formerly possessed.⁴⁵ His death in March of the following year was to bring to a close his long and useful career on the northern frontier.⁴⁶

The expedition of Domingo Terán de los Ríos, 1691-1692.—

⁴²Respuesta fiscal, Oct. 10, 1690, *ibid.*, 87-88.

⁴³Junta de hacienda, *ibid.*, 88-93.

⁴⁴Junta de hacienda, *ibid.*, 98-101.

⁴⁵Charges of fraud in the purchase of supplies for the expedition of 1690 were made against León, and were substantiated by Captain Francisco Martínez (Testimony of Martínez, Oct. 9, 1690, *ibid.*, 68-7.)

⁴⁶The date of his death is inferred from a letter of Diego Ramón to the viceroy, March 25, 1691, reporting León's death, and announcing that he had assumed charge of the province (the viceroy to Diego Ramón, April 5, 1691, cited in Portillo, *Apuntes para la Historia Antigua de Coahuila y Têxas*, 240-241.

The viceroy appointed as incumbent of the new post that had been created, Domingo Terán de los Ríos. Terán had been in the royal service for thirty years, the first twenty of which were spent in Peru. He had gone to Vera Cruz in 1681 as deputy of the *Consulado* of Seville, was later made captain of a company of infantry in the Castle of San Juan de Ulúa, and from 1686 to 1689 was governor of the provinces of Sonora and Sinaloa. His services in pacifying the natives on the western coast, and especially in opening up a valuable mine, had earned for him the favor of the king, who had instructed the viceroy to provide Terán with a suitable office. His patent as governor of the provinces to be carved out of the Texas country and adjoining regions was dated January 23, 1691.⁴⁷ On the same day detailed instructions were drawn up for his guidance. The opening paragraph stated briefly the general purposes of the expedition. They were three in number. First, the founding of eight⁴⁸ missions among the Texas and neighboring tribes; second, the exploration of the country and its rivers; third, the thorough investigation of the rumors of foreign settlements.

The route to be followed, and the methods of dealing with the natives were carefully prescribed. The roundabout course by way of Espíritu Santo Bay should be abandoned, and a direct road opened up to the Texas. Terán was urged to take great care in drawing up the official diary, giving a full description of the country, its products, and the natives. Names should be given to all new rivers discovered. Every effort should be made to continue the friendly relations with the Texas. Before entering their pueblo, messengers should be sent to learn their pleasure. Their wishes should be deferred to in every particular, when the necessary steps were taken for the founding of the new missions. If it should be found advisable, as seemed to be the case, to establish missions among the Cadodacho, the same conciliatory policy should be followed as with the Texas. All supplies for the missions were to be under the control of Massanet and his fellow-priests. No important

⁴⁷A statement of Terán's services is contained in a document enclosed with letter of Terán to the king, Jan. 30, 1691, 26 pp. (México, 61-6-21).

⁴⁸This number included the first mission of San Francisco.

action should be taken without due consultation with them. Terán was distinctly given to understand that his part in the founding of the missions was to be limited to the control of the troops.

His chief duty, in fact, was to be the exploration of the province of Texas and the surrounding region. He was to try to discover any navigable rivers, especially the large stream that was said to divide the settlements of the Cadodacho, and one mentioned in former reports as being near the Texas village. In this connection, he was to learn whether the French or any other foreign nations were settled in the region, and to apprehend any intruders he might find. A summary of the last reports concerning the activities of the French, as sent in by Governor León, was included for Terán's information. In order to facilitate the work of exploration, he was informed, a maritime expedition would be sent to San Bernardo Bay to coöperate with the land forces. After all of the foregoing instructions had been carried out, Terán was to return to México, and report in person to the viceroy.⁴⁹

Terán was very much dissatisfied with the arrangements for the expedition. He was given only fifty men with which to make the journey by land. He felt that this number was too small for the extensive work before him, and disliked, as well, the restrictions that were placed upon his authority. Shortly after his appointment, Terán wrote to the king, complaining of the meager provisions that had been made, but promising to do all in his power to make the expedition a success.⁵⁰

The expedition which Terán was to lead was intended to produce little immediate change in the nature of Spanish establishments in Texas. While a notable extension of Spanish influence was planned, the region was still to remain exclusively a mission field. A governor had been appointed, but no provision made for his residence. In other words, there was yet to be no attempt made to give to Texas the characteristic features

⁴⁹Ynstrucciones dadas por el Superior Gobierno pa. que se observen en la entrada de la Provincia de Texas, Jan. 23, 1691, *Historia*, xxvii, 16-23 (Archivo General y Público, México, D. F.).

⁵⁰Terán to the king, Jan. 30, 1691, México, 61-6-21, 4 pp.

of a frontier province. It is not from the local aspect of Texas, however, but rather from a larger point of view that the chief importance of the proposed expedition is to be found. It was to constitute a part of the general plans then under consideration by the Spanish government for the development and defence of the whole Gulf region. The work of Terán, in exploring the western portion of this region, would fit in admirably with the movement already under way for the occupation of Pensacola Bay.⁵¹ The two movements combined would result in the extension of Spanish dominion in unbroken fashion from St. Augustine to the city of Mexico, and the entire Gulf region would be protected from the ambitious encroachments of the French.

The land expedition under the command of Governor Terán set out from Coahuila on May 16, 1691, being composed of fifty soldiers, ten priests, and three lay brothers. The maritime division, consisting of two vessels, did not leave Vera Cruz until more than a month later. It was under the general command of Juan Enríquez Barroto, now a captain, while Gregorio de Salinas was in charge of the fifty troops that were sent to coöperate with Terán. According to the instructions of the viceroy, Terán was to halt his company at a convenient spot, and send Captain Martínez to the coast to meet the ships, after which the combined forces were to proceed to Texas. The land expedition followed the old route as far as the Rio Hondo, but at that point it struck out directly across the country to the Texas settlements. Terán had already begun to bestow new names on all of the streams that were crossed. The Rio Grande became the Rio del Norte; the Nueces, the San Diego; and the Hondo, the San Pedro. Few of the new designations, however, were to survive. On June 13 the site of the present city of San Antonio was reached, and the name of San Antonio de Padua applied to the region.⁵² The expedition rested here for one day, mass was said with military pomp, and the place was noted as an excellent one for a settlement and mission. When the Guadalupe River

⁵¹Treated in the following chapter.

⁵²The Indian name of San Antonio in the Payaya tongue was "Yanaguana."

was reached, a large number of Jumano and their allies were encountered. They were led by the ubiquitous Juan Xaviata. The Indians brought letters from the priests at Mission San Francisco, telling of a serious epidemic among the Texas, and of the death of Father Fonteuberta. New rumors of white men among the Cadodacho were also reported. In spite of the pretended friendliness of the Jumano, they caused the Spaniards much trouble and anxiety. Had it not been for the vigilance of the soldiers, it is probable that they would have made an attack upon the camp. As it was they caused a stampede of the horses, and stole a large number. When the present Colorado River, called by Terán the San Pedro y San Pablo, was reached, the expedition went into camp, and Captain Martínez was sent with a force of twenty soldiers to San Bernardo Bay. He took with him two hundred horses and mules with which to bring back the expected supplies from the ships. Martínez soon reached La Salle's old fort, and continued to the coast, where he remained for six days, without, however, finding any trace of the vessels. He rescued two more French boys from the Indians, and leaving a letter for Captain Salinas, returned to the Colorado. On the day of his departure from the coast, the maritime expedition arrived at the bay.⁵³

As soon as Martínez rejoined the main force, conferences were held to decide upon a future course of action. Governor Terán was in favor of sending another detachment to the coast in search of the ships before proceeding to the Texas. The priests strongly opposed such a measure. They said that it would be criminal to delay longer the succor for the priests at the mission, especially since they were only a few days' journey away. Terán allowed his own opinion to be overruled by that of the majority, and the march was continued to the Texas.⁵⁴ The priests became so impatient at the deliberate progress of Governor Terán

⁵³The viceroy to the king, July 26, 1692, p. 2 (México, 61-6-21). According to the statements in the diaries of the land expedition, the vessels reached the bay on July 2, but the date given by the viceroy seems more probable, and explains fully the failure of Martínez to find the ships. Martínez's diary is in *Historia*, xxvii, 112-116.

⁵⁴*Parecer del Padre Com. Fr. Damian Masanet y demas Religiosos misioneros*, July 19, 1691, *ibid.*, 84-87.

that they hurried on in advance from the Trinity, without giving any notice of their intention. They were greeted by Fathers Bordoy and Jesús María with tearful welcome. After some hesitation, Terán decided to follow. On August 4 the priests sent a message, reporting their arrival at the mission, and asking Terán to encamp half a league away. A few days later Terán formally reinvested the chief of the Texas with the authority of the king, and presented him with the gifts that had been sent by the viceroy. With his usual passion for change of nomenclature, Terán now bestowed a new name upon the region which was beginning to be known as the province of Texas. The name "Texás,"⁵⁵ he said, was not the real name of the tribe, but merely a form of salutation, equivalent to "friend," used by a number of different tribes in that country. The Indians, whom the Spaniards had called "Texas," had always called themselves "Asinay." He therefore decided to give a formal title to the province, and called it "La Nueva Montaña de Santander y Santillana." The old name had already become too firmly fixed to be supplanted, however, and the more lengthy designation given by Terán was not to survive.⁵⁶

The situation in the new province of Nueva Montaña was not all that could be desired. Since the departure of Governor León in the previous year, another mission had been founded, called Santísimo Nombre de María. It was situated on the banks of the present Neches River, and was ministered to by Father Jesús María. In spite of this outward evidence of growth, however, little real progress had been made in the conversion of the natives. While the epidemic lasted, the priests had reaped an unusual harvest of souls, some eighty adults having been baptized. On the whole, the outlook was far from promising. The Indians showed an unwillingness to attend the services of

⁵⁵"Texás" was probably pronounced by the Indians as "Teshá" or "Techá," and its meaning was clearly that of "friend." The form "Téjas" is historically incorrect, and was a later development, when the old sound of "x" had fallen into disuse. (See page 88, note 9). It will be noted that the accent was on the second syllable.

⁵⁶Two diaries were kept of the march from Coahuila, one by Terán, and the other by Massanet. Both are in *Historia*, xxvii, 23-74 and 87-111, respectively.

the church, and their real nature was beginning to show forth. After a year of intercourse with the much-landed Texas, even the priests were beginning to despair of any real success among them.

Governor Terán was already frankly pessimistic as to the outcome of the expedition. A large number of horses and mules had been lost through Indian thievery, and the unusually dry season. The sea division had failed to put in an appearance, and might never arrive. The early misgivings of the governor seemed to be fully justified. No sooner had he reached the missions, than he began to consider the advisability of an immediate return to New Spain. After remaining among the Texas for twenty days in order to rest the exhausted horses, he set out on August 24 for the coast to make another effort to join the sea division, fully determined to return to México if the vessels were not found. Fortunately Captain Salinas was met up with on the Río de los Franceses (Garcitas Creek). Salinas bore new instructions for Terán, which made it impossible for him to return to México without attempting to carry out the exploration that had been ordered. It was decided to return at once to the missions, and begin the work. Captain Barroto returned to Vera Cruz for additional supplies. After a tedious trip, impeded by the continual rains and swollen rivers, the company arrived at the missions again late in September. During Terán's absence the situation had been considerably aggravated. The Indians were becoming more and more insolent and unfriendly. Frequent attacks were made upon the cattle and horses. The chief had forsaken the settlement in order to make a campaign against a hostile tribe, and had told the priests that he did not wish to find them there upon his return.⁵⁷ Several of the missionaries were discouraged, and ready to cease their labors.

Terán began his work of exploration on November 1 by making an examination of the river near the missions, the present Neches. He found it to be a small stream, incapable of being navigated. A few days later, notwithstanding the lateness of

⁵⁷Declaration of Alonso de Rivera, March 18, 1692, in *Testimonio de la Informaci6n*, etc., p. 16 (México, 61-6-21).

the season, the march to the Cadodacho country was begun. Massanet and two other priests accompanied the expedition. Troubles were soon to come thick and fast. The horses were in such a miserable condition that progress was painfully slow. Soon snow and sleet began to fall, and the weather became bitterly cold. The road was almost impassable, horses died in great numbers, and the soldiers suffered severely from lack of suitable clothing. Terán finally halted the main body at a stream which he called the Río Grande,⁵⁸ and taking thirty men with him mounted on the least dilapidated of the horses, pressed on northward. On November 28, at a distance of fifty-six leagues from the Texas, the party arrived at one of the settlements of the Cadodacho tribe, apparently on the present Red River. The approach to the village was made very cautiously, as it was feared that some of the French might be lurking there. The natives received them very hospitably, however. A week was spent in the vicinity. An examination was made of the river, and it was deemed to be easily navigable. Terán's one desire seems to have been to finish his task as quickly as possible, and carry out the letter of his instructions so as to avoid the censure of his superiors. It was manifestly impossible to found the four missions that had been planned. No supplies had been brought for that purpose. The priests were favorably impressed with the country and the Indians, however, and signified their intention of returning at some future time. The return trip, begun on December 5, was merely a repetition of the hardships of the northward march. Most of the distance was covered on foot, as very few horses had survived. The province of Nueva Montaña was reached on December 30. Terán remained at the missions only long enough to make preparations for the march to San Bernardo Bay. Father Massanet refused to furnish fresh mounts for the soldiers or any supplies for the journey, and a bitter quarrel arose between him and Terán. The whole venture was practically a failure by this time. Had it not been for Massanet, it is probable that the missions already established would have been abandoned. As it was, six of the priests decided to return with Terán. Massanet and two companions remained,

⁵⁸Probably the present Sulphur River.

and were given a guard of nine soldiers to protect them. The increased number is significant of the changed attitude of the Indians.

The start for the coast was begun on January 9. Again progress was extremely slow. The former camping place, called Santa Margarita de Buena Vista, was not reached until March 5. Here Captain Barroto was found with additional supplies and reinforcements. Governor Terán remained in camp for more than two weeks, engaged in drawing up his reports, and taking the testimony of various witnesses to prove that he had done all in his power to carry out his instructions. He ascribed the failure of the expedition chiefly to the insufficient provisions that had been made for it, and to the refusal of the priests to await the arrival of the sea division before proceeding to Texas. Terán drew a very dismal picture of general conditions among the Texas, and characterized the whole mission project as futile. Captain Martínez was left in command of the land forces, with orders to return to Coahuila as soon as the horses were able to travel. Terán himself embarked on one of the vessels for Mexico. An attempt was made to carry out the viceroy's instructions to explore the Río de la Palizada, but bad weather interfered with this measure. The course of the ships was finally turned toward Vera Cruz, where they arrived safely on April 15.⁵⁹

The Terán expedition was a lamentable failure. The proposed new missions were not founded, and those in existence were

⁵⁹The foregoing account is based chiefly on Terán's diary, *Historia*, xxvii, 47-74. The testimony taken by Terán in justification of his conduct is found in *Testimonio de la Imformacion hecha por el Genl Dn. Domingo de Theran de los Rios . . . en el Parage de Santa Margarita de buena Vista*, 44 pp. (México, 61-6-21). A journal of the return voyage from San Bernardo Bay to Vera Cruz is given in the document, entitled, "Derrotero que hizo el Alferez Dn. Alexandro Bruno Piloto de la Fragata Santo Christo de San Roman, etc., *Historia*, xxvii, 74-78. The complete autos of the expedition from May, 1691, to March 21, 1692, are to be found in Vol. 182 of *Provincias Internas*; *Archivo General y Público*, México, D. F. (Bolton. *Guide to Materials for the History of the United States in the Principal Archives of Mexico*, 123.) A good secondary account of the expedition, but containing several errors of detail, is given in Clark, *op. cit.*, 27-38.

in a more precarious state than before. The extensive exploration of the country had been prevented by bad management. Just how completely Terán had failed, however, was probably not at first realized by the high officials of New Spain. The viceroy, in reporting the results of the expedition to the king, gave the impression that it had accomplished practically everything that had been expected. He said that the new missions had been established among the Texas, and that the *entrada* to the Cadodacho country had resulted in success. He did not send the *autos* of the expedition, however, lest they might be lost during those perilous times.⁶⁰

In a letter which Terán himself wrote to the king, the failure of the expedition was more clearly revealed. Terán laid the chief blame upon the viceroy, who, he said, had neglected to authorize the necessary measures, in spite of repeated appeals. The wretched nature of the country also, Terán said, had immeasurably hindered the operations. He claimed, however, that he had rendered the king one service, the importance of which could not be exaggerated. That was the clear demonstration of the fact that nothing further was to be feared from the French; for the exploration that had been made proved that no foreign nation would try to occupy such a worthless region, and threaten from it the kingdom of New Spain.⁶¹

The royal officials in Spain, however, were not entirely deceived as to the results of the expedition. A perusal of Terán's diary showed a notable discrepancy in the description of the country given in it and that contained in his letter. No action could be taken by the home government until full reports should be received from the viceroy, and the documents sent by Terán were merely added to the growing *expediente* relating to the exploration and defence of the Gulf region.⁶²

The abandonment of the missions.—After the return of Governor Terán to México, interest in Texas seems to have perceptibly waned. No effort was made to revive the plans which had been formulated. Not until the latter part of the year did the

⁶⁰The viceroy to the king, July 26, 1692, 4 pp. (México, 61-6-21).

⁶¹Terán to the king, Aug. 23, 1692, 4 pp. (México, 61-6-21).

⁶²Respuesta fiscal, June 8, 1693, 2 pp. (México, 61-6-21).

viceregal government manifest sufficient interest in Texas to inquire as to the progress that was being made by the missionaries there. On November 25, however, the viceroy ordered Captain Diego Ramón, who was temporarily in charge of the province of Coahuila in consequence of the death of Alonso de León, to report the latest news from the Texas missions. Ramón was also asked to give suggestions in regard to the best way of communicating with the priests. Ramón made his reply on January 11, 1693. He said that the most recent news received from Texas had been brought by two Indians, who arrived in Coahuila in the previous October. They reported that the priests were in good health, but in sore need of food, as their supplies had given out, and most of the cattle had died. The crops had been a total failure, and they were anxiously awaiting succor from Mexico. Ramón suggested that a party of twenty men be sent out from Monclova with provisions for the missions. The route was already known, and the journey could be made with little difficulty.⁶³ This suggestion was at once adopted by the authorities in México, and orders issued by the viceroy for a relief expedition to Texas.⁶⁴ In the meantime Captain Ramón had been succeeded by Gregorio de Salinas Varona as governor of Coahuila, the latter having been appointed to that office by royal patent of August 29, 1690.⁶⁵ Salinas took possession on January 23, 1693,⁶⁶ and it fell to his lot to lead the new expedition. It was to be his fourth visit to Texas.

The relief party left Monclova on May 3, with ninety-seven pack-loads of provisions, and one hundred and eighty horses for the use of the twenty soldiers who made the trip. The usual detailed diary was kept, but there are no incidents of especial interest to note.⁶⁷ The mission of San Francisco de los

⁶³Ramón to the viceroy, Jan. 11, 1693, in *Testimonio de Autos sobre las Providencias Dadas*, etc., pp. 3-5 (Guadalajara, 67-4-11).

⁶⁴Respuesta fiscal, Jan. 29, 1693, *ibid.*, 6-7; viceroy's decree, Feb. 16, 1693, *ibid.*, 7-8.

⁶⁵Guadalajara, 66-5-12.

⁶⁶Salinas to the king, May 6, 1693 (Guadalajara, 67-4-13).

⁶⁷Viaxe que hizo El Capittan de Cauillos Corazas Don Gregorio de Salinas Varona, Gouor de la Provincia de San Franco de Coahuila, y nueva Estremadura, a la Prouincia de los Texas, etc., in *Testimonio de Autos sobre las Providencias Dadas*, 26-59.

Texas was reached on June 8. Succor had arrived at an opportune time. The priests had already decided to abandon the country in July if nothing had been heard from Mexico by that time. The events that had transpired after Terán's departure now became known. The second mission of Santa María had been destroyed by a flood shortly after the troops had left. No attempt had been made to rebuild it, and all of the Spaniards had taken up their abode at Mission San Francisco. Sickness had broken out again in the summer and autumn, and one priest had died in November. Provisions had been very low since the winter season. In spite of the industry of the priests, their crops had been a complete failure. The first one was washed away by the floods, and the second one ruined by the drought. The Indians had gladly accepted pieces of cow-hide for food, and the soldiers had often been reduced to meat alone. The priests had fared a little better, since, as they said, God had not wished them to be reduced to such extremities; but they had considered themselves fortunate to have a small corn cake at morning and evening. When Salinas and his men arrived, they had had nothing but corn to eat for several weeks.

The hardships of a physical nature, however, were the least of the obstacles which the priests had encountered. No success whatever had been obtained in the work of conversion. The Indians steadfastly refused to attend the services of the church. The medicine-men (Cona) of the tribe had persuaded the superstitious people that the water of baptism had a fatal effect. The few Indians who had been baptized on their death-bed were carried away by their relatives to be buried after the old heathen rites. The natives had refused to believe that there was only one God. They declared that there were two: One who gave the Spaniards clothing, knives and hatchets, and one of their own who gave them corn, frijoles, nuts, acorns, and water for their crops. They had shown no respect for the priests, and had often declared that they would kill them if they did not leave the country. Father Massanet had completely changed his opinion in regard to the character of the Texas. He now admitted that they desired nothing from the missionaries except food and gifts. More than a year of misery and disappointment had

sufficed to break even his iron resolution. He was ready to give up the whole undertaking as a fruitless and thankless task.

In obedience to the viceroy's order, Massanet drew up a formal report setting forth the condition of the mission. It could not well have been more pessimistic in nature, and was evidently written with the hope of inducing the viceroy to authorize the abandonment of the work. He told with interesting details the obstacles which had been met with. In order to convert the Indians to Christianity, he said, three measures would be necessary. First, the establishment of a presidio; second, a suitable site for missions; and, third, the congregating of the Indians in one group, instead of allowing them to live in scattered fashion. In addition to his formal report Massanet also wrote a long letter to the viceroy. He said that if the government was not prepared to establish a presidio, the priests should be permitted to retire, and an expedition sent to see them safely out of the Texas country. He asked the viceroy to arrive at a decision as soon as possible.⁶⁸

Governor Salinas remained at the mission for only a week. He had difficulty in inducing the guard of soldiers to remain with the priests. Two of the religious returned to Mexico. The return trip was begun on June 14, and Monclova reached on July 17.⁶⁹ Massanet's letter and report were immediately forwarded to the capital. The *fiscal* marvelled at Massanet's suggestion that the Indians should be converted by force of arms. Such a policy was contrary to all sound theology. There seemed nothing to do, he said, but to issue formal permission to the priests to retire to their college, and abandon the mission. The question was so intimately related with the plan that was under way for the occupation of Pensacola Bay, however, that no action should be taken until a junta general could discuss the whole situation.⁷⁰

⁶⁸Massanet to the viceroy, June 14, 1693, *ibid.*, 61-64. The formal report of the same date is *ibid.*, 65-68. i. .

⁶⁹Salinas to the viceroy, July 31, 1693, in Testimonio de los autos diligencias y Prouidencias dadas sobre la Provincia de Coaguila, ff. 192-201. Guadalajara, 67-4-13 (transcript, 6 pp.)

⁷⁰Respuesta fiscal, Aug. 19, 1693, in Testimonio de Auttos sobre las Prouidencias Dadas, 68-71.

The junta was held on August 31. There seemed to be no good reason why Texas should not be abandoned. There could no longer be any danger from the French, for the repeated investigations made in the past four years had proven that they were no longer interested in the region in question. The effect of the withdrawal upon the Pensacola project did not seem important enough to merit consideration. The junta therefore resolved that Governor Salinas should be ordered to send a force of soldiers to Texas to bring back the priests in safety. It was hoped that the abandonment would not be a permanent one, and that at some more propitious time the work might be renewed. Father Massanet was to be requested to examine other suitable sites for missions on the return journey, and, if he saw fit, to remain at one of them. Such a mission would be easier to maintain on account of its proximity to Coahuila, and it would enable the priests to keep in touch with the Texas. The viceroy's formal decree, embodying these resolutions, was issued on the same day.⁷¹

Governor Salinas, upon receipt of the foregoing order, convoked a council on October 1 to discuss the situation. It was unanimously resolved that the season was too far advanced to permit an expedition to be made at that time, and that it must be postponed until the following spring. The experiences of Terán's expedition afforded abundant proof of the wisdom of this decision, and the viceregal authorities were compelled to signify their approval.⁷²

The little company in Texas, however, was not to await the arrival of the military escort. After the return of Salinas, the priests had begun to note still greater disquietude among the Indians. In August they learned that the Texas chief had convoked the surrounding tribes, and had proposed a general massacre of the Spaniards. The French were said to be implicated as well. The plot was to be sprung at the beginning of cold weather. Massanet at once had all of the soldiers and the lay brothers to do sentinel duty both day and night. The cannon

⁷¹Junta general, *ibid.*, 71-75; viceroy's decree, *ibid.*, 75.

⁷²Junta in Monclova, Oct. 1, 1693., *ibid.*, 75-79; respuesta fiscal, Oct. 17, *ibid.*, 84-85.

were loaded, and a lighted fuse kept ready constantly, so that the Indians who entered the mission might see the provisions for defense. Massanet also succeeded in getting possession of four guns that had been given the natives by French traders. The situation had remained in this critical condition until October 6, when the Indian chief openly warned the corporal of the squad of soldiers that all of his people were angry with the Spaniards, and that they must return to their own country. All of this time the Indians were making frequent attacks upon the horses and cattle, and were most insolent in their demeanor toward the priests. Massanet finally summoned the chief, and asked him if the story told by the soldier was true. The Indian mockingly replied that it was indeed true; that his people had often urged him to drive the priests away. Massanet reproached the chief for his ingratitude, but told him they would abandon the country. He warned the chief that they were well armed, and would defend their lives as dearly as possible if any attack were made upon them. The departure was then arranged with all secrecy. The more valuable ornaments were carried away, but the heavier ones, as well as the cannon, were buried. The flight was begun on October 25, the mission being burned to the ground as they left. The fugitives were pursued for several days, but were not molested. Four of the soldiers deserted, and returned to live among the Indians.⁷³ When the Colorado River was reached, an Indian overtook the party, and reported that the soldiers had already dug up the buried articles, and had distributed them among the Texas. For forty days the priests and their escort were completely lost, and wandered down to the Gulf coast before getting their bearings. After four months of almost incredible suffering, they arrived at the presidio of Monclova on February 17, 1694.⁷⁴

⁷³They were Joseph Urrutia, Nicolas Rodelo, Francisco González, and Marcos Juan. Urrutia was to become a great favorite with the Texas, and later lead them in many campaigns against their enemies. He finally returned to civilization, and was to play a prominent part in the later history of Texas.

⁷⁴Massanet to the viceroy, Feb. 17, 1694, in *Prosiguen los Autos de la Retirada de los Religiosos Misioneros y soldados de la Prouincia de los tteexas*, 1-5 (Guadalajara, 67-4-11).

After the trying vicissitudes he had experienced Father Massanet had no heart for further missionary work in the northern country. When he arrived in Coahuila, he was given the viceroy's dispatch asking him to inspect suitable sites for missions nearer Coahuila. Massanet replied that he had marked out desirable locations long before, but that he was entirely destitute of supplies with which to found new missions. He promised, however, to do whatever the viceroy might desire in the matter.⁷⁵

Under the circumstances, there was obviously only one course for the viceregal government to follow, and that was to postpone indefinitely further attempts to found missions in the region north of Coahuila. The new allusions to the presence of Frenchmen among the Texas and the Cadodacho no longer awoke a feeling of alarm. The *fiscal*, Doctor Juan de Escalante y Mendoza, said that such reports were mere chimeras, and should be entirely ignored. In regard to the founding of new missions, he thought that in view of the unfavorable conditions and the uncertainty of success, no action should be taken at that time. The priests should therefore be instructed to return to their college until a more fitting occasion arose for the continuance of the work.⁷⁶ These suggestions were adopted by a junta de hacienda held on March 12. Governor Salinas was instructed to provide the priests with the necessary supplies for their journey to Querétaro. Father Massanet should be thanked for the great services which he had rendered both to the divine and temporal majesties.⁷⁷

With this action, the province of Texas was formally abandoned after four years of fruitless effort and expense. The interest of the viceregal government in that region had first been aroused by the intrusions of the French. The movement for the founding of missions, begun when the foreign menace seemed past, grew in scope when new rumors of French activity were received. These larger plans were necessarily relinquished, however, when the intractable nature of the Indians was fully

⁷⁵Massanet to the viceroy, Feb. 17, 1694, *ibid.*, 5-6.

⁷⁶Respuesta fiscal, March 11, 1694, *ibid.*, 13-15.

⁷⁷Junta de hacienda, *ibid.*, 16-17.

realized. The first occupation of Texas was an enterprise conceived and executed by the colonial officials of New Spain. The home government, with its energies absorbed in war, had little share in it, save to approve measures after they had already been adopted. While ready to sanction a movement which promised to extend the Catholic religion and the dominions of the king, it showed little direct and active interest in the Texas project. This comparative indifference was perhaps chiefly due to the opinion prevalent among royal officials in Spain that the Gulf region, especially that portion west of the Mississippi River, offered little inducement for colonization to a foreign nation, and that it was needless to expend large sums for its development and defence. Moreover, at the same time that the Texas missions were being tested, the attention of the home government was directed toward plans that had been presented for the occupation of Pensacola Bay, a region which was represented to offer every advantage for settlement. The following chapter will treat of this movement from its inception to its final execution.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SECOND DEFENSIVE MOVE OF SPAIN: THE OCCUPATION OF PENSACOLA BAY, 1689-1698.

The Genesis of the Pensacola Project.—One of the most notable results of the series of maritime expeditions sent out in search of La Salle's colony had been the rediscovery of and revival of interest in Pensacola Bay, a region which had figured conspicuously in the early activities of the Spaniards in Florida. The leaders of the voyage of 1686 had been unanimous in praising the bay as a most excellent and desirable port. It was considered to be far superior to Mobile Bay, which had been identified as the old Bay of Espíritu Santo, and to San Bernardo Bay, where La Salle had met disaster. No suggestion for its occupation seems to have been made, however, until the discovery of the ruined settlement on the Garcitas proved beyond doubt that the French had actually begun their efforts to secure a foothold on the mainland of the Gulf of Mexico.

The name most intimately associated with the early movement for the occupation of Pensacola Bay is that of Andrés de Pez, leader of three of the voyages that had been made in search of the French colony. The increasing importance of Pez in connection with this study makes it advisable to give at this point a brief sketch of his remarkable career. He came of a family of sailors and fighters. His father and brother were both captains in the royal navy, and met their death at the battle of Palermo in 1676. Pez himself entered the king's service in 1673, serving for eight years as ordinary sailor in the fleet of Andalusia. At the end of that time he was transferred to the windward squadron of New Spain. Because of his bravery and efficiency in combatting the pirates of the Caribbean, he was soon promoted to the rank of captain. In one of the battles in which he was engaged, sixty-five of his men were killed, and he himself was wounded five times, being maimed in one arm. His reputation for courage and reckless daring had caused the Count of Monclova to select him to aid in the search for the French. After his

voyage to San Bernardo Bay in 1688, he was appointed captain of one of the presidial companies at Vera Cruz. He was soon to be made admiral of the windward squadron, and in later years became successively general of the fleet to New Spain, governor of the Council of the Indies, and one of the king's confidential ministers. At the time of his death, in 1724, he was one of the most highly honored and influential men in Spain. In spite of his steady rise to prominence, Pez does not seem to have been a man of brilliant attainments. He was intensely egotistical, often unpopular with his associates and subordinates, especially during his younger years, and guilty of serious mistakes, which came near interrupting permanently his upward career. He seems to have been born under a lucky star, however, and succeeded in retaining the royal favor in spite of his indiscretions. Always ready to take advantage of any opportunity for self-advancement, Pez saw in the Pensacola project an excellent chance to win wealth and distinction. By his persistent efforts, he was to arouse the interest of the indifferent royal officials of Spain in Pensacola Bay, and therefore deserves the credit of being considered the real originator of the movement which resulted in its occupation.¹

Shortly after the news of Alonso de León's successful expedition of 1689 reached Mexico, Captain Pez presented to the viceroy a memorial in which he formally proposed the occupation of Pensacola Bay. He described the general advantages of the region, its abundant products of fruit, timber, and buffalo.² There was enough timber in the vicinity of the bay, he said, to build all of the fleets of Europe. It was in all ways the best

¹Relación de servicios de Andrés de Pez, April 28, 1689, 4 pp (México, 61-6-20); Pez to the king, undated (probably 1691), 2 pp. (México, 61-6-21). The facts given above in regard to the later career of Pez have been drawn from a large number of miscellaneous documents seen by the writer in the Archivo General de Indias.

²Pez's memorial, it seems, was not based entirely upon personal observation. The diaries of the voyages he had made in Gulf waters showed that he had not been able to enter the bay, and this evidence was later to be used against him. Some years afterwards it was said that Juan Enríquez Barroto was the author of the memorial which Pez presented, and there are many reasons for believing that this statement was true. See page 177, *infra*.

harbor on the Gulf coast, and could easily be fortified, as two projecting points of land commanded the entrance to the channel. It behooved Spain to lose no time in establishing a fort and settlement there before the French renewed their activities. He believed that there could be no question but that the French would soon follow up La Salle's expedition by a more formidable one. If they had gone to great expense to found a colony at such a worthless place as San Bernardo Bay, it was reasonable to expect that they would covet so desirable a port as Pensacola. That they already knew of its existence could not be doubted, since the many foreigners who had accompanied the various maritime expeditions would long since have spread the news of its discovery. Pez repeated the familiar warning that, if the French should occupy the bay, they would be able to attack at will the fleets and galleons, and, by opening up communication with their settlements in Canada, would be in a good position to invade the frontier provinces of New Spain.

Recognizing fully the exhausted condition of the royal treasury, Pez suggested a plan by which the expense of the undertaking might be reduced to a minimum. He proposed the radical step of abandoning St. Augustine, removing its presidio to Pensacola, and making the latter place the capital of the whole province of Florida. The port of St. Augustine, Pez argued, was of little benefit to Spain. Its harbor was a poor one, and seldom frequented. Trade between Florida and Cuba was carried on chiefly by way of Apalache. The king simply spent 96,000 pesos annually for the upkeep of the presidio, and derived therefrom no returns whatever. With half that amount, or even less, a fort could be maintained at Pensacola, and a harbor of unspeakable excellence would be opened up. Anticipating the objection that would be made to the abandonment of St. Augustine, Pez said that the entrance to its harbor could be blocked at little expense; or that, if it was thought undesirable to abandon the place entirely, a small force would suffice to hold it against the French and English, as the natives of the region were declared enemies of those two nations. If, he continued, the expense of such a project seemed too great, he would remind the viceroy that even greater sums had been spent on the Philip-

pinos and California with no returns whatever; whereas many obvious advantages would be secured from the occupation of Pensacola, not the least of which would be the conversion of the Indians, who had already shown themselves anxious to receive the true faith.³

The viceroy, the Count of Galve, apparently did not question the truth of Pez's statements in regard to Pensacola. He agreed with Pez that a bay of such wonderful natural advantages would inevitably arouse the cupidity of the French, and would lead them to found a colony there unless steps were taken to anticipate them. He had serious doubts, however, as to the advisability of abandoning St. Augustine, and asked Pez if such action would not leave Florida exposed to the invasions of the Dutch [sic] from Virginia. Pez assured him that there was no danger from that source. Despite the viceroy's confidence in Pez, however, he was unwilling to authorize such momentous measures as were proposed in the memorial. Instead, he resolved to send Pez to Spain to present the project in person to the royal authorities. In order to keep the plans as secret as possible, an unusual procedure was adopted.

The viceroy made no official report on Pez's proposition, but wrote a personal letter to the president of the Council of the Indies, strongly endorsing the plan for the occupation of Pensacola Bay, and explaining his reluctance to take action upon his own responsibility. Pez was entrusted with the delivery of this letter, and was instructed to confer privately with the president before submitting his project to the Council as a whole.⁴

Captain Pez sailed for Spain in the summer of 1689, taking with him, as ocular evidence of the reality of French designs, the two Frenchmen, Archevêque and Grollet, who had just been

³The memorial of Pez has not been found, but its contents have been drawn from a number of documents which give summaries of his proposals, the chief ones being the following: Letter of the viceroy to the president of the Council of the Indies, June 29, 1689, 4 pp. (México, 61-6-21); consulta of the Junta de Guerra, March 22, 1691, pp. 2-8 (México, 61-6-21); Para despachar una carta del virrey Conde de Galbe de 12 de Junio 1693, pp. 3-5 (*ibid.*).

⁴The viceroy to the Marquis of Los Velez, June 29, 1689, 4 pp.; the viceroy to the king, Jan. 13, 1693, 2 pp. (México, 61-6-21.)

captured in Texas. At the same time copies of Pez's memorial, and of all documents relating to the recent expedition to Texas were sent to the king through the usual channel. Pez was in Madrid by January, 1690, but before he was ready to begin the promotion of his project, his memorial had gone through the regular routine, and had reached the hands of the *fiscal* of the Council of the Indies, who drew up his recommendations on February 22. The office of *fiscal* was held at this time by Martín de Solís y Miranda, who in former years had been a member of the *audiencia* of México. While Solís believed that Pensacola Bay was well adapted for settlement, and that its seizure by a foreign nation would endanger the safety of the king's colonial dominions, he opposed the measures suggested by Pez for two main reasons. First, because of the chronic exhausted condition of the royal treasury; and second, because he thought it would be extremely unwise to abandon St. Augustine. That post, he said, must be held on account of the proximity of the English. Far from being relinquished, it should be aided and strengthened in every possible way. Once allow the English to gain a foothold in Florida, they would spread rapidly over the whole province, and threaten New Spain itself. The *fiscal* noted, furthermore, that the viceroy had apparently not deemed Pez's proposition of sufficient importance to merit a special report. It would be impossible, he said, to take any action in such a serious matter on the strength of Pez's uncorroborated statements, and he therefore advised that no further consideration be given the memorial. The *fiscal* believed that Pensacola was too important a region to be neglected, however, and that some steps should be taken to strengthen Spain's hold upon it. He suggested the employment of the favorite Spanish method for this end—the founding of missions among the Indians. This plan would be not only the most economical, but also the most satisfactory from all other points of view. He then definitely recommended the sending of missionaries to the Pensacola tribe. In view of the reports of the priests, he said, further knowledge could be obtained, and future measures planned in a more intelligent way. He suggested that the same policy should be adopted in regard to the Texas nation. The natives of those two regions should never be bound

out for service (*encomendados*), but should be placed perpetually under the protection of the crown, and allowed all possible rights and privileges. By such means, Solís believed, the Gulf region could be held against foreign encroachment, and at small cost to the royal treasury.⁵

At a meeting of the Council of the Indies, held on February 27, the reply of the *fiscal* and all related documents were ordered sent to the *relator*, after which they were to be duly considered by the Junta de Guerra.⁶ Before the Junta had time to act, however, Captain Pez had delivered the viceroy's letter to the president of the Council, and the whole matter was placed in an entirely different light.

The knowledge of the viceroy's advocacy of Pez's scheme caused a complete reversal of the *fiscal*'s unfavorable attitude. In a report which Solís made about a month after his first opinion was given, he strongly recommended the adoption of the measures proposed by Pez, with the exception of that one which related to the abandonment of St. Augustine. The *fiscal* now brought forth practically the same arguments that Pez himself had used. They differed little from those which had been advanced during the discussion of La Salle's designs upon Espíritu Santo Bay. If it had seemed advisable, said Solís, to incur such great expense to find La Salle's colony, it seemed equally important to prevent the French from seizing Pensacola. The bay should be fortified, notwithstanding the depleted condition of the royal treasury. A presidio must be erected there, and some provision must be made to supply the necessary funds.⁷

After the *fiscal*'s prompt action, the matter dragged along for several months, and it was not until October 10 that formal discussion was begun by the Junta de Guerra. The *expediente* had now assumed such voluminous proportions that it was no small

⁵Respuesta fiscal, Feb. 22, 1690, 5 pp. (México, 61-6-21).

⁶Minute of the Council, Feb. 27 (*ibid.*).

⁷This *respuesta* has not been found. Its date is given as March 22, 1691 in a letter of the viceroy to the king, May 15, 1693, but this is obviously a mistake for March 22, 1690. The general contents as given above have been inferred from other documents which will be cited below.

task merely to read the documents that were presented. A vote was taken on October 12. Only one member, Gaspár Portocarrero, agreed with the *fiscal*, and supported Pez's proposition. The other councillors steadfastly opposed any plan for the founding of a presidio and settlement at Pensacola. The objections of the majority were embodied in the written statement that was drawn up by the Marquis of La Granja in explanation of his vote, and on account of its general interest and importance, this document deserves being summarized in some detail.

The chief argument of the *fiscal* and of the councillor who joined with him in the advocacy of Pez's plan, La Granja said, was that because the Junta had spared no labor or expense to prevent the French from obtaining possession of Espiritu Santo Bay, it should be equally solicitous concerning Pensacola Bay. Such an argument, he said, was based upon faulty premises, and evidently advanced without due reflection. The great anxiety of the Junta in regard to Espiritu Santo had been due to the belief that that bay was less than one hundred leagues from Vera Cruz and México, and that it was a better port than Vera Cruz itself. No misunderstanding of this kind could exist as far as Pensacola was concerned, for it was known to be situated more than three hundred leagues from the principal cities of New Spain, in a region of the Gulf which could be navigated only with great difficulty and danger. No nation was likely to form there an establishment from which the fleets and galleons could be menaced.

Pez's proposal to abandon St. Augustine, La Granja continued, was in itself a patent indication of the promoter's inexperience in founding new settlements, and likewise revealed his general ignorance of the region in question. Furthermore, despite the fact that Pez had tried to convey the impression that he was the first to recognize the advantages of the bay, the information contained in his memorial was by no means new. The bay had been well known to the first explorers of Florida, and had often been mentioned in their memorials. Although the English and the French had often visited the bay in their frequent invasions of Florida (now so lightly to be abandoned), they had never evinced a desire to hold it permanently. It was

probable, therefore, that the soil was not so fertile as the "new Columbus" claimed, and that the ship-building timber said to grow there could be found in other regions more accessible than Pensacola.

La Granja could see no reason why any foreign nation should desire to occupy Pensacola Bay. Only three were in a position to do so—France, England, and Holland. But each of them already possessed convenient naval bases in the West Indies, from which they could harass the shipping of Spain, without going to the expense of developing such an isolated point as Pensacola. Nor did the counsellor believe that New Spain was in any danger of being invaded from that direction, on account of the enormous distance to be traversed. It would be little short of scandalous, he said, to fortify Pensacola Bay, when there were many other ports of far greater importance which were entirely unprotected.

From a religious aspect also, La Granja said, the arguments of the supporters of the movement did not seem well taken. They should remember the multitude of Indians in the very heart of Spain's colonies who were still unconverted, notably those of Darien, bordering on the provinces of Cartagena, Santa Fé, and Panamá. Not only were the souls of those natives being lost, but at the same time they were aiding foreigners of all nationalities to infest the "South Sea" with piratical raids. The "reduction" of these Indians had been postponed many times on account of lack of funds with which to construct a presidio in their country. And yet, the Marquis triumphantly declared, on the strength of the assertions of a single individual, it was now proposed to build two new castles and a settlement at Pensacola, even when the coasts and frontiers of Spain itself were destitute of such defences.

La Granja did not believe that the *fiscal*, a man of the legal profession, was qualified to pass upon the question under consideration merely because he had resided in New Spain for a number of years. Instead of giving advice of a military nature, he should have called attention to the fact that Pez's memorial was not substantiated by the sworn statements of the officers and pilots who had visited the bay; he should have noted the con-

fession that foreigners of various nations had been allowed to serve in the crews of the maritime expeditions, an open violation of the laws of the Indies, which deserved severe punishment. Finally, La Granja said in concluding his opposing arguments, he doubted the advisability of entrusting such an important enterprise to the care of Pez. If the viceroy had believed the latter to be a suitable man for the task, why had he not formally and openly commissioned him for that purpose, instead of merely giving him permission to go to Spain to attend to personal business?⁸

Having thus demolished, to his own satisfaction at least, the case of the minority, La Granja then set forth the measures which he thought should be taken in regard to Pensacola. First, it should be ascertained whether or not the bay was as wonderful as Pez represented it to be. This knowledge would doubtless be secured by the new expedition of Alonso de León, who, the viceroy had reported, would be sent out to search for the eighteen Frenchmen alleged to be living among the Texas, as well as to make a general exploration of the Gulf region⁹

If the bay should be found so desirable as was claimed, the viceroy should proceed to close its harbor by sinking a few old ships in the entrance to the channel. This measure would mean only a single expenditure, and not a constant drain on the royal treasury by the maintenance of a useless presidio and a port, which would only serve as a blind door (*puerta falsa*) for the contraband trade of foreign nations. The viceroy should be given to understand that under no circumstances was the presidio of St. Augustine to be weakened, but that its subsidies must be sent with unfailing punctuality. If the windward squadron was not otherwise engaged, it should be sent to reconnoiter the

⁸La Granja did not allude to the letter written by the viceroy to the president of the Council, whether through ignorance or malice, is not clear. The Count of Galve later complained of the injustice of this remark, and explained that he had concealed Pez's mission under the pretense of private business in order to prevent foreign nations from getting any inkling of the plan to occupy Pensacola (The viceroy to the king, Jan. 13, 1693, 2 pp. México, 61-6-21).

⁹This statement reveals the general ignorance of the royal officials concerning the country from Texas to Florida.

whole Gulf coast once more, apprehending any foreigners that might be discovered. In case prisoners were taken, they should be kept in the hatches so that they might learn nothing of the nature of the country. In concluding his long and vigorous brief, the Marquis of La Granja repeated the oft-expressed opinion of the Junta and the Council of the Indies, that the real remedy against foreign encroachment in the Indies was the creation of an efficient navy. By no other means could such an extended coast-line as that of the Gulf of Mexico be successfully defended.¹⁰

The final report of the Junta de Guerra was made on March 22 of the following year. It contained practically the same arguments as those given in the dissenting vote of the Marquis of La Granja.¹¹ Passing over the identical points, a brief summary of the positive recommendations of the Junta to the king may be given. The viceroy should be ordered to adopt the most efficient measures to prevent the French or any other foreigners from establishing a settlement on the Gulf coast. If, in view of the reports brought back by Alonso de León from his new *entrada*, the viceroy should decide that the situation so warranted, he should close the harbor of Pensacola Bay with a few worthless hulks. As far as the conversion of the Indians was concerned, the Junta said, the viceroy had already taken steps to this end, as missionaries had been sent out with Governor León.¹² Such

¹⁰"Voto del Sr. Granja," undated (between Oct. 12 and Nov. 14, 1690), 8 pp. (México, 61-6-21).

¹¹The Junta also called attention to the fact that it was apparent from Pez's diaries that he had not entered Pensacola Bay, and that his description of it was not based upon personal observation.

¹²Consulta of the Junta de Guerra, March 22, 1691, 15 pp. (México, 61-6-21). In a letter of May 15, 1693, the viceroy replied to the objections of the Junta, and accused it of ignorance and poor judgment. He said that it had confused Espíritu Santo, or Mobile, Bay with San Bernardo Bay, where La Salle had been wrecked. No one had ever believed, he said, that Mobile Bay was only one hundred leagues from Vera Cruz. The opinion of the junta that an invasion of New Spain by land was impracticable, the viceroy said, was also a fallacious one. The book of Hennepin proved that La Salle had traversed more than eight hundred leagues from the capital of New France to the Gulf of Mexico. It was therefore not improbable that the French could pene-

were the meager proportions to which the supreme military council of the Spanish colonies reduced the whole Pensacola movement after two years of deliberation.

Notwithstanding the ardent opposition of the Junta de Guerra, King Charles II was pleased to adopt an unusual course of action. He exercised his own judgment, rejected the recommendations of the majority of the Junta, and concurred in the opinion of the *fiscal* and his sole supporter, to the effect that Pez's plan for the occupation of Pensacola Bay should be carried out, with the exception of that part which called for the abandonment of St. Augustine. The resolution of the king was duly published, and obedience promised by the Junta. The matter had now entered upon a new phase. The debate had been closed. But the dissatisfaction of the Junta was still to be manifested in a tendency to delay the execution of the king's order, and to place as many obstacles as possible in the way of Pez.

In another *consulta* of September 27 following, the Junta warned the king against acting upon the uncorroborated memorial of Pez, when it was evident from his diary and other documents that he had not personally examined the bay, nor had even landed upon its shores. The king should also remember, it said, that in all of the early discussion of the Gulf coast in connection with the search for La Salle, none of the viceroys had suggested the occupation of Pensacola. The Junta believed that it was in duty bound to remind the king that in a matter of such great importance it was best to go slowly, and not to act upon doubtful information. It therefore advised that copies of all pertinent documents should be sent to the viceroy in order that he might fully acquaint himself with the merits of both sides of the question. He should then be instructed to send capable pilots and engineers to examine Pensacola Bay, and learn definitely the truth about it. At the same time a thorough exploration should be made by sea and land expeditions of the

trate the 450 leagues that lay between Pensacola and México. He disposed in like fashion of the other arguments of La Granja and the Junta (The Count of Galve to the king, May 15, 1693, 9 pp. (México, 61-6-21).

region between Pensacola and Espíritu Santo Bays.¹³ When the viceroy should have executed these orders, he should remit the various reports and maps to the king, together with his personal opinion, so that the whole matter might be reconsidered by the Junta. If in the meantime the viceroy should have reason to believe that it was advisable to occupy Pensacola at once, he should be given authority to place the bay in the best possible state of defence, making use of any available funds at his command. Supplies which were lacking in New Spain for such an undertaking should be remitted to the viceroy without delay. If they were not needed at Pensacola, they could be used by other presidios. The Junta also advised the king to inform the viceroy that no change was to be made in the presidio of St Augustine, but that its supplies should be sent with the utmost regularity.¹⁴

The king accepted the Junta's recommendations, noting on the margin of the *consulta* the customary laconic "*como parece*." Another long delay ensued, however, and the formal *cédula* was not issued until June 26, 1692. The viceroy was thereby definitely commanded to send land and sea expeditions to make a detailed examination of Pensacola Bay, and to explore the Gulf region westward as far as "Espíritu Santo Bay."¹⁵ The Pensacola project had finally reached the stage of preliminary action. Its promoter had long since become discouraged, and had secured permission to resume his duties in New Spain. His interest in Pensacola did not wane, however, and he was to continue to play the leading part in the movement which he had inaugurated.¹⁶

¹³The Junta was apparently thinking of San Bernardo Bay, and not of Mobile Bay. The colonial officials were to interpret "Espíritu Santo" as Mobile Bay.

¹⁴Consulta of the Junta de Guerra, Sept. 27, 1691, 5 pp. (México, 61-6-21).

¹⁵Real *cédula*, 3 pp. (México, 61-6-21).

¹⁶Just when Pez returned to Mexico is not clear. Some time in 1691 or 1692 he presented a petition to the king, recounting his past services, and his efforts to secure action in regard to Pensacola. He said that he had spent all of his available funds during his residence in Spain, but without success. He therefore asked to be allowed to return to his post at Vera Cruz (Pez to the king, undated, 2 pp., México, 61-6-21). During his stay in Spain, Pez was made a knight of the military order of Santiago.

The Pez-Sigüenza Expedition of 1693.—Upon receipt of the royal dispatch, the Count of Galve took immediate steps to carry out the exploration which had been ordered. A junta general was held in México on December 17 to discuss necessary measures. It was unanimously agreed that Andrés de Pez, who by this time had been promoted to the post of admiral of the windward squadron, would be the logical person to place in command of the sea expedition. All other measures were left to the discretion of the viceroy.¹⁷ Dr. Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora, one of the most noted scholars and scientists of New Spain, was selected by the viceroy to accompany and assist Pez. Sigüenza was at this time professor of mathematics in the Royal University of Mexico, and chief cosmographer of the kingdom. Laureano de Torres y Ayala, governor-elect of Florida, was chosen to lead the land expedition. Torres had only recently arrived in Mexico on his way to take possession of his post. Complete instructions were drawn up for the leaders of the expedition on January 12, 1693. As the land expedition was to play a minor part in the plans for the occupation of Pensacola, further consideration of it will be deferred until the results of the Pez-Sigüenza expedition have been fully reviewed.

Pez and Sigüenza were furnished with separate sets of instructions. Pez was ordered to equip two war vessels for the voyage. Each was to have a complement of one hundred and twenty men, and to carry supplies for eighty days. The departure from Vera Cruz was to be made at the end of March or early in April, and the course directed straight to Pensacola. Soundings should be made of the bay; the best sites for a presidio and settlement determined upon, the rivers of the vicinity explored, and investigations made in regard to stone quarries, the fruits and products of the country, the nature of the Indians, and all other matters of interest. When these activities should have been concluded, the expedition was to proceed to Mobile, or Espíritu Santo Bay. If no more than twenty *palmos* of water

¹⁷Junta general, June 2, 1693, summarizing action of junta of Dec. 27, 1692, in Testimonio De las Dilixencias executados en Virtud de Rl Zedula de S Mgd. Sobre El reconocimiento de la Bahia de Santa Maria de Galue (antes Panzacola), etc., p. 51 (México, 61-6-21).

were found at its entrance, no further investigation need be made there. In such case, the vessels should proceed to the Río de la Palizada, or the Colbert, as it was called by the French. A party should be sent to explore that river as long as their supplies would last, exercising the same care as in the examination of Pensacola Bay. The Indians should be conciliated by means of liberal gifts, and inquiries made concerning the French who lived in Canada. The expedition was then to return as quickly as possible to Vera Cruz, in order that a report might be sent to the king in the fleet that would return to Spain during the summer months. Sigüenza's instructions were limited to the details of the work in which he was expected to engage. He was to draw maps of Pensacola Bay, the coast-line of the Gulf, and the Palizada River, and to write an accurate and scientific description of the regions visited.¹⁸

The two vessels sailed from Vera Cruz on March 25. Sigüenza kept a journal, which is a striking testimony to his reputation as a scholar, and constitutes the chief authority for the expedition. The Mississippi was sighted in seven days, and in six more Pensacola Bay itself was reached. As the ships sailed into the broad expanse of water, Sigüenza recalled the occasions on which it had been visited by explorers in the past: how it had been described by the Inca in his History of Florida; how it had been the scene of the misfortunes of Narváez and Cabeza de Vaca; how it must be the same bay which Hernán de Soto had called Achussi; and the one which Tristán de Luna y Arrellano had attempted to colonize at the command of Philip II. Remembering that the bay had been entered by the last named leader with his great armada of fourteen ships on St. Mary's Day (August 14), and had therefore been named after the Virgin, Pez and Sigüenza decided that it would be unjust to defraud it of such a great honor. They accordingly rechristened it "Bahía de Santa María de Galve."¹⁹ the cognomen of the viceroy being added to the holy name of the Virgin. Admiral Pez

¹⁸Instructions to Pez, Jan. 12, 1693; *ibid.*, 46-50; instructions to Sigüenza, *ibid.*, 2-4.

¹⁹This name was in later years corrupted into "Santa María de Gálvez," probably because of the prominence of the great Gálvez family.

ordered that the new name should be inscribed on the official map of the expedition. The *Te Deum Laudamus* was sung, and formal possession of the bay taken in the name of the king. While these ceremonies were in progress, the vessels had passed through the channel, and at three o'clock anchor was cast in the inner harbor.

The shallop which had been carried along was at once made ready for the work ahead. On the following day, April 8, an exploring party was organized, which included Pez, Sigüenza, the pilot Pedro Fernández Cenrra, and Captain Juan Jordan. Jordan had been with Barroto and Romero on the voyage of 1686, and since that time had always been one of the most enthusiastic panegyrists of Pensacola Bay. He was to be closely associated with its later occupation. The entrance to the bay was first examined, in order to learn whether it would be possible to build fortifications that would command the entire channel. A trigonometrical calculation was made by Sigüenza, and it was found that the distance between the nearest points was approximately three thousand *varas*. The point on the east was named "Punta de Sigüenza." While the professor was engrossed in his mathematical problems, the other members of the party were enjoying the idyllic pastime of fishing, and marveled at the great variety of fine fish which swarmed in the water. The channel was next sounded. Its greatest depth was found to be eight *varas* for a distance of about twelve hundred *varas*, gradually becoming less as the shore was approached on either side. The party then landed on the western extremity. A prominent bluff was named "Barranea de Santo Tomé." Although the beach was covered with dazzling white sand, Sigüenza praised it highly, and thought it would be an excellent site for a fort. During the succeeding days, the inner shores of the bay and the various streams that flowed into it were explored. On the 11th the mouth of the first river was found. It was named in honor of Captain Jordan. As the boat was turned into the stream, several dark objects were seen on the banks, and their rapid flight proved them to be Indians. A landing was made, but only the deserted camp was found, guarded by a fiercely vociferous dog. A lighted fire was still burning, and over it hung pieces of half-cooked buffalo meat. The place was called "El Robledal"

from the many oaks in the vicinity. After erecting a cross, and leaving a quantity of food for the natives, the party continued up the stream, which Sigüenza notes as being lined with majestic pines, suitable for ship masts. Soon several more Indians were seen, and an effort made to communicate with them. But the aborigines threw away the burdens that they carried, and retreated in headlong flight. Their camp was found nearby, surrounded by a multitude of articles, which the Indians had abandoned in their haste. Charred buffalo meat reduced to a fine powder, pottery, horn spoons, gourds, furs, red ochre, wooden combs, and as Sigüenza says, a "thousand other little things" were noted. The place was called "El Baratillo," from its resemblance to a junk-shop. The river was ascended several leagues further, but the fallen trunks of trees barred further progress. On the return trip, the camps of the Indians were again visited. They were still deserted. The articles that had been left by the Spaniards, however, had been removed, and at El Robledal the Indians had erected another cross, leaving a buffalo skin on it as a peace offering.²⁰

On the following day a much larger river was found, which was called "Río del Almirante," in honor of Admiral Pez. Sigüenza said that he hoped that the name would perpetuate forever the memory of the man who was endeavoring to add a new kingdom to the royal dominions. The river was traversed for several leagues, and was judged to be easily navigable for ships of at least four hundred tons' burden. On the 13th a search was made for the village of the Panzacola tribe, but no signs of human habitation were found, except for a solitary hovel deserted by its former occupants. The active work of exploration was continued until the 17th, the whole compass of the bay having been examined by that time. A third river was found, which was named "Río de Jovenazo," after the Duke of Jovenazo, one of the prominent officials of Spain. Nine days were then spent in making preparations for the continuation of the voyage. Wood and water had to be secured, and a new main-mast placed on one of the ships. When the old mast was removed it was found

²⁰From the appearance of their canoes, these Indians were believed to live a considerable distance away.

to be badly decayed. Only a miracle could have prevented it from giving way during the bad weather that had been experienced. To attest their gratitude to Providence, the explorers erected a mammoth cross on Sigüenza Point, and it was duly consecrated amid the booming of the frigates' guns. Just as mass was beginning, a soldier died, and was later buried near the majestic cross. Two days later (April 26) the ships sailed out of the bay, having remained there just one day less than three weeks.

Mobile Bay was found after some difficulty on April 29. Its channel was sounded, and was reported to measure only twenty *palmos* in depth. This being the case, in accordance with Pez's instructions, no further examination was made. By May 5 the expedition had arrived at a place called "Laguna de Pez,"²¹ The ships were safely anchored, and a party sent out in the shallop in search of the Río de la Palizada. Cape Lodo was sighted on the next day, and from it the Palizada could be seen. The mouth of the river was found to be obstructed by a great mass of driftwood and numerous sand bars, just as had been reported by previous expeditions. The party of sixteen men tried to row the boat through one of the narrow channels, but were swept back by the force of the current. Sigüenza says that all were astounded to learn the true nature of this supposedly great and celebrated river. The ships were then regained, and the homeward journey begun. Vera Cruz was reached on May 13, after a remarkably short voyage of five days.²²

The results of the expedition.—Sigüenza immediately forwarded his journal to the viceroy, and drew up in addition a paper in which he summarized his work, and presented his recommendations. He thought that fortifications should be erected both at Punta de Sigüenza and the Barranca de Santo Tomás. The castles would have to be built of wood, but that had been found

²¹See map, on opposite page.

²²The above account is based almost entirely upon Sigüenza's excellent journal, in *Testimonio De las Dilixencias executadas*, etc., pp. 4-33. A few additional details of the exploration of the mouth of the Mississippi are given in "Declaron. de Pilotos y otras personas del reconocimto de la Bahía de Santa Maria de Galve," *ibid.*, 42-43. See also Pez to the viceroy, June 1, 1693, *ibid.*, 40-41; and the viceroy to the king, June 9, 1693, pp. 1-3 (México, 61-6-21).

Contemporaneous sketch-map illustrating Pez-Sigüenza Expedition of 1693.
 (Tracing from photograph of the original in A. G. I.,
 México, 61-6-17.)

necessary in many other parts of the Indies. The best site for a settlement, he said, would be found on the beautiful Río del Almirante. He thought it probable that this river took its rise far toward the north, probably in one of the lakes of Canada. It doubtless flowed through a rich country, and whoever followed its course into the interior, and developed the trade and resources of the country would surely reap great profits. Sigüenza believed that the place called El Robledal, on the Río Jordan, would also be a good site for a settlement, as communication with Apalache and the rest of Florida could easily be opened up from that point. The map which Sigüenza had drawn of Pensacola Bay was also forwarded to the viceroy from Vera Cruz.²³

Admiral Pez waited until he reached the capital before submitting his report. He summarized very briefly the events of the voyage, referring to Sigüenza's journal for details. He called especial attention to the great size of Pensacola Bay, and its strategic position in the Gulf. He believed that it was absolutely necessary to fortify the bay, since the French king had already tried to establish a settlement at the mouth of the Palizada River or at some port in its vicinity in order to facilitate communication with his colonies in New France. This plan had only been frustrated through La Salle's misfortunes. It was probable that as soon as France was free of the war then in progress, she would renew her efforts to secure a port on the Gulf shore. Pez besought the viceroy to acquaint the king with all of these facts, and to ask royal aid in the task of fortifying the bay. The cost of the necessary supplies, he said, would be very moderate, as was shown by the estimate that he had submitted to the Junta de Guerra in the previous year. The total amount required was only a little more than 13,000 pesos. It would be necessary, however, Pez explained, to procure these supplies from Spain, as well as the troops and colonists that would be needed; for, otherwise, the expense would be much greater.²⁴

²³Sigüenza to the viceroy, May 15, 1693, in *Testimonio De las Dilixencias executadas*, 33-38. The map is reproduced opposite page 160.

²⁴Pez to the viceroy, June 1, 1693, *ibid.*, 40-41. Pez evidently referred to supplies only, for an estimate of the expense of occupying Pensacola presented to the Junta de Guerra in 1691, gave the total cost as 197,700 pesos, or 13,180 escudos. This included the pay of 200 troops, however (México, 61-6-21, 3 pp. MS).

On June 1 Sigüenza made still another report, pointing out specifically the danger that would result if Pensacola was not at once occupied. He praised the Bay of Santa María de Galve in most extravagant terms. It was the finest jewel that the king possessed, not only in America, but in the whole empire, because it combined all of those advantages which, taken singly, made other bays famous. Ships of no mean size could approach its very beach without difficulty. Anchor could be cast at almost any spot within its area of approximately twenty-two square leagues. It could shelter with ease all of the armadas of the universe. It had a capacity for more than one hundred shipyards, and could furnish lumber and masts for vessels of all dimensions. A bay with such attractions was certain to be coveted by foreign nations. Once allow them to settle there, and they could be dislodged only at great cost. Sigüenza enumerated once more all of the familiar arguments to prove the danger from the French, and made this prophetic statement:

If less accurate reports [than are now available] induced the French king to send a squadron to the Gulf of Mexico in search of the Río Colbert, in order to reach New France by that route, who will not be persuaded that, as soon as he is relieved of the present war in Europe, he will attempt a second time, with definite information, an enterprise which failed the first time from lack of such information?²⁵

Although the land expedition under Governor Torres had not yet been completed, and no report had been received concerning it, the viceregal government felt that it was in a position to take definite action. Even the most strenuous opponent of the Pensacola project could no longer complain of the paucity of information in regard to the bay. At a junta general of June 2, all of the documents and reports were considered. The results of the maritime expedition were set forth, the arguments of Pez and Sigüenza recapitulated and the proceedings of the Junta de Guerra and the king's *cédula* again reviewed. It was noted that the royal order had authorized the viceroy to use his discretion, and to place Pensacola Bay in the best possible state of defence if, in view of the results of the exploring expeditions, it seemed advisable to take such action. The members of the junta were

²⁵Sigüenza to the viceroy, June 1, 1693, *ibid.*, 43-46.

unanimously in favor of taking advantage of this permission, and of effecting the occupation of the bay without delay. It was therefore resolved that temporary fortifications should be constructed at Pensacola until a full report could be sent to the king, and the necessary assistance obtained from Spain for placing the new establishment upon a secure and permanent footing. A committee, consisting of Pez, Sigüenza, and the *factor*, Sebastián de Guzmán, was appointed to decide upon the best methods of procedure. When their report was concluded, the viceroy should then supply the necessary funds, and give final orders for the inauguration of the work.²⁶

The conference of the three experts took place two days later. They were unable to agree upon a uniform plan of action, and in consequence each submitted a separate report to the viceroy. Sigüenza drew up his suggestions with his usual thoroughness, carefully anticipating every contingency that might arise. He urged that fifty men be sent at once to Santa María de Galve. Establishing their camp on the Río Jordan, they should first locate the village of the Panzacola Indians, and win the favor and aid of the natives through suitable gifts. The governor of Florida should be instructed to send a number of settlers, with supplies of fresh provisions, and cattle and horses. Communication would thus be opened up with Florida proper. The principal settlement should then be built on the Almirante River. As it would require some time for the expected families to arrive from Spain, proclamations should be issued in the chief cities of New Spain, offering titles of nobility and other inducements to prospective emigrants. By the joint labor of these settlers and the Indians, timber could be cut, brick and cement manufactured, and the fortifications constructed. The main fort should be located at the Barranca de Santo Tomás, and should have a garrison of from eighty to one hundred men. All of these operations, Sigüenza said, could probably be carried out within a year's time, if the right sort of person was chosen to superintend the work, and all parties did their duty.²⁷

The *factor*, with his more intimate knowledge of the resources

²⁶Junta general, June 2, 1693, *ibid.*, 50-55.

²⁷Sigüenza to the viceroy, June 4, 1693, *ibid.*, 55-59.

of the viceroyalty, said that it was useless to attempt to colonize Santa María de Galve from New Spain. The impossibility of providing the necessary funds, settlers, and supplies, he said, could readily be seen when it was remembered that the government was at that time unable to equip the families that were waiting to return to the important province of New Mexico.²⁸ The occupation of Pensacola was too urgent a matter, however, to permit of delay. It would be possible to hold the bay temporarily until reinforcements were sent from Spain. Twenty-five soldiers could be sent thither from Florida, and an equal number from Vera Cruz. The aid of the settlers of Apalache and of the Indians could be secured, and a small fort built at the mouth of one of the rivers flowing into the bay. If the enemy should land, he could easily be repulsed, as the wooded nature of the country was well adapted for the laying of ambushes. The *factor* cited his own experience in Santo Domingo as evidence of the ability of a small force to cope with a superior enemy. With less than six hundred men, he said, he had killed more than eight thousand Englishmen during the war of 1655.²⁹

Admiral Pez was opposed to any such temporary makeshifts as Sigüenza and Guzmán had suggested. A weak establishment, he said, would merely invite attack, not only by some foreign nation, but also by any wandering band of pirates. Unless the supplies that he had asked for in his estimate could be secured from Spain, he believed that it would be inexpedient to undertake the occupation of the bay. He therefore counselled delay until a report could be made to the king, and the necessary aid secured. In the meantime, he suggested, a frigate could be sent to reconnoiter the bay, and give warning of any new danger.³⁰

The recommendations of Pez were obviously dictated by motives of self-interest. If his original plans were carried out, he would remain the dominant figure in the movement, for he doubtless had good reason to believe that he would be chosen to

²⁸New Mexico had practically been abandoned since the Indian revolt of 1680.

²⁹Sebastián de Guzmán to the viceroy, June 4, 1693, *ibid.*, 60-62.

³⁰Pez to the viceroy, June 5, 1693, *ibid.*, 59-60.

continue the task of promoting it.³¹ His great influence with the viceregal officials made it a foregone conclusion that his plan would be adopted. The *fiscal* examined the three reports on June 5. He said that inasmuch as the committee had been unable to agree, and it was impossible to raise the necessary sum in Mexico anyway, it would be best to proceed slowly, and not jeopardize the whole project by precipitate action. He advised that Pez be sent to Spain to make a personal report, and to perfect all arrangements for the occupation of the bay.³² A junta general of June 8 definitely authorized such action. Pez was voted a salary of 2500 pesos per year while absent on his mission. He was to be furnished a credit of 20,000 pesos by the viceroy, to be drawn upon in case it proved impossible to secure funds in Spain. If the money could not be furnished by the merchants of New Spain, the *Consulado* of Seville was to be asked to advance it, reimbursement to be made later, as had been done on similar occasions.³³

The viceroy drew up his formal report on June 9, taking care this time to give his own personal opinion on the question. He said that the careful exploration that had been made fully established the fact that the Bay of Santa María de Galve was as important as had been claimed, and that it should be occupied as soon as possible. In accordance with the opinion of his advisory council, he was therefore sending Admiral Pez to Spain to secure the necessary men and supplies. The viceroy explained that it had been impossible to obtain funds through the merchants, as had been hoped, since all available credits in Seville had been utilized in the purchase of food to be shipped in the outgoing fleet. He was therefore writing a letter to the *Consulado* of Seville, asking it to lend the 20,000 pesos that would be required, pledging as security the royal revenues in the treasury branches of Vera Cruz and Mexico. He trusted that the king would approve of his action, and would authorize the enlistment of the two hundred troops, as well as the purchase

³¹For Sigüenza's charges against Pez in this connection, see page 177, *infra*.

³²Respuesta fiscal, June 5, 1693, *ibid.*, 62-64.

³³Junta general, *ibid.*, 64-69.

of the supplies contained in the list to be presented by Pez. In the meantime, the viceroy said, he would send Jaime Franck,³⁴ the only military engineer in the country, to Santa María de Galve, to inspect the prospective site of the fort, and mark out the preliminary plans, so that everything might be ready by the time that Pez returned. In regard to the land expedition that had been authorized, the viceroy explained that, although it was then engaged in the work of exploration, no reports had been received from it. This would make little difference, as the expedition would serve chiefly to mark out sites for future settlements, and to promote the conversion of the natives, and would have little influence upon the plans for the occupation of Santa María de Galve.³⁵

This official letter, the bulky *testimonios* of the exploration, and Sigüenza's map were all made ready, and sent to Spain in the fleet that departed shortly afterwards. Admiral Pez embarked at the same time, fully armed with arguments and incontestible proofs of the truth of his early representations.

The land expedition under Laureano de Torres y Ayala, 1693.—Before passing on to a consideration of the next stage in the development of the Pensacola movement, it will be necessary, for the sake of completeness, to trace briefly the results of the land expedition that had been sent out by the viceroy under the command of Laureano de Torres y Ayala. Torres was given instructions to explore the Gulf region between Pensacola and

³⁴Franck was an Austrian engineer, who had gone to New Spain with the Count of Monclova. He had done very efficient work in the construction of the Castle of San Juan de Ulúa, and in planning other fortifications for the city of Vera Cruz. He was a eccentric character, but thoroughly competent in his profession. His name is given as "Jaime Lajonk" (!) in Lowery, *Descriptive list of maps of the Spanish possessions within the present limits of the United States*, p. 214 (Washington, 1912; P. Lee Phillips, editor).

³⁵The viceroy to the king, June 9, 1693, 9 pp. (México, 61-6-21). Three days later the viceroy wrote a personal note to the secretary of the Council of the Indies, stating that he was sending Pez to report on the Pensacola matter, and expressing his opinion that Pez would be able to convince the most skeptical person as to the importance of the occupation of the bay (The viceroy to Juan de la Rea, June 12, 1693, 6 pp., *ibid.*).

Mobile Bays. Fray Rodrigo de la Barreda, *guardian* of the Franciscan convent of Havana, formerly a missionary in the Apalachicola district, was selected to accompany him. The two leaders sailed from Vera Cruz on February 24, and arrived at Havana on March 17. In spite of this early start, they did not reach Florida until after Pez and Sigüenza had concluded their exploration. With a force of twenty-five soldiers furnished by the governor of Havana, they arrived at Apalache on May 15. Reinforcements and a number of Indian guides were provided, and on June 8 the march to Pensacola was begun. The vessel was sent to reconnoiter the coast, and to await the land forces at Pensacola Bay. After a tedious march over a rough and unknown country, Torres and his men arrived at the bay on July 2. With the aid of the guides, they at once found the site of the Panzacola village. Only the deserted houses of the village were to be seen, for the tribe, according to the statements of the accompanying Indians, had finally been exterminated through the long war which they had been forced to wage with the Mobilas. The ship was found anchored in the bay. Torres then proceeded to examine the locality in the same careful fashion as Pez and Sigüenza had done two months previously. The continuation of the journey by land to Mobile Bay was given up, as the guides said that progress would be very difficult because of the many swamps and creeks that must be crossed. Two of the pilots were therefore despatched in the ship to reconnoiter the bay. They were gone for ten days, and made a thorough examination of the harbor. No Indians were encountered, and it was said that the Mobilas had retired toward the north in order to trade with the English colonists of Carolina. On August 5 Governor Torres was ready to take up his march to St. Augustine. He wrote letters from "La Gran Baya de Panzocola" to the king and the viceroy, sending to the latter the diary and *autos* of the expedition. He described Pensacola as a good port, capable of being fortified with ease, but lacking in building stone, and uninhabited by native tribes.³⁶

³⁶The diary and autos have not yet come to light. The above summary is based on the following documents: Horden y Instrucion q a de executar Don Laureano de Torres y Ayala, Jan. 12, 1693, 8 pp.; the viceroy to the king, May 12, 1693, 5 pp.; same to same, June 9, 1693, 9 pp.; Torres to the king, Aug. 5, 1693, 7 pp. (all in (México, 61-6-21).

The land expedition had thus been delayed until, as has been seen, it had little bearing upon the plans for the occupation of Pensacola Bay. The viceroy did not report the results of the exploration until May of the following year. During these months nothing was done toward sending an engineer to lay out the plan of the proposed fortifications. The viceroy had evidently decided to allow the case to rest on the findings of the Pez-Sigüenza expedition, and to take no further action until the outcome of Pez's mission to Spain was apparent.³⁷

The royal order of 1694, and continued procrastination.—The viceroy's dispatch of June 9, 1693, with Sigüenza's journal and map and accompanying documents, reached Spain in December following: There was no longer any active resistance manifested by the Junta de Guerra. Indeed, as a result of its recommendations,³⁸ a *cédula* was issued on June 13, 1694, instructing the viceroy to begin without further delay the occupation and fortification of Santa María de Galve Bay, according to the specifications which the military engineer, Jaime Franck, might have prepared. The details were left to the discretion of the viceroy. He was again cautioned, however, against making any change in St. Augustine. While the preliminary occupation was being carried out from New Spain, the *cédula* continued, the king would make arrangements to send the two hundred troops that had been asked for, as well as all supplies necessary to place the new establishment on a substantial basis. In accordance with the viceroy's suggestion, the *Consulado* of Seville had been asked to advance the 20,000 pesos. The king trusted to the intelligence and zeal of the viceroy to place the bay in a con-

³⁷The autos were remitted by the viceroy, with an official report, on May 12, 1694. He observed that there were some discrepancies between the figures of Torres and Sigüenza, but that this was probably due to the difference in season, and the varying influence of the moon. Except for a few minor details, the results of the two expeditions, he said, were identical, and showed the excellence of the region that had been visited (México, 61-6-21, 5 pp.).

³⁸Consulta of the Junta de Guerra, April 2, 1694, *Indiferente General*, 147-5-29, 9 pp.

dition to withstand any attack that might be made upon it by foreign enemies.³⁹

Having definitely authorized the occupation of Pensacola Bay, the Junta de Guerra apparently dropped the matter, and made little effort to see that its recommendations, as embodied in the royal *cédula*, were executed. Pez himself returned to America, and no one in Spain seemed to be sufficiently interested to push the project. The permission accorded to the viceroy to begin the occupation of the bay did not materially advance the enterprise. In answer to the *cédula* of June 13, the Count of Galve replied, a year and a half later, that lack of resources would prevent his taking any action until the desired assistance should be sent from Spain.⁴⁰ The death of Galve early in 1696 removed one of the most enthusiastic advocates of the movement. His letter served, however, to call the attention of the Junta de Guerra to the whole matter again, and in December, 1696 an investigation was instituted to learn why the troops and supplies which had been authorized two and a half years before had not been sent to Pensacola. It was discovered now that the *Consulado* of Seville had refused to advance the 20,000 pesos, and that consequently nothing whatever had been done in the matter. Upon receipt of this surprising intelligence, the Junta decided to make an attempt to raise the required funds through an *asiento* with private individuals. The president of the Casa de la Contratación was accordingly requested to endeavor to find some person who would agree to finance the undertaking. The governorship of the new post was offered as an inducement, and other special favors were promised.⁴¹ The president replied on January 21, 1697 that he would spare no efforts to strike a bargain with some responsible individual.⁴²

This belated outburst of energy proved to be merely a flash

³⁹Real *cédula*, June 13, 1694, 4 pp. (México, 61-6-21); Para despachar una carta del Virrey Conde de Galbe de 12 Junio de 1693. 12 pp. (*ibid.*).

⁴⁰Para despachar una carta del Virrey Conde de Galve de 10 de Dice. 1695, 2 pp. (México, 61-6-21).

⁴¹Minuta de consulta, Dec. 13, 1696, 2 pp. (México, 61-6-21).

⁴²Para despachar una carta del Virrey Conde de Galbe de 12 de Junio de 1693 (with annotations of later date), pp. 11-12.

in the pan. Private as well as royal resources had been exhausted by the long war with France, and by the many appeals for aid that had been made by the government. Another year of procrastination was to ensue before further action was taken in regard to Pensacola. During that interval, the treaty of Ryswick was signed,⁴³ and the warring nations of Europe paused for a breathing spell before renewing the struggle. No sooner had peace been declared than the old fears of French aggression were revived in Spain. The period of inaction was at an end.

The final order for the occupation of Pensacola.—Early in 1698 trustworthy reports were received by the Spanish government that Louis XIV was preparing to carry out the old plans of La Salle, and found a colony on the Gulf of Mexico. It was said that four vessels were being fitted out in France for this purpose, and that families would be sent from Martinique, Santo Domingo, and Guadeloupe to occupy some port in the Gulf—presumably Pensacola Bay.⁴⁴ After hurried action by the Junta de Guerra, a royal *cédula* was issued on April 19, 1698, which made the founding of a presidio at Pensacola the most urgent business of the whole empire.

The *cédula*, after summarizing the whole course of events since the attempt of La Salle to settle on the Gulf coast, told of the new reports that had been received concerning French designs, and announced the king's determination to occupy the Bay of Santa María de Galve with the utmost haste. To this

⁴³September 20, 1697.

⁴⁴This information was contained in a letter written by a Spanish subject in La Rochelle to one of the ministers on March 14, 1698, and sent to Spain by special messenger (Diego de Peredo to Enrique Enríquez de Guzmán, 3 pp., México, 61-6-21). At about the same time the government came into possession of a French pamphlet, which told of the organization, under the patronage of Louis XIV, of a trading company designed to effect the colonization of Louisiana (Capítulo de librillo en q. se expresa el intento q tienen franceses en tomar pie en el Seno Mejicano, *ibid.*, 3 pp.). These documents were transmitted by the king to the Council of the Indies on April 1. On the 7th, the Council ordered a summary made of all of the "antecedentes," and on the 12th the matter was referred in all haste to the Junta de Guerra. The proceedings of the latter body are not available.

end orders had been given for the raising of the troops and supplies that had originally been asked for by the Count of Galve, so that they might be sent to New Spain without fail in the fleet that was soon to sail. In order to make sure of forestalling the French, however, the viceroy, now José Sarmiento de Valladares, Count of Montezuma, was commanded to begin immediately the preliminary occupation of the bay. He was authorized to make use of any available revenues whatsoever for this purpose. As many men as possible were to be sent to take possession of Pensacola, and the engineer, Jaime Franck, was to accompany them, in order that work on the fortifications might be gotten under way, without awaiting the arrival of the expeditionary forces from Spain. Copies of the *cédula* were addressed to the viceroy, the governor of Havana, and the *corregidor* of Vera Cruz, and were hurried to America on a special ship.⁴⁵

Not content with the steps taken by the Junta de Guerra to meet the threatened danger, the Council of the Indies began to devise additional measures for anticipating the French. Just at this time a great deal of anxiety prevailed in Spain in regard to the safety of the galleons from South America, which were long overdue. It was feared that they had met with some accident. The safe arrival of the galleons, with their store of treasure, was a matter of vital importance to the whole nation. The merchants who were most interested had therefore resolved to send out a relief expedition to investigate the causes for the delay. Two vessels were being made ready at Cadiz for this purpose, having been placed under the command of a prominent naval officer, named Martín de Aranguren Zavala. One hundred soldiers had been requested by the *Consulado* of Seville in order that discipline might be insured during the voyage. The Council of the Indies, ever on the watch for some means of relieving the bankrupt royal exchequer of additional strain, saw in this enterprise a chance to take further precautions against the designs of Louis XIV in the Gulf region. Zavala was given secret

⁴⁵Real *cédula*, April 19, 1698, in *Testimonio de Autos ejecutados en Virtud de Rl Cedula de Su Magd. Sobre la fortificazon. y Poblazon de la Bahia de Sta Ma de Galue y Panzacola*, pp. 2-7 (México, 61-6-22).

instructions, which were to govern his action in case he found upon arrival at Havana that the galleons were safe, and had already continued the voyage to Spain. In the event of such good fortune, he was to proceed at once to Vera Cruz, and join his forces to the expedition that would be sent out by the viceroy to Pensacola Bay. As Admiral Pez was then under suspension on account of alleged neglect of duty,⁴⁶ Zavala was formally commissioned as commander-in-chief of the combined expedition. The foregoing instructions were to be observed only in case Zavala found that the galleons had already departed for Spain. He was advised that, although the occupation of Pensacola was a matter of great importance, his primary duty was to insure the safe return of the galleons.⁴⁷

Still another precautionary measure was adopted by the government. Secret instructions were also given to Captain Juan Jordan, who was now in Spain, to embark in Zavala's fleet. Upon arrival at Havana, he was to deliver to the governor of the port a royal requisition for a frigate, fourteen cannon, one hundred men, and necessary supplies, including lumber for the building of a redoubt. He was then to proceed to Santa María de Galve Bay, and hold it against the enemy until the main expedition from Mexico should put in an appearance.⁴⁸

There were thus three distinct plans formulated by the home government for the occupation of Pensacola. It might reasonably be expected that one of the three would prove successful.

⁴⁶Pez was accused of cowardice and neglect of duty in connection with a combat with pirates off the coast of Cuba in 1697 (*Expediente sobre la causa y prision del general de la armada de barlovento D. Andres de Pez y el Almirante Dn. Guillermo Molfi*; Santo Domingo, 55-6-2). Although Pez was supposed to be suspended from his post, his services had been too badly needed to be dispensed with, and he was still in command of the windward squadron. He was not cleared of the charges until 1701, and until that time suffered a temporary loss of prestige.

⁴⁷Consulta of the Council of the Indies, April 22, 1698, 6 pp. (México, 61-6-21); instructions to Zavala, April 24, 1698, 4 pp. (México, 61-6-33); the king to the viceroy, April 24, 1698, 4 pp. (México, 61-6-33.).

⁴⁸Instruccion que ha de observar el Capn Dn Juan Jordan de Reyna, April 28, 1698, in *Testimonio de Autos ejecutados*, etc., 237-239.

The energy that was now manifested was in strong contrast to the indifference of previous years. Once more it had required the threat of foreign encroachment to awaken the inefficient royal government. But Spain was to show that she could still accomplish something when fully aroused to the necessity for action.

The founding of the presidio of San Carlos de Austria.—The royal *cédula* reached México on July 14, 1698, and was promised the customary obedience. As the king's orders admitted of no delay, the machinery of the viceregal government was instantly put into operation. The viceroy first called upon Sigüenza and a prominent naval officer, named Andrés de Arriola,⁴⁹ for expert advice as to the proper measures to be employed for the occupation of the bay. Arriola had visited Pensacola in 1695, and thus had personal knowledge of the region. He was henceforth to occupy as prominent a position in the later phase of the Pensacola enterprise as Pez had done in earlier years. He had been in the royal service for twenty-four years, and had successfully performed many important missions. In 1694 he had achieved much fame by a record-breaking voyage to the Philippine Islands. Upon his return he had been commissioned to clear the Gulf waters of a gang of pirates which had been especially troublesome, and it was while on this cruise that he had entered Pensacola Bay, and had also been off the mouth of the Río de la Palizada. He had recently been made *alcalde mayor* of Guanajuato, and stood high in the favor of the viceroy.⁵⁰

⁴⁹Arriola's name is usually given as "Riola," in the French documents of the period (cf Margry, iv, 386, 387, 388, etc.). This mistake was doubtless due to the peculiar form in which Arriola wrote his name—"ARIola," the "A" being obscured in a flourish of the preceding word.

⁵⁰Full details of Arriola's adventurous career are given in his "Relación de servicios," dated October 25, 1695 (México, 61-1-19, 7 pp.; enclosed with letter of the Count of Galve to the king, Dec. 29, 1695, *ibid.*, 3 pp.). He had served in three different fleets until 1691, when he became sergeant-major of the presidio of Vera Cruz. In 1694 he was appointed general of a relief expedition to the Philippines. For two years the annual galleons from those islands had failed to put in

Sigüenza and Arriola made their reports two days after the viceroy's order was issued. It was with evident satisfaction that Sigüenza learned of the determination of the crown to carry out his favorite project. Before giving his suggestions in regard to the arrangements that should be made, he could not refrain from making a few general observations concerning the whole movement. He first quoted from his report of June 1, 1693, and asked the viceroy to compare those words with the passage in the royal *cédula* which referred to the designs of the French. Comparison of the two statements, Sigüenza declared, would prove that his early predictions had been completely verified. He then explained how Pez had been able to make a detailed report on Pensacola Bay in spite of the fact that he (Pez) had never examined it personally prior to 1693. The memorial presented by Pez in 1689, Sigüenza averred, had been the work of Juan Enríquez Barroto, one of Sigüenza's students. Barroto was of a retiring disposition, however, and had not pushed the matter, whereupon Pez stepped in, appropriated the report as his own, and obtained sole credit for the ideas which it contained. Sigüenza blamed Pez for the long delay in the occupation of Pensacola, saying that the latter had thought he would get more out of the project for himself if he went to Spain to promote it in person. Sigüenza claimed that he could prove that the entire list of supplies asked for by Pez could have been procured in New Spain in the beginning. The selfish motives of one man, he said, had therefore been responsible for the long delay, and made it necessary for the royal treasury to be burdened with the extraordinary expenses which would be incurred in the hasty occupation that was then necessary. Having vented his indignation against Pez, Sigüenza then took up in his usual careful

an appearance, and Arriola was ordered to investigate. He made the voyage from Acapulco to Cavite in less than four months, learned that both of the missing galleons had been wrecked, and returned by a new route to report the news. He made the return trip in six and one-half months, having been gone less than eleven months, and thus breaking, it was said, all previous records for trans-Pacific navigation. As a reward for this service, he had been recommended by the Count of Galve for the office of president of the *audiencia* of Santo Domingo or that of governor of Havana (*ibid.*).

way the details of the actual occupation. He advised that a force of one hundred and fifty men be sent from Mexico, reinforced by troops from St. Augustine, Havana, and Apalache. Three ships would be required for the transportation of the men and supplies. The landing should be made at the Baranca de Santo Tomé, and the first defences erected there. He urged great haste, lest the French should arrive first, and offered his own services, as far as his failing health permitted, in any capacity in which he might be useful.⁵¹

Arriola's recommendations for the founding of the presidio at Pensacola differed little from those of Sigüenza. The following were the chief items that he thought necessary: Two hundred soldiers, three ships with crews of forty men each, a number of skilled workmen, and supplies for six months. He supposed that the presidio would have to be built of wood, as he had seen no stone on his visit to the bay in 1695. Fortifications should be built on each of the points at the entrance of the channel. As the distance between them was about 3,000 *varas*, it might be advisable to stretch a wooden chain in the center, so that the artillery would be able to command the channel on each side. Arriola said that he felt it to be his duty to state that the country around Pensacola, as he remembered it, was sterile, swampy, sparsely inhabited, and far from being the inviting region that others had described it to be. In view of the king's urgent orders, however, there was nothing to do but to proceed with the work of occupation. He thought the real objective of the French, however, was the Río de la Palizada, for that was doubtless the river for which La Salle had been looking when his ships were wrecked at San Bernardo Bay. Arriola said that when he had visited the Palizada on his voyage of 1695, he had seen many indications that it was a stream of great volume. He suspected that it was the one which Hernán de Soto had called "Río Grande," down which the *adelantado* had sailed for more than four hundred leagues to the open sea. It was very important to control the mouth of this great river,

⁵¹Informe de Don Cárlos de Sigüenza y Góngora, July 16, 1698, in Testimonio de Autos ejecutados, 14-29.

Arriola continued, and it should be thoroughly explored. The Río del Almirante should also be examined again, as it might prove to be a branch of the Palizada. To aid both the founding of the presidio at Santa María de Galve and the proposed exploration of the Palizada, supplies should be forwarded from Apalache, and priests sent to work among the natives of the coast region.⁵²

Arriola's report was adopted in preference to Sigüenza's,⁵³ and the actual work of preparation was begun. The *factor* had already drawn up an estimate of the cost of the expedition. The total expense amounted to 39,000 pesos. The chief items were three ships, twelve cannon, two hundred soldiers, one hundred and twenty sailors, nine artillerymen, three priests, three surgeons, twelve carpenters, six brickmasons, and four smiths, all with their helpers, making a total of 357 individuals.⁵⁴ Arriola was appointed commander-in-chief and governor of the new post. Francisco Martínez, who had been conspicuous in the early expeditions to Texas, was made sergeant-major, and second in command. Jaime Franck, the military engineer, was detailed to superintend the building of the fortifications. Recruiting progressed very slowly. Special inducements in the way of extra pay were offered. A proclamation was issued ordering all men who had served in the windward squadron to enlist, under penalty of being declared deserters in case of failure to respond. Numbers of beggars and convicts were also pressed into service. The preparations were continued throughout August and September and well into October, for there were countless details to be looked after in typical Spanish fashion. For three months Vera Cruz was the scene of bustle and activity seldom witnessed in the Spanish colonial dominions.⁵⁵

⁵²Informe de Dn Andrés de Arriola, July 16, 1698, *ibid.*, 29-33.

⁵³Respuesta fiscal, July 28, 1698, *ibid.*, 8-14.

⁵⁴Regulación de gastos, July 17, 1698, *ibid.*, 33-37.

⁵⁵The detailed autos are *ibid.*, pp. 1-166. The three priests chosen to accompany the expedition were Fathers Rodrigo de la Barreda, Alfonso Ximénez de Cisneros, and Miguel Gómez Alvarez (p. 60). On September 18 the viceroy sent to the king a brief report of progress made (México; 61-6-22, 4 pp.).

Arriola's instructions were dated September 16. They consisted of two parts. One set was to guide him in case the bay was found to be deserted; the other, in case the French had already arrived. The three ships were to keep together, and sail directly to "Santa María de Galve, commonly called Pensacola." If no signs of settlement were seen, the expedition was to enter the harbor, with great caution, however, leaving one vessel outside on sentinel duty. The troops should disembark under good military discipline, the supplies should be landed, and work on the fortifications begun at once. Franek was to draw up the plans of the presidio, and was to have general supervision of all matters connected with its construction. The Indians might be utilized in this task, but were not to be forced to labor against their will. As soon as these activities were under way, the exploration proposed by Arriola should be carried out. As soon as feasible, one of the ships should be sent to report the progress made. In the event that the French were already settled at the bay, Arriola was to bring about a general engagement with them, if after careful investigation of their numbers and strength, he thought it wise to risk battle. If the enemy was too strong to be attacked, the expedition should retire to Vera Cruz, where further measures would be decided upon.⁵⁶

The three vessels set sail from Vera Cruz on October 15.⁵⁷ They were beset by stormy weather and contrary winds, and did not reach Pensacola until November 21, after a hazardous voyage of thirty-eight days. The bay was found to be already occupied, but happily not by the French. Just a few days before, Captain Juan Jordan had taken possession of the region in the name of the king. Zavala's fleet had arrived at Havana on October 13, and the welcome news was received that the galleons were safe, and had continued their voyage to Spain. Jordan at once presented the royal order to the authorities of the port, and was given such assistance as their meager resources permitted. Only fifty men were furnished instead of the one

⁵⁶Instruccen. dada al Mre de Campo D. Andres de Arriola, *ibid.*, 166-177.

⁵⁷Oficiales reales of Vera Cruz to the viceroy, Oct. 22, 1698, *ibid.*, 183.

hundred which the king commanded. Two small vessels were made ready, with a total of six cannon. Jordan left Havana on November 6, and reached Pensacola on the 17th. Zavala had remained at Havana for two weeks, and, in accordance with his secret instructions, had continued his voyage to Vera Cruz, where he was to arrive more than a month after the departure of the forces which he was ordered to join and command.⁵⁸ Had it not been for the bad weather which delayed the progress of Arriola's fleet, the expedition sent out by the viceroy would have preceded that despatched from Spain by several days. As it was, however, Captain Jordan had the honor of being the winner of the race, and the first to begin the formal occupation of Santa María de Galve.

Upon the arrival of the main expedition, operations were begun in earnest. The troops and supplies were landed at Barranca de Santo Tomé, timber cut and hauled, and temporary quarters erected. Franck at once selected a site for the fort, and within six days a battery of sixteen guns was in position. The presidio was given the name of "San Carlos de Austria." It was built of pine logs, in the form of a square, one hundred *varas* on each side, and with four bastions.⁵⁹ To its construction Franck endeavored to give the best that was in him, because, as he said, he wished it to be, by the grace of God, the last presidio he would ever have to build in the Indies. Although the king had ordered fortifications to be erected on both sides of the entrance to the bay, it was decided to be impracticable to build a fort on the eastern point, called "Punta de Sigüenza," on account of its low and swampy nature.⁶⁰

Both Arriola and Franck were very unfavorably impressed

⁵⁸Jordan to the viceroy, Dec. 6, 1698, *ibid.*, 239-241; Zavala to the king, July 28, 1699, 6 pp. (México, 61-6-33); Jordan to the king, Nov. 7, 1699, 3 pp. (México, 61-6-22).

⁵⁹A plan of the fort is in A. G. I., México, 61-6-22. A small reproduction may be found in P. J. Hamilton's *Colonial Mobile*, p. 48 (ed. 1910).

⁶⁰Junta formada por Dn Andres de Arriola, Nov. 23, 1698, in Testimonio de Autos ejecutados, 255-261; Papel del Ingeniero Don Jaime Frank, Dec. 9, 1698, *ibid.*, 242-247; Franck to the viceroy, Dec. 20, 1698, *ibid.*, 248-254.

with the isolated region to which they had been exiled. Conditions seemed totally different from those represented in the roseate-hued picture drawn by Pez and Sigüenza a few years before. Franck was so greatly disappointed that he would have preferred, had the royal order been less imperative, to postpone the building of the presidio, and hold the bay with some sort of trench fortification until the king could be informed of the true conditions there. He thought it useless to fortify Pensacola, when there were several other bays in that region which the French might occupy at their pleasure. He believed that he was merely wasting his own time and the king's money in the work that he was carrying out.⁶¹ Arriola's dissatisfaction is clearly revealed in various letters which he wrote to the king and to the viceroy shortly after his arrival. He had only words of condemnation for the whole enterprise. The channel to the bay could not be fortified so as to prevent hostile ships from entering at will. The surrounding region was sterile. The harbor itself was unsheltered. The navigation of the adjoining coasts was extremely dangerous. In his opinion, the only justification for holding the bay would be the conversion of the few natives who lived in its vicinity.⁶²

There was no thought of abandoning the project, however, until the pleasure of the king could be learned. As soon as work on the presidio was well under way, the shallop was put together, and the immediate region about the bay was explored. The Río del Almirante was followed to its source. It proved to be an inconsiderable stream, instead of the mighty river which Sigüenza had believed it to be. The Jovenazo was also navigated for two days, but the intense cold caused the explorers to desist. None of the other streams flowing into the bay was deemed worthy of examination.⁶³ These activities merely confirmed Arriola's first opinion as to the uselessness of his mis-

⁶¹Franck to the viceroy, Dec. 20, 1698, in *Testimonio de Autos ejecutados*, 248-154.

⁶²Arriola to the king, Dec. 1, 1698, 5 pp. (México, 61-6-22); Arriola to the viceroy, Dec. 22, 1698, in *Testimonio de Autos ejecutados*, 262-269.

⁶³Arriola to the king, May 9, 1699, 9 pp. (México, 61-6-22). A map of the Pensacola region, in colors, is in this legajo. It is reproduced in Hamilton's *Colonial Mobile*, p. 44.

sion. He did not believe that the French had any designs upon Pensacola, but was convinced that their real objective was the Río de la Palizada. He therefore decided to carry out the larger work of exploration which he had planned, and to return to Mexico to report at the earliest opportunity.⁶⁴

The construction of the presidio progressed as well as could have been expected in face of the many difficulties that were encountered. The unusually cold weather, and the lack of suitable clothing and shelter entailed severe hardships upon the troops. The unruly disposition of the recruits caused trouble from the first. Some forty of the transported criminals deserted in a body, although most of them were later recaptured. The camp was split into rival factions, and quarreling and fighting were of frequent occurrence. Food was poor and scarce. Petty thievery became a veritable pest. On the night of January 3, a fire broke out, and consumed eight buildings, including the chapel, the quarters of Captain Jordan, and the chief store house of provisions. The danger of starvation was now added to the growing list of misfortunes. On the 4th, one of the vessels was dispatched to Mexico, with an appeal for succor, and at this time the unfavorable reports of Arriola and Franck were remitted to the viceroy. A few days later an incendiary fire was discovered just in time to prevent another disaster.⁶⁵ Under such adverse conditions was brought into being the new establishment by means of which Spain hoped to maintain her claim to the whole Gulf coast and lower Mississippi valley.⁶⁶

⁶⁴Arriola to the viceroy, Dec. 22, 1698, in *Testimonio de Autos ejecutados*, 262-269.

⁶⁵Jaime Franck gives a grimly humorous account of conditions at Pensacola in a letter to the secretary of the Council of the Indies, written on February 19, 1699 (*México*, 61-6-22, 9 pp.).

⁶⁶In concluding this chapter, attention should be called to the old mistake in the date of the founding of Pensacola. It has usually been given as 1696, doubtless through Barcia's *Ensayo Cronológico* (p. 316). Although the correct date may be inferred from the French sources in Margry, vol. 4, most American historians have persisted in perpetuating the old error contained in early Spanish works. Cf. Winsor's *Narrative and Critical History of America*, v. p. 17, note 1; Monette's *Valley of the Mississippi*, i, 75.

Its efficacy was soon to be tested by the speedy materialization of the danger which the expeditionary forces had been sent to counteract.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FRENCH COLONIZATION OF LOUISIANA, AND
THE IMPOTENCE OF SPAIN.

The second French invasion of the Gulf region.—On the morning of January 26 a fleet of vessels arrived before the entrance to the harbor at Santa María de Galve, and announced its presence by firing five cannon shots. A dense fog prevented the ships from being clearly perceived from shore, and, fearing that they might attempt some hostile move under cover of the fog, Arriola replied to the salute by firing three shots charged with ball. At the same time he gave orders for a boat to go forth to reconnoiter the strangers. The squadron was found to consist of five vessels, three of them being large frigates, and two small ketches. As the mist cleared away before the morning sun, they could be plainly seen, anchored at the entrance to the channel, some two leagues away. The flag of France was flying in the breeze. The Spanish colors were immediately hoisted on the unfinished fort, and preparations made to resist the expected attack. The presidio was placed in the best possible state of defence, the two vessels in the harbor were made ready for action, and men were stationed at possible landing points. One of the vessels, having no guns, was converted into a fire ship. Arriola assumed command of the meager naval forces, while Martínez was entrusted with the defence of the presidio. All of the recently apprehended deserters were pardoned in order they might assist in the approaching battle. The rest of the day, however, passed without incident.

At sunrise of the following day, the flagship of the French squadron fired a blank shot, to which Arriola replied in like manner, and a launch put forth for the presidio. In order to present as formidable an appearance as possible, all of the soldiers were stationed at their posts, care being taken to conceal their half-naked condition by arranging them so that only their heads could be seen over the parapets. Arriola received the launch on the beach, allowing only the envoy and one companion

to land. The visitors were then escorted to headquarters, where all of the officers were assembled. After the usual courtesies had been exchanged, the emissary, who gave his name as M. Escallete, delivered a message from his commander-in-chief, the Marquis de Chasteaumorant. The latter sent word that he had come at the command of the king of France to reconnoiter the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, and to drive out certain Canadian adventurers who were said to have taken refuge in that region. He asked permission to enter the bay, in order to obtain shelter for his ships, as well as to secure fuel and water for the return voyage to France. He trusted that this request would be granted in view of the friendly relations then existing between Spain and France. If the Spaniards were in need of provisions, he would be glad to supply them with anything they might desire from the ships under his command. The envoy obligingly gave full details concerning the size and strength of the squadron. The flag-ship, named the *François*, carried fifty-eight guns: the second ship, the *Marin*, had thirty-eight guns; the third, the *Badine*, had thirty-two; and the two ketches, six guns each.

Arriola drew up a reply to the French commander, in which he complimented that officer in most extravagant Spanish fashion, but expressed his regret at being unable to accede to the request that had been made. He had strict orders from his king, he said, to prevent any foreign vessel from entering the bay. In view of the good harmony then prevailing between the two crowns, however, he would send his sergeant-major, with a good pilot, to assist in anchoring the vessels at a safer place along the coast, where they would be able to secure the necessary wood and water for the continuation of their voyage.

Francisco Martínez, a pilot, and several other men accordingly returned with the emissary to the flag-ship, where they were royally entertained by the French. They learned that the expedition consisted of one thousand men, all splendidly equipped, with a large number of cattle and horses, and abundant supplies of all kinds. The two smaller vessels were kept secluded at a considerable distance away. The Spaniards were told that these vessels were captured corsairs, which had been taken off the coast of Cuba, but Martínez thought that they

contained women and children destined for the founding of a colony. The notorious pirate, Laurent de Graaf, or "Lorenzillo," as he was called by the Spaniards, was acting as pilot and interpreter for the French, and in addition a Spanish pilot, named Juan Vicente, who had formerly served in the windward squadron, had been pressed into service. Martínez was asked many questions in regard to the Gulf, especially about the Palizada, San Bernardo, the Río Bravo, and Pánuco, but gave his hosts little information, beyond stating that all of those places were very shallow and uninviting.¹

The verbal request made through his envoy having been refused, Chasteaumorant wrote a formal letter to Arriola, again asking leave to enter the bay. This letter read as follows:

Sir: The officer whom I sent to you has doubtless acquainted you with the reasons for which my master, the king of France, has ordered me to these coasts. For my own part, I greatly appreciate the compliments with which you honor me, and should like to have an opportunity of showing my appreciation. The necessity of securing wood and water obliges me to recur to the aid of Your Lordship. I therefore entreat you to allow the vessels of the king to enter that port in order that they may be sheltered in case of bad weather. As soon as we can supply our needs, we shall begin our return voyage to France. The good union existing between the two crowns should induce you to grant this request. Moreover, I pledge my word that not a man shall go ashore except with your permission, and that there will be no trading except as you may desire. I am, very sincerely, Monseigneur, your most humble and obedient servant, The Marquis de Chasteaumorant.

Arriola replied to this second appeal in the following words:

My Dear Sir: I could not better manifest the esteem in which I hold Your Lordship's person than by the letter which I wrote you in order to assure you of my friendship, and of my desire to serve you as far as may be within my power. It grieves me exceedingly that I am not able to grant the request which Your Lordship was pleased to communicate to me through your emissary, the Ship-Lieutenant, and now repeat in your letter . . . since I have express orders from my king and master (may God guard him) to prevent the entrance of any foreign vessels what-

¹Martínez to the governor of Havana, Feb. 21, 1699, 5 pp. (México, 61-6-22).

soever. In view of this, and since Your Lordship understands with what exactness such sovereign orders must be obeyed, you will not consider me discourteous if I confess that my hands are tried; and that, just as Your Lordship tries to serve your king, so I should strive to fulfill scrupulously what my master commands me to do. Nevertheless, in view of the courtesy due a person of Your Lordship's rank, and of the perfect union now existing between the two crowns, I offer to furnish you with wood and water through the labor of my own men, in case you do not find it convenient to use your own at the point immediately opposite the place where you are anchored, as I have given you to understand through the Lieutenant and my Sergeant-Major. I have also sent a pilot with orders to remove the ships to a safe position on the coast. . . . It thus appears that I have observed the laws of good faith and correspondence. I can frankly and in all amity assure Your Lordship that, according to the reports as to the size of your vessels, there is not sufficient depth in the channel for them to enter the bay. If Your Lordship or any officer wishes to land, you will be received and entertained as well as the resources of this isolated region may permit. I protest against any action beyond that which I have offered to concede. I shall consider any other measures as a manifest infraction of the peace secured at such great cost, and shall be obliged to defend myself in order not to violate the instructions of my king and master as specified above. I am at Your Lordship's service, with all good will and desire to assist you to the utmost of my ability. May God protect Your Lordship many and happy years. Bay of Santa María de Galve, January 28, 1699. I kiss the hand of Your Lordship, your most affectionate servant, Andrés de Arriola.²

On the morning of the 29th the boats from the French ships were observed to be engaged in sounding the channel. Arriola at once sent an officer to order them to retire. The leader, who was "Lorenzillo," answered in good Spanish that they would obey, and the sounding party immediately returned to the ships. Upon receipt of Arriola's second letter, a council of war was held on the flag-ship, and it was evidently decided not to tarry longer at Santa María de Galve. Chasteaumorant wrote a farewell missive to Arriola, announcing that he would proceed to

²This correspondence is enclosed with a letter of Arriola to the king, dated May 9, 1699 (México, 61-6-22). Copies are also contained in Testimonio de Autos ejecutados, 282-284.

carry out the orders of his king for the extermination of pirates in the Gulf. He could not refrain, he said, from protesting against the inhospitality of the Spaniards during a time of peace, when Spanish ships would be cordially welcomed in any port belonging to France. He appreciated, however, the courtesy with which he had been treated. On the 30th the squadron took its departure, and was lost to view on the western horizon.³

Such was the nature of the first encounter between Spanish forces and the Iberville expedition, for such, of course, was the identity of the squadron which had appeared at Pensacola. It may be well at this point to depart from the Spanish sources, and recall the essential facts of that well-known expedition as they really occurred, before proceeding further with the Spanish side of the narrative.

The warning message which reached Madrid early in 1698 had not been based upon idle rumor, but was abundantly justified by events that were then transpiring in France. After a lapse of thirteen years, plans to carry out La Salle's old enterprise were finally under way. The conclusion of the treaty of Ryswick had enabled Louis XIV to turn his attention once more to the extension of his colonial possessions in America. The necessity for prompt action was apparent. England was known to be preparing to secure her share of the empire that would be left without a master upon the demise of the rapidly failing king of Spain. Reports of the organization of an English company for the exploitation of the Mississippi valley reached France just at the time that a similar project was being promoted by Remondville and his associates. The danger from the English seemed so imminent that the French government was unwilling to trust the colonization of Louisiana to a private commercial company,

³The preceding account is based on a number of letters written by the various officers at Pensacola. The most important are the following: Arriola to the viceroy, Feb. 20, 1699, in *Testimonio de Autos ejecutados*, 284-289; Martínez to the viceroy, Jan. 31, *ibid.*, 281-282; Franck to the viceroy, Jan. 31, *ibid.*, 278-281; Franck to Martín de Sierra Alta, secretary of the Council of the Indies, Feb. 18, 1699, 8 pp. (México, 61-6-22); Arriola to the governor of Havana, Feb. 2, 2 pp.; Martínez to same, Feb. 21, 5 pp.; Jordan to same, Feb. 15, 5 pp.; Arriola to the king, May 9, 1699, 9 pp. (*ibid.*).

but decided to make the enterprise a royal one. The outcome of several months' preparations was the Iberville expedition, which sailed from Brest on October 24, 1698. Iberville's fleet consisted of four vessels, bearing about two hundred men and all necessary supplies for the founding of a colony, while a powerful frigate under the command of the Marquis de Chasteaumorant, was dispatched to Santo Domingo, with orders to join the expedition at that island in order to furnish additional protection against the English. Iberville arrived at the French settlements in Santo Domingo early in December, and spent the remainder of that month in making arrangements for the final stage of his voyage. It was during this time that the master filibuster, Laurent de Graaf, and a number of his adventurous companions, joined the expedition. Further alarming reports of English activities were received, but it was apparently not suspected that the Spaniards had occupied Pensacola. Iberville was unable to obtain any definite information in regard to the location of the Mississippi River, and, in order to avoid the mistake of La Salle, decided to make for the Florida coast, and follow the mainland closely until the great river should be discovered. This decision led, of course, to the meeting with the forces of Arriola at Pensacola, where, as has been seen, Iberville was careful to remain in the background. The expedition then proceeded westward, visiting Mobile Bay, and finally stopping at a safe anchorage along the coast, now called Ship Island. From this point the exploration was continued in canoes, and on March 2 the Mississippi was found and entered.⁴ In April a temporary fort was built at Biloxi, and Iberville returned to France to report to the king, and to make further plans for the development of the new colony.⁵ In spite of the proximity of the new

⁴The ease with which Iberville's party passed through the mouth of the Mississippi reveals clearly the incapacity and lack of diligence on the part of the various Spanish explorers who had attempted to navigate its waters.

⁵The French sources relating to Iberville's expedition and its preliminaries are printed in Margry, *Découvertes et Etablissements des Français*, vol. 4. Good secondary accounts may be found in Fortier, *History of Louisiana*, i, 30 *et seq.*, and in Ogg, *The Opening of the Mississippi*, 171-182.

settlement to Pensacola, it was to be a full year before the Spaniards learned definitely of its existence. We are now ready to return to the situation at Pensacola.

As soon as the French squadron had departed, Arriola called a council of his officers to discuss the situation. The flimsy falsehoods of the visitors had deceived no one. It was clear to all that the French had come fully prepared to found a colony in the Gulf region. It was supposed that, since they had found Pensacola already occupied, they would seek a suitable location further west. Arriola believed that if they did not settle at Mobile Bay, they would explore the Río de la Palizada, and probably establish themselves at San Bernardo Bay, which he thought to be identical with the place called "Mississippi." In the council of war, Arriola submitted three questions, upon which the members were asked to give their opinions in writing: First, as to the advisability of sending a boat to observe the movements of the French; second, as to whether Arriola should remain at Pensacola, or embark at once for Mexico, to secure needed supplies and naval forces to prevent the French from accomplishing their designs; third, any general suggestions for defence were invited. The officers were unanimously opposed to sending a vessel in pursuit of the squadron. There could be no doubt as to the intentions of the French, the vessel would only be captured, and valuable time lost in giving the alarm. With one exception, all of the members of the junta urged Arriola to leave at once for Mexico,⁶ and make a personal appeal to the viceroy for supplies and reinforcements.⁷ In accordance with the resolution of the council—a resolution which, we may be sure, was entirely in harmony with the wishes of the commanding officer—Arriola sailed for Vera Cruz on February 2, leaving Francisco Martínez in charge of the garrison and presidio.

The Darien episode, and its connection with Pensacola and Louisiana.—Arriola arrived in New Spain during a period of

⁶Juan Jordan thought that Arriola should remain at the presidio, and send some of his subordinates to Mexico. He hinted that he himself would be entirely competent to undertake the mission.

⁷The junta was held on January 30. The opinions of the various officers are given in Testimonio de Autos ejecutados, 305-325.

great excitement. Early in the previous November the viceroy had received word from the governor of Carácas that a large number of Scotch settlers were planning to found a colony at Isla de Oro, on the Isthmus of Darien. This report was confirmed in January by a dispatch from the governor of Havana, who enclosed affidavits of a number of sailors to the effect that the Scotch were already en route to Darien. Upon receipt of this information, the danger was discussed in a junta general, which resolved that all available vessels be made ready for action against the invaders. Among the ships affected by this order were those belonging to the outgoing fleet and Zavala's three vessels which had been held at Vera Cruz pending the arrival of definite news from Arriola.⁸ When this preliminary action had been taken, the general alarm was still further increased by the receipt of an official dispatch from Panama, stating that five Scotch vessels, with a total of four thousand men, had arrived at Rancho Viejo, twelve leagues from Porto Bello, and that six thousand more colonists were expected in the near future. Renewed efforts were made to fit out a great armada, and every resource of the viceroyalty was strained to meet what seemed to be the most formidable aggression that had yet been attempted against Spain's colonial possessions. It was just at this juncture that Arriola arrived with his report of the new French invasion, thus adding another momentous problem to the weighty ones which already confronted the harassed colonial officials.⁹

Special councils were convoked in the capital and among the naval officers at Vera Cruz to discuss the situation. It was the

⁸Zavala had reached Vera Cruz on November 18, only to find that the expedition to Pensacola had departed several weeks before. As the viceroy had taken all necessary steps to occupy the bay, it was thought best for Zavala's fleet to remain at Vera Cruz until the outcome of Arriola's expedition could be ascertained. The first reports from Pensacola arrived in Mexico about January 23, in the vessel that had left the bay on the 4th. As these reports showed that the expedition had met with no resistance, Zavala received orders to prepare his vessels for the return voyage to Spain. The danger from the Scotch, however, caused these instructions to be rescinded, as indicated above.

⁹The viceroy of the king, July 14, 1699, pp. 1-2 (México, 61-6-22).

general opinion that the new crisis threatened more sinister consequences to New Spain than the more distant peril at Darien. The viceroy alone held out against any diversion of the naval forces then being made ready for action against the Scotch. He did not believe that there was any immediate danger from the French. Their action at Pensacola showed that they were unwilling to do anything to disturb the recently concluded peace. While the squadron under Chasteaumorant had doubtless been sent to establish a colony at Pensacola Bay, it probably returned to France upon finding the bay preempted by the forces of Spain, for, according to the reports of the various maritime expeditions, no other portion of the Gulf coast offered sufficient inducements for settlement. On the other hand, the persistence of a Scotch colony at Darien, the viceroy argued, would result in incalculable injury to all of the Indies. The aggressive foreigners would soon spread their heretical doctrines among the natives; they would seize Porto Bello and Panamá, pass to the South Sea, and eventually endanger the Philippine galleons and the southern fleet. With the aid of the English in Jamaica, they would be able to conquer all of Spain's colonies in the new world. There could be no question, the viceroy thought, as to the paramount importance of the Darien expedition over that proposed against the French.¹⁰

The viceroy was at first unable, however, to win over his subordinate officials to his own way of thinking. Arriola was tireless in his efforts to demonstrate the seriousness of the French intrusion. Zavala strongly favored prompt action against the French, and reminded the viceroy that the sole purpose of his voyage to New Spain had been to prevent them from securing a foothold on the Gulf coast. The king's *cédula* of April 19, 1698, was pointed to as irrefutable evidence of the desire of the home government that no chances be taken in the matter. Finding himself so completely in the minority, the viceroy finally allowed his own opinion to be overruled, and it was resolved that the

¹⁰The viceroy's arguments are given in a letter to Zavala, dated March 28, 1699, enclosed with a letter of the viceroy to the king, Sept. 24, 1699 (México, 61-6-33).

Darien expedition should be postponed until the Gulf was cleared of the French invaders.

Later developments, however, were to cause a speedy reversal of this decision. New reports from Panamá indicated that, while the original estimates of the number of the Scotch had been greatly exaggerated, some nine hundred of that nation were actually settled at Darien. Appeals for aid continued to be made from Cartagena. In view of the smaller number of the enemy, the viceroy decided not to delay the return of the fleet to Spain, as he had intended to do; but this action meant that all other available naval forces would be in still greater demand. As time went by, the viceroy became more and more confirmed in his opinion that no overt act of hostility was to be apprehended from the French. The governor of Pétit Gouave had manifested his desire to observe the terms of the treaty of Ryswick, and had offered to assist in exterminating the pirates of the Caribbean. The viceroy's influence finally told, and at a junta general held on April 18 it was resolved to proceed first with the expedition against the Scotch. Zavala was therefore given instructions to sail for Havana, and thence for Cartagena, where he was to join and command the naval forces that were being mobilized.¹¹ After the expulsion of the Scotch, he was to return to Vera Cruz, and await further orders. Zavala's departure was to be delayed by a series of misfortunes until well into midsummer. By the time he reached Havana, early in August, news of the voluntary retirement of the Scotch had been received. Instead of returning to Vera Cruz, however, he continued his voyage to Spain,¹² and thus had no further connection with Pensacola or the later operations against the French.¹³

¹¹This action was strictly in accord with the wishes of the king, as it later transpired; for in cédulas of March 18 and May 13, 1699, Zavala was ordered to suspend operations at Pensacola, no matter at what stage they might be, and proceed with his fleet to Cartagena to aid in the expulsion of the Scotch (México, 61-6-22).

¹²Zavala was severely censured for his disobedience of the viceroy's orders, and was eventually arrested after his arrival in Spain (Respuesta fiscal, Madrid, Feb. 8, 1700; México, 61-6-22).

¹³The above account of the Darien episode is based upon the following documents: The viceroy to the king, July 14, 1699, 10 pp. (México, 61-6-22); instructions of the viceroy to Zavala, July 26, 1699, 7 pp.; Zavala to the king, July 28, 1699, 9 pp.; the viceroy to the king, Sept. 24, 1699, 6 pp.; Zavala to the king, Jan. 11, 1700, with respuesta fiscal of

The Darien affair effectually destroyed any chances that Arriola might have had for obtaining prompt relief for the two hundred and sixty men he had left at Pensacola, or for securing naval forces with which to expel the French from the Gulf region. Immediately after his return to Mexico, he had been asked to submit a report setting forth the needs of the presidio.¹⁴ He stated that he had left provisions enough to last only until the end of May, and that supplies of all kinds were sorely needed. He drew up a list of the most urgent necessities for a period of four months and asked that they be sent as soon as possible. On account of the laborious nature of the work in which the soldiers were compelled to engage, he requested one hundred additional men to supply the places of those who had died or were unfit for service.¹⁵ By decree of March 28 the viceroy had ordered Arriola's recommendations to be carried out, adopting the fiscal's suggestion that the new men could be conscripted from the gambling houses and jails.¹⁶ Several months were to pass, however, before these orders were executed. The preparations for the Darien expedition absorbed the attention of the officials, and not until May was definite action taken in regard to the larger problems connected with Pensacola.¹⁷ A junta general of the 18th of that

¹⁴Decree of the viceroy, March 14, 1699, in *Testimonio de Autos ejecutados*, 297.

¹⁵Informe de Arriola, March 14, 1699, *ibid.*, 297-300.

¹⁶Respuesta fiscal, March 28, 1699, *ibid.*, 301-304; decree of the viceroy, March 28, 1699, *ibid.*, 304.

¹⁷In the meantime, Arriola's stay was enlivened by a controversy with Sigüenza. As a result of the unfavorable reports which Arriola had spread concerning Pensacola Bay, the old professor accused him of neglect of duty, and of general misrepresentation of conditions at the new post. On April 6 Arriola addressed a letter to the viceroy, complaining of Sigüenza's accusations, and asking that the matter be settled for once and all by a joint expedition to be made by himself and Sigüenza. He offered to pay all expenses of the voyage, so that his reputation for veracity might be vindicated (*ibid.*, 323-326). The fiscal thought Arriola's proposition a fair one, and thought that Sigüenza should be ordered to accompany Arriola on the voyage. (Respuesta fiscal, April 8, 1699, *ibid.*, 327-328). Sigüenza was in failing health, however, and asked to be excused from the mission. The old scholar died in the following year (August 22, 1700—Cabo's *Tres Siglos*, ii, p. 93).

Feb. 8, 1700, 5 pp. (México, 61-6-22). A good general account of the Scotch Darien colony may be found in Dr. C. L. G. Anderson's *Old Panama and Castilla del Oro*, 471-500 (Washington, 1911).

month was devoted to a consideration of the Pensacola question. In spite of the adverse reports of Arriola, Franck, and most of the officers of the garrison, it was decided that the only possible course to follow would be to hold the bay until the king should give orders for its abandonment. Arriola was continued in chief command of the presidio, much to his disappointment. In order to clear up any doubts in regard to the French, he was ordered to undertake another extensive exploration of the whole Gulf region as soon as he should return to his post.¹⁸

Three days later Arriola made a final effort to secure the adoption of effective measures by the viceregal government. In a letter to the viceroy he signified his willingness to sacrifice himself in the service of the king, and return to his post, even if he had to embark in a launch. He wished to remind the viceroy, however, that his original purpose in making the voyage to Mexico had been, first, to secure naval forces with which to prevent the French from establishing a settlement; second, to report the utter unfitness of Santa María de Galve; and, third, to set forth the impossibility of fortifying the bay on account of the great width of its channel. He could not promise to keep a hostile fleet from entering the bay unless he were given a number of war vessels. He did not wish his reputation to be endangered by misfortunes for which he could in no wise be to blame, and asked that all instructions should be given him with the understanding that he would be held responsible only for the defence of the presidio itself. He again suggested the blocking of the channel so that large ships could not enter the harbor.¹⁹

Arriola's letter was taken up in another junta general of May 23, but no change was made in the measures that had been authorized. All members agreed that it would be impossible at that time to furnish naval forces to prevent the French from forming a colony, or to defend the entrance to Pensacola Bay. The only vessels which would serve such purposes were those of Zavala, which were destined for Darien. There was nothing to do, therefore, but to hold the bay, maintain the fortifications

¹⁸Junta general of May 18, 1699, cited in proceedings of junta general of May 23, 1699 (*ibid.*, 334).

¹⁹Arriola to the viceroy, May 21, 1699, *ibid.*, 328-333.

already constructed, and await the decision of the king. Arriola was to defend himself as best he could, acting upon his own discretion in case of threatened attack, just as he had done when the fleet of Chasteaumorant had appeared. If Arriola's personal presence was required at the presidio, the proposed exploration should be made by Martínez and Jaime Franck.²⁰

Arriola's efforts to arouse the authorities to the seriousness of the French menace had met with failure. New complications were already at hand, however, for on May 20 a vessel had arrived at Vera Cruz from Pensacola with the surprising report that the English had begun a settlement a few leagues to the westward of Mobile Bay. In order to understand the origin of this report, it will be necessary to consider briefly the course of events at Pensacola during Arriola's absence in New Spain.

Rumors of English settlement on the Gulf coast.—On February 8 Martínez sent a pilot and four men to Mobile Bay to learn if the French squadron was still there. No ships were seen, but evidence was obtained that the French had visited the bay. At one place a number of pines had been cut down, and a cross had been erected, bearing an inscription that could not be deciphered.²¹ From this time on, the French scare seems to have subsided to a considerable degree, but in its stead came the fear of a still more formidable enemy, the English. The first anxiety at Pensacola on this score was occasioned by dispatches from Governor Torres, which reached the presidio early in February. The story related by Torres was as follows: In the summer of 1698 he had sent one of his officers, Francisco Romo de Uriza, to the neighboring colony of St. George (Carolina) with funds to pay for certain negro slaves which had been purchased from the English for the king's service. While in the governor's residence at St. George, Romo observed the presence of several Indians, and asked whence they had come. The governor replied that they lived near Espíritu Santo Bay, called Pensacola by the Spaniards. He then took a compass, and going to a large map

²⁰Junta general, May 23, 1699, *ibid.*, 333-341.

²¹Jordan to the governor of Havana; Feb. 15, 1699; Martínez to Torres, Feb. 19, 1699; same to the governor of Havana, Feb. 21, 1699 (México, 61-6-22).

on the wall, pointed out a certain bay. "This is what you call Pensacola Bay," he said to Romo, "but on the map it is given as Espíritu Santo." Romo asserted that all of the region indicated belonged to the king of Spain. The governor denied this, stating that the bay was in the same latitude as St. George, and therefore belonged to England. He then told Romo that he had read in a gazette that the kings of France and England had made a bargain to the effect that the first nation to occupy the bay should be allowed to remain in possession of it. The governor added that he himself intended to enter the race in the following year.²²

Absurd as this story may appear, it was given considerable credence by the Spaniards in Florida. Martínez became uneasy lest an open attack should be made upon his presidio. Further information sent by Governor Torres did not lessen the alarm. In January an English vessel was wrecked near St. Augustine, and a number of survivors were sheltered at the presidio. Thinking that he might be able to learn something more of the English designs, Governor Torres sent a squad of soldiers with the Englishmen to St. George. The corporal, Luís Rodrigo, reported that five vessels were at the English colony, and that a settlement was to be made at Apalache. Torres doubted this, however, and thought that the English were aiming at Espíritu Santo Bay, also called Ascension Bay, and Tampa by the natives. He therefore sent Rodrigo with a small force to reconnoiter this bay. No signs of the English were found, and the Indians said that none had been seen. While this expedition was in progress, however, the lieutenant at Apalache reported that two ships, apparently English, had appeared in the harbor, and had remained for two days. No rumor was too insignificant to receive attention, and the whole province of Florida remained in a state of unrest.²³ The danger from the French squadron now seems to have been forgotten.

²²Declaration of Romo, Oct. 24, 1698, 3 pp. This declaration was received at Pensacola on Feb. 4 (Martínez to governor of Havana, Feb. 21, 1699).

²³Torres to the king, Sept. 16, 1699, enclosing autos and diary of Rodrigo's journey to Tampa Bay, 24 pp. (México, 61-6-22); Torres to the king, Jan. 5, 1699, 4 pp. (*ibid.*).

On April 22 a number of Panzacola Indians arrived at Santa María de Galve and reported that some of their people had seen six ships in a bay (*ensenada*) between the Palizada River and Mobile, about five days' journey from the presidio. Some of the men from the vessels had landed to treat with the natives. They wore fur-lined caps, and carried red flags. From the descriptions given by the Indians, Martínez at once came to the conclusion that the strangers were English, and resolved to send a few men in a canoe to investigate the matter. They were to leave the canoe at Mobile, and continue their journey on foot until the ships were discovered. The party was able to go no further than Mobile. The bay was reconnoitered, but no trace of foreigners was found, save for the cross that had been left by the French. This souvenir was secured, and taken back to the presidio.²⁴

Conditions at Pensacola were now too critical for Martínez to make further efforts to clear up the rumors brought by the Indians. The garrison was practically on the verge of starvation. In response to an urgent appeal for aid, the governor of Havana dispatched a vessel with provisions early in April, but sufficient only to last one month. The men were reduced to famine rations. Many died from lack of nourishing food and proper medical attention. Several went stark mad. The clothing of the troops had fallen into rags. Their faces had become blackened from sitting around the pine-knot fires until they bore little resemblance to human beings. To make the situation more intolerable, a mutiny broke out on the part of Jordan and his men, which was quelled only through the intercession of Franck, who arranged a compromise. Jordan was allowed to maintain a separate command. He posted his own sentinels, and kept entirely aloof from the rest of the company under Martínez.²⁵ As the days went by, and no relief came from Mexico, the exiles began to fear that Arriola's ship had been lost. It was finally decided that the

²⁴The cross was sent by Martínez to the viceroy, and forwarded by the latter to the king. The letters "D F A U P," were the only ones that could be deciphered.

²⁵Franck gives an interesting account of this mutiny in a letter to the governor of Havana, May 15, 1699, 7 pp. (México, 61-6-22).

vessel which had arrived from Havana should be sent to Vera Cruz to report the miserable state of the company, as well as to transport the incapacitated men, who had merely become a useless burden. Some eighty of the sick and dying were placed on board. Just before the vessel sailed, an incident occurred which was regarded as further corroboration of the reports that had been received concerning the English settlement. On May 2 two English sailors arrived at the presidio in a small boat, claiming that they had been shipwrecked off the Florida coast while en route from Jamaica to New England. Martínez was convinced that they were bound for the new settlement. The men denied any knowledge of a town to the westward, but admitted that there was an English colony called "Santiago" (Jamestown) not far from Pensacola. Martínez now drew up a full report in regard to the danger from the English, and resolved to send the two prisoners to Mexico for further examination. The vessel sailed on May 4, and reached Vera Cruz, as has been seen, on May 20, the dispatches of Martínez being forwarded immediately to the viceroy.²⁶

The fiscal, Baltasar de Tobar, rendered his opinion on June 5. He had been one of the advocates of immediate offensive measures against the French, and at once came to the conclusion that the ships told of by the Indians were not English, as Martínez believed, but that they undoubtedly belonged to the very squadron that had visited Pensacola. He asked the viceroy to take immediate steps to carry out the king's orders to protect the Gulf region from the encroachments of the French.²⁷

The Count of Moctezuma was still skeptical, however, and re-

²⁶Martínez to the viceroy, May 4, 1699, 2 pp.; Franck to the governor of Havana, May 15, 1699, 7 pp.; Martínez to same, May 16, 1699, 4 pp.; same to the Count of Adanero, May 16, 1699, 6 pp.; Francisco Lorenz de Rada to the viceroy, May 22, 1699, 2 pp.; Vicente de Oria to the viceroy, May 22, 1699, 2 pp. (all in México, 61-6-22). Much additional correspondence concerning conditions at Pensacola is to be found in this legajo.

²⁷Respuesta fiscal, June 5, 1699, in Testimonio del Segundo Quaderno de Autos . . . Sobe. la Poblazon y fortificazion de la Bahía de Santa Ma. de galue, pp 9-10 (México, 61-6-22). The Englishmen were later released.

refused to become alarmed. His first action was to call upon Bartolomé Guillén, one of the pilots who had just returned from Pensacola, for a statement as to the possibility of a fleet of vessels finding a safe harbor between the Palizada River and Mobile Bay. Guillén replied that he knew of no good harbor in the region except that of Mobile, although he had heard that further west there were certain inlets, formed by a number of small islands called the Cayos de San Diego, in which ships might find shelter.²⁸ The viceroy was not satisfied with this reply, and asked for a more detailed report.²⁹ Guillén fell seriously ill, however, and Sigüenza was called upon to express his opinion as to the plausibility of the story told by the Indians. Sigüenza declared that it was impossible for ships to remain for any length of time in the region indicated without being exposed to great danger. He characterized the whole report as a typical Indian falsehood, and thought that no uneasiness need be felt.³⁰

Sigüenza's opinion apparently removed any doubts that the viceroy may have entertained, and once more the latter refused to consent to the adoption of any measures that would interfere with the success of the Darien expedition. He believed that the exploration which Arriola had already been authorized to make would set at rest all rumors concerning French and English settlements on the Gulf coast. In lengthy dispatches of July 12 and 14, Moctezuma informed the king of all developments up to that time. He declared that he had done his best in the presence of the two problems that had confronted him, and believed that his decision to postpone action against the French in order to dislodge the Scotch from Darien had been justified by the existing situation. He recommended the maintenance of the presidio at Santa María de Galve, in spite of the adverse reports that had been made against it. While the new post would not benefit the colonies in a positive way, it would obviate great evils which would be sure to follow its occupation by the French; for, although the bay was uninviting and incapable of being forti-

²⁸Guillén to the viceroy, no date, *ibid.*, 15.

²⁹Decree of the viceroy, June 15, 1699, *ibid.*, 16-17.

³⁰Sigüenza to the viceroy, June 16, 1699, *ibid.*, 17-19.

fied, it would furnish the French a good base from which they would be able to paralyze the commerce of the Indies.³¹

Plans for an offensive expedition against the English, and the discovery of the French settlement at Bilori.—While the authorities of New Spain had been discussing important questions of state, the garrison at San Carlos de Austria had continued its hand-to-mouth existence. The failure of the viceroy to send supplies had made it necessary for Martínez to make another appeal to Havana in the latter part of May. A prompt response had been given, but the quality and quantity of the provisions sent were far from what had been expected.³² The men were forced to supplement their meager rations by acorns and roots, which only increased the sickness and misery. On August 15 another cargo of patients was sent to Mexico, in charge of Juan Jordan, whose departure removed a long-standing source of dissension. At this time were sent letters by Martínez, Franek, and Jordan, telling of continued and unmistakable evidence of the existence of the English settlement. The repeated declarations of the Indians, and the passage of various boats that were undoubtedly bound for the new town confirmed the early reports. The site of the settlement, as nearly as could be determined, was said to be about twenty leagues west of Pensacola, on the mainland opposite the Cayos de San Diego.³³

The vessel reached Vera Cruz on September 17. One of the first to receive the news it brought was Arriola, who was now making active preparations for his return to Pensacola. He lost no time in sending in suggestions for the expulsion of the English, and urged that an expedition be sent against them before they had time to strengthen their fortifications. The viceroy replied that he would take immediate steps to meet the exigencies

³¹Copia de Capitulo de Carta del Virrey Don Joseph Sarmiento a Su Magestad fha en México en 12 de Junio de 1699, 6 pp.; the viceroy to the king, July 14, 1699, 10 pp. (México, 61-6-22).

³²Testimo de los autos fijos sobre dar su ssa; providencia de Bastimentos Para la Nueva Poblacion de Sancta Maria de Galue alias Pensacola, etc., accompanying letter of Diego Cordoba Laso de la Vega to the king, Oct. 10, 1699, 16 pp. (México, 61-6-22).

³³Arriola to the king, Oct. 27, 1699, p. 2. Jordan to the king, Nov. 7, 1699, 3 pp. (México, 61-6-22).

of the situation.³⁴ By this time the welcome news had been received of the voluntary retirement of the Scotch from Darien, and the viceroy's first idea was to utilize the fleet of Zavala, which he supposed would be awaiting instructions at Havana. He accordingly dispatched orders to Zavala to make a thorough reconnaissance of the Gulf coast, and to exterminate any foreigners he might find.³⁵ Zavala of course was not in Havana, having already begun his return voyage to Spain, in direct disobedience to the instructions which he had received from the viceroy.³⁶ This unexpected development made it necessary for new plans to be devised. In a junta general of October 29, it was decided that Arriola should be ordered to sail at once for Pensacola, and undertake the expulsion of the English. He was furnished with a small frigate of twenty-six guns and the vessel which had brought the last cargo of patients from the bay. The additional one hundred men, who had been promised many months before, were now recruited from the slums and prisons of New Spain, and constituted Arriola's chief reliance for the campaign which he was to undertake. More inefficient preparations for an aggressive expedition against unknown forces could hardly be imagined.

On November 15 Arriola wrote the king that he was making final arrangements for his return to Pensacola. He referred to the scant forces that had been given him, the deplorable condition of the presidio, and the little aid that could be secured there for the work before him. He emphasized the utter futility of holding Pensacola. The presidio would not prevent foreign nations from settling in that region, as was proven by the reports of the English settlement. He again suggested the blocking of the harbor, and the abandonment of the place. The funds expended on the presidio could be used in maintaining a squadron of twelve war vessels, which was the only means by which foreign nations could be kept out of that region.³⁷ A few weeks after this letter was written Arriola sailed to share once more the privations of his forlorn company.

³⁴Arriola to the king, Oct. 27, 1699, p. 2.

³⁵The viceroy to the king, Sept. 26, 1699, 4 pp. (México, 61-6-22).

³⁶Supra page 194.

³⁷Arriola to the king, Nov. 15, 1699, 4 pp. (México, 61-6-22).

Arriola did not complete the arrangements for the expedition against the supposed English settlement until the beginning of March. He managed to equip a force of one hundred of his strongest troops, which left only about forty at the presidio, for disease and desertion had greatly reduced their ranks. Both Martínez and Franck were detailed to accompany the expedition. The fleet of four vessels sailed on March 4, the first destination being Mobile Bay. Some leagues west of Mobile a party of Indians was sent ashore. They returned with the report that a short distance away there was a fort garrisoned by two hundred men, protected by a fleet of several vessels. Not long afterwards a small boat was sighted, which flew an English flag.³⁸ It was overtaken, and found to contain ten men. To the surprise of the Spaniards, these men proved to be not English, but French, and the hoax which the latter had perpetrated was now revealed. The Frenchmen were returning to their fort at Biloxi, which had been established, they said, in the previous April, immediately after the departure of Chasteaumorant. They told Arriola that in addition to the fort called Biloxi, they had built another post twenty-five leagues up the Palizada, or Mississippi, River; and that four hundred leagues still further up the river, they had a third fort, which was in direct communication with Canada.

Arriola now seems to have given up all idea of an attack upon the French fort. He released the prisoners, and sent them on their way with a message to their commanding officer, protesting against the invasion of Spanish territory during a time of peace, and announcing that he would soon follow in person. Biloxi was reached on March 23, and the Spaniards were received with great courtesy by the commanders of the French vessels. The half-starved men were treated to such rare dainties as fresh eggs, fresh bread, milk, wine, and brandy, which caused them to reflect unfavorably upon their own unappetizing rations. Arriola did not permit this hospitality to interfere with his duty. He addressed another note to the French commandant, protesting against the establishment of the French fort, and warning him that refusal to abandon it would be considered as an infraction

³⁸Franck to the king, June 4, 1700, p. 6 (México, 61-6-22).

of the treaties then in force.³⁹ Two days later a courteous reply was received from the French officer, who was in command. He said that he had occupied that region in order to circumvent the English, who were planning to seize it for themselves. He was acting under the direct orders of his king, and could take no action without authority from France.

Arriola had perforce to content himself with the protest that he had made. An attack upon the fort was out of the question, and on the 27th he began his return voyage. Three days later a terrific hurricane arose, which caused the loss of all except one of the vessels. Most of the passengers were saved, however. After five days of untold suffering, the survivors made their way back to the French fort, where they were received with extraordinary kindness, and hospitably entertained until the vessels could be summoned from Pensacola to carry them back to the presidio.

Such was the unfortunate outcome of the only offensive expedition which Spain attempted to send against the French colony of Louisiana. The sole desire of the Spanish garrison at Pensacola henceforth was to be allowed to leave the inferno to which they had been condemned. The reports sent in by Arriola, Franck, and others were in complete agreement as to the folly of attempting to maintain the presidio, or cope with the forces of the French. The viceregal government decided to make no changes until the pleasure of the king could be learned. Arriola was given a furlough of four months, and Martínez placed in command during his absence. Supplies were ordered sent to the presidio, and the discontented troops were doomed to remain at their posts until their fate should be decided by the distant authorities in Spain.⁴⁰

Spanish and French Diplomacy concerning Louisiana.—The utter incapacity and helplessness of the viceregal government of

³⁹A French draft of this letter is given in Margry, iv, 539-541. The date is incorrectly given as March 23, 1701, instead of March 23, 1700.

⁴⁰The foregoing account is based chiefly on the following documents: Arriola to the viceroy, June 4, 1700, summarized in "Para despachar una carta de Don Franco, Martínez en 14 de Abril de 1702," (México, 61-62); Franck to the king, June 4, 1700, 8 pp. (*ibid.*). Additional details are given in the French sources in Margry, iv, 386 *et seq.*

New Spain in the presence of the danger which now confronted it was merely a faithful reflection of the complete demoralization which existed in the mother country, and, indeed, in the rest of the Spanish empire. The prematurely decrepit and imbecile Charles II was fast nearing the end of his inglorious reign, and a series of unparalleled calamities seemed to attend his last days. The suspense was finally ended by his death in November, 1700, and the prompt accession of the grandson of Louis XIV to the Spanish throne. One of the first problems which demanded the attention of the young king, Philip V, was the adjustment of the unsettled questions of Pensacola and Louisiana.

The first step in the diplomatic battle that was to ensue was taken by France. On March 23, 1701, Pontchartrain drew up a dispatch for the Duke of Harcourt, the French ambassador in Madrid, setting forth the general attitude of the French crown toward Louisiana. The original purpose of the king of France in encouraging the discovery of the Mississippi, Pontchartrain stated, was to aid his colonists in Canada, and develop the commerce of that region. The extensive explorations of M. d'Iberville had disclosed, however, the designs of the English, who were planning to possess themselves of the mines of New Spain. The great number of the inhabitants of Pennsylvania, New York, and Carolina would make it easy for them to spread over the interior region, and become masters of the whole continent. The king realized the importance of impeding their progress if Spain was to be protected in the possession of her rich mines; but he wished to do nothing that was not entirely in accord with the wishes of Spain. Pontchartrain therefore asked Harcourt to inform the king of Spain and the Council of the Indies of the friendly interest of the king of France, and sent a map and a memorial by Iberville, which would show the rapid progress that had already been made by the English in the direction of New Spain.⁴¹ Iberville's memorial described in detail the strength and resources of the English colonies. Their settlements extended from 30 to 40 degrees, and contained more than 60,000 families. They had already attempted to settle on

⁴¹Translation of letter of Pontchartrain to the Duke of Harcourt, March 23, 1701 (México, 61-6-22, 2 ff).

the Mississippi, and would eventually seize Mexico if Spain and France did not join forces to stop them. Spanish defenses on the Gulf were not strong enough to resist the English, and nothing would be better for the safety of the Spanish dominions than to have the French in possession of the Gulf region and Mississippi Valley. Spain should therefore cease her opposition to the colonization of Louisiana, and should even be willing to allow France to occupy Pensacola Bay, in case it should be abandoned, as seemed very probable.⁴²

Pontchartrain's dispatch and Iberville's memorial were sent by the French ambassador to the king of Spain, and on June 6, 1701 the Junta de Guerra, in obedience to an urgent command of the king, took up the consideration of the weighty question of Louisiana.⁴³ With typical courtesy, the Junta first recommended that the king of France should be thanked for the solicitude he had manifested for the integrity of the dominions of Spain and for the extension of the Catholic faith, as well as for his kindness in giving warning of the designs of the English. The port of Pensacola had been occupied, the Junta observed, because of its strategic advantages, and lest some other nation should establish a settlement there. The Junta believed that the post should be maintained, even though it occasioned heavy expense to the crown, for the question of expense was a minor consideration when a place of such great importance was concerned. The king of France should therefore be informed that it was the intention of Spain to hold Pensacola, and orders should be sent to the officials of New Spain, Florida, Havana, and Campeche to aid the presidio at

⁴²Traducción de memoria de Monsr de Iberville tocante al Rio de Mississippi en el Golfo Mexicano, 6 ff (México, 61-6-22). The original French text is in Margry, iv, 543-550.

⁴³On Feb. 1, 1701 the junta had been furnished a summary of the latest correspondence from New Spain and Pensacola, telling of Arriola's discovery of the French settlement, of the dissatisfaction of the troops at Pensacola, and of the decision of the viceroy not to attempt any action against the French or make any change at Pensacola until further orders were received from Spain (Para despachar dos cartas de Dn Andres de Arriola Sobre Vahia de Pansacola y Poblacion de franceses en aquella Costa, etc. (México, 61-6-33, 6 pp).

all times, so that it might be kept in a proper state of defence. The coöperation of the French king in furnishing naval forces against the English would be welcomed, and with such assistance the advance of the enemy could be checked. The Junta did not believe that the English colonists were so numerous as had been reported; but nevertheless the king should order the occupation and fortification of all desirable ports on the Gulf coast.

Since there could be no doubt, according to recent reports received from Arriola and other officials, that French subjects had settled on the Mississippi River, within the territory of the king of Spain, his Most Christian Majesty should be requested to order his officers to receive commissions from the Spanish crown, whereupon the viceroy of New Spain could be instructed to aid the new settlements as the legitimate possessions of the king of Spain. Nothing could surely be more satisfactory to the king of France, for the undisturbed possession by Spain of the whole Gulf region could not fail to benefit both nations.

While the majority of the members of the Junta adopted the foregoing recommendations, there was one dissenting vote. The Count of Hernán Núñez said that the statements contained in the French documents submitted to the Junta were entirely in accord with all reports from the viceroy of New Spain and the governor of Pensacola, for those officials had constantly complained of the lack of men, supplies, ships, and arms, not only for the defence of Pensacola, but even for that of the most important posts in the colonies. Only the generous support of the French king had enabled Spain thus far to withstand the great naval power of the English and the Dutch. It was useless, Hernán Núñez said, to attempt the impossible. He was therefore of the opinion that all Spanish troops should be withdrawn from Pensacola, and that the presidio should be turned over to the forces of the French crown as quickly as possible. It was highly offensive (*repugnante*) to him that Spain should try to keep the French from developing a region which she herself would never be able to utilize. If Spain really wished to see the Catholic faith preserved and extended, she should accept the offer of the French king, instead of trying to de-

ceive herself into believing that by the mere promulgation of royal decrees fleets could be built, Pensacola colonized, and other fortifications constructed. The absurdity of such a belief was shown when it was remembered that after months of endeavor the coasts of Spain were practically defenceless, and that only two ships from the entire navy had been fit to be incorporated with the French armada. Seldom, if ever, had the dignified Junta listened to words of such uncompromising frankness as those which came from the Count of Hernán Núñez.⁴⁴

The king was not satisfied with the report made by the Junta. He thought it too brief and indefinite. On June 17 he submitted a number of questions as to the means by which the Junta expected to carry out the measures it had proposed: Could the settlements of Pensacola and Mississippi be supported and defended by the viceroy of New Spain, or would it be necessary to send aid from Spain? What revenues were available, and were they sufficient to permit the proposed measures to be executed without endangering the whole undertaking?⁴⁵

The Junta made its reply to these questions on June 21. It was evidently determined that the king should have no reason to complain of the brevity of its report, for the recommendations made were most detailed and voluminous. The Junta flattered itself, from the questions that had been presented, that the king had been pleased to adopt its suggestions that Pensacola should be retained, and that the settlements established by the French should pass under Spanish control. When it had made these suggestions, it had not overlooked such an important matter as the financial side of the undertaking. It then proceeded to enumerate the various sources of revenue in New Spain which might be applied to the support of the new establishments of Louisiana. They were the *medias anatas* of the *encomiendas*, the tax on arms, the bull of the holy crusade, the *alcabalas*, the million of the charitable subsidy granted by the pope, the profits on quicksilver, and the royal fifths from silver.

⁴⁴Consulta of the Junta de Guerra, June 6, 1701, 8 pp. (México, 61-6-35).

⁴⁵Consulta of the Junta de Guerra, June 21, 1701, pp. 1-2. (*ibid.*).

All of these revenues, the Junta characterized as new ones. In addition, there were the old and customary taxes in New Spain, which were alone sufficient to meet all of the ordinary expenses, such as the subsidies of the presidios, salaries, and the maintenance of the windward squadron, leaving the first-named revenues free for extraordinary requirements. The chief cause for the constant deficit in New Spain was the diversion of its revenues into channels foreign to that kingdom. With proper administration, these revenues would suffice for all needs, leaving a good surplus for other purposes, including the maintenance of the new settlements on the Mississippi. In view of these facts, the Junta was confident that it would not be necessary for the king to send any funds or supplies to aid the new establishments. The viceroy could merely be ordered to make their welfare his first care. The abundance of products in New Spain, and the ease with which supplies could be transported from Vera Cruz to Pensacola and Louisiana would facilitate his task.

Since Pensacola and the French posts on the Mississippi were already fortified, nothing remained to be done in connection with them save to issue the suggested orders to the viceroy. In regard to the new settlements recommended in the memorial of Iberville, the viceroy and various governors should be instructed to consider the best means of establishing them with all possible haste. They should also be required to be especially vigilant in counteracting the designs of the English, and should follow Iberville's suggestions for opposing the advance of that nation. The Junta repeated its belief that the English were not as numerous as Iberville imagined. Two prominent priests, Dr. Juan Ferro Machado, ecclesiastical visitor of Florida, and Dr. Alonso Leturiondo, curate of St. Augustine, who were then in Madrid, had assured the Junta that the English of Carolina were limited to a very small number of families barely sufficient to transact the commercial affairs of their colony, and incapable of overrunning the interior regions, as Iberville feared. In any case, their progress could be checked through alliances with the various Indian nations. With the aid of the tribes of Apaches, Apalachicola, Texas, Nuevo León, and New Mexico, an impenetrable barrier could be erected. Moreover, since no mines had

been discovered in those regions, it did not seem probable that the English would make any great exertions to conquer them. In order to strengthen Spanish influence among the natives, the Junta suggested the advisability of entrusting all missionary work to the Jesuits, who had accomplished so much in other regions.

By means of the Indian barrier, and the vigilance of the windward squadron, strengthened if necessary by the vessels of the various fleets, the Junta believed that the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico could be amply protected. If the worst came to the worst, and an invasion should materialize, the viceroy would be justified in making use of any funds whatsoever, even going to the extent of appropriating the sacred ornaments of the churches, since their product would go toward the expulsion of heretics. It must be remembered, the Junta said, that the primary obligation of the Spanish sovereigns was to keep the Catholic faith pure and undefiled in the new world which had been granted to them by the pope. The king of France should be the first to admit this truth. In conclusion, the Junta reiterated its conviction that under no circumstances should Pensacola be abandoned, nor any symbol of sovereignty be allowed to persist in the Gulf region save that of his Most Catholic Majesty.

The Duke of Jovenazo extended his vote at length, supporting the majority report. He thought that Iberville's idea of colonizing the Gulf region was a good one, although it would require much time to carry it into effect, just as it would take the English a long time to execute their designs. He realized that Spain had no surplus population with which to make new settlements; but, in spite of that fact, it was useless to think of allowing foreigners to form colonies in the region under consideration, for the laws of the Indies made it impossible for such an idea to be entertained. He recalled the steps that had been taken for the emigration of a number of families from the Flemish dominions of the king to the Island of Santo Domingo, and suggested that such emigration might be encouraged by offering exceptional honors and privileges to the first settlers who might go. He agreed with the Junta that the French officers

in Louisiana should be required to receive commissions from the Spanish crown. He confirmed the truth of the statements made in regard to the available revenues of New Spain, but felt it his duty to state that in spite of such potential resources all of the presidios were complaining of the delay in the furnishing of their subsidies and supplies. As far as Pensacola itself was concerned, Jovenazo advised that one hundred men and the corresponding quantity of arms and ammunition be sent from Spain at once to strengthen the presidio, for it was the most important post in the region, and would furnish a base for the establishment of the other settlements that were proposed.

One other affirmative vote was given in detail—that of Martín de Solís, formerly *fiscal* of the Council of the Indies, and now a regular councillor of that body and of the Junta de Guerra. Solís, as will be remembered, had been one of the strongest supporters of the Pensacola project, and he did not fail to refer to the part he had taken in the establishment of the presidio of San Carlos. He suggested that the governor of Florida be ordered to found a colony near Pensacola, and to open up a safe road by which supplies could be forwarded overland from the port of Apalache. In case of necessity, aid could also be extended to the presidio at Pensacola by the officials of New Mexico, Parral, and Nuevo León. That post was too important to be abandoned, and, indeed there was no necessity of giving it up. Solís then enumerated in great detail every source of revenue in New Spain available for the support of the new establishments. The new taxes referred to by the Junta, he said, would produce more than a million pesos, leaving for the ordinary expenses of the kingdom and the subsidized presidios a host of other classes of revenue. He characterized as absurd the statement that the English colonists of “San Jorge or Virginia” numbered 60,000 families; for there were not so many as that, he said, in the two vast kingdoms of Peru and New Spain, even including the various islands of the Caribbean. There were well-informed persons from Florida then in Madrid, who declared that the population of St. George did not exceed three hundred families; and it was impossible for them to make the conquests that had been feared. In order to take no chances, however,

Solis suggested that the viceroy should be ordered to send emissaries to the Texas Indians, asking them not to permit the English to pass through their territory; and that the governors of Florida, Havana, and Pensacola be instructed to keep in close communication with one another, as well as with the viceroy, so as to be able to coöperate promptly in case of danger.

The Count of Hernán Núñez did not change his vote, in spite of the additional arguments of the Junta. He called attention to recent reports from the viceroy and the governor of Pensacola which showed the practical impossibility of maintaining the presidio there. If the king of France wished to take over the responsibility of defending Pensacola, in addition to the region he had already occupied, Hernán Núñez saw no objection whatever, but thought it would be a happy solution of the whole matter, since, in his opinion, there could not be the slightest divergence in the interests of the two monarchies. He complained of the vague assertions of the Junta. When most of the establishments in America were suffering from a lack of men and supplies, it seemed absurd to think of assuming new burdens. He believed that Iberville had minimized rather than exaggerated the number and power of the English, for he had seen no one with personal knowledge of the English colonies who did not say that Virginia, Pennsylvania, and the whole eastern coast were strong, and ready for war. Without the aid of the French, he said, Spain would be unable to hold, not only Pensacola, but even the most important ports of the whole empire.⁴⁶

The foregoing lengthy document, together with the Junta's report of June 6, and the original French letters, were sent to the king, and a French draft of the Junta's recommendations was made for transmission to the king of France, to whom it was forwarded by Philip V, with a personal letter dated July 5, 1701. No reply was made by the king to the Junta de Guerra.

⁴⁶Consulta of the Junta de Guerra de Indias, June 21, 1701: Representa lo que de nuevo se la ofrece con motivo de lo mandado por V. M. en vista de la Consta. ynclosa sre. la dependencia de las Poblaciones de Pensacola, y Rio Misipipi, en que ay votos particulares (México, 61-6-35, 19 pp.).

On September 3 all papers concerning Pensacola and the Mississippi were ordered sent to Manuel García de Bustamante, one of the members of the Council of the Indies. With this action, the whole matter seems to have been dropped for almost a year, as far as the Junta de Guerra was concerned.⁴⁷

The occupation of Mobile Bay by the French early in 1702, in spite of the uncompromising answer of the Spanish government, caused the Junta to take up the question once more. The news of the occupation of Mobile came in a letter from Francisco Martínez, written at Pensacola on April 14, 1702. Martínez stated that Iberville had arrived at the presidio on December 16 with four ships, and had asked to be allowed to enter, this request being granted in view of the close alliance between the two crowns. Three days later Iberville sent Martínez a letter, announcing that he had orders from the king of France to occupy Mobile before the English should seize it. Martínez begged Iberville to postpone his operations until instructions could be received from the viceroy; but Iberville replied that he had only two months in which to finish his task, and must proceed with it. He said that his royal master's only desire was to act for the best interests of both crowns, and that there should be no opposition on the part of Spain.⁴⁸

The Junta de Guerra reported these developments to the king on August 1, 1702, and said that it was forced to call attention to the fact that the French were extending their settlements in the Gulf region, to the notable injury of the king's dominions; that they were opening up ports on the Gulf, and preparing to penetrate into the heart of New Spain. The Junta had already made two reports on the subject of the French encroachments in the previous year, and it would ask the king to note

⁴⁷The French text is printed in Margry, iv, pp. 553-568. Philip's letter to Louis XIV is *ibid.*, 552-553. The memorial, as it appears in Margry, contains numerous errors. "Santa María de Galve" is invariably given as "Santa María de Galvez," and the "Texas" become the "Iccas." (Pp. 558, 561, etc.).

⁴⁸Para despachar una carta de Du. Franco, Martínez . . . en 14 de Abril de 1702 (México, 61-6-22, p. 1); consulta of the Junta de Guerra, Aug. 1, 1702 (México, 61-6-35). Translations of the correspondence between Martínez and Iberville are in Margry, iv, pp. 576-580.

them again. Copies of those two documents were therefore enclosed, and the Junta wished to reiterate the arguments contained therein, reminding the king that, until he should make some decision in the matter, the Junta would be unable to apply the measures that were deemed necessary in order to preserve the integrity of the royal dominions.⁴⁹

The young king was by no means pleased with the Junta's frank disapproval of his procrastinating policy, and entered the following curt note on the margin of the report:

"This notice is incomplete. Since the papers which the Junta says have not arrived are lacking, this representation is premature, and it is couched in such ill-advised terms that it has displeased me exceedingly, and caused me great surprise that ministers of such experience and high rank should have allowed it to reach my hands."⁵⁰

No further answer was vouchsafed the Junta. The royal reprimand evidently reached its mark. The zeal of the Junta was curbed, and no further attempt was apparently to be made to arouse the king to a sense of the danger from the French until several years had passed. Spain tacitly acquiesced in the French occupation of Louisiana. But the old ministers of Charles II, who perpetuated the exclusive policy of Spain, did not forget; and even during the period of the Spanish and French alliance there were not wanting warning voices to remind the king of the insidious designs of the traditional enemy of Spain.

⁴⁹ Consulta of the Junta, Aug. 1, 1702 (México, 61-6-35, 3 pp.; a copy is also contained in México, 61-6-22).

⁵⁰ Annotation of the king on consulta of Aug., 1702, *ibid.*

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Audiencia de México.

The greater portion of the material has been found in three *legajos* (México, 61-6-20 to 22), which bear the following title: "Expediente sobre el reconocimiento y fortificación de la Bahía del Espíritu Santo que está en la costa septentrional del Seno Mexicano, 1684-1705." Legajo 20 covers the years from 1684 to 1689; Legajo 21, from 1689 to 1698; Legajo 22, from 1698 to 1705.

61-6-20.

Echagaray Expediente, 1684-1686, 93 pp. Contains material relating to the project of Martín de Echagaray down to April 22, 1686.

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Oficiales reales of Florida to the king, Feb. 20, 1687, 3 pp.

Junta de Guerra de Ynas: Pone en las Rs manos de V. M. la carta en que el Virrey de la Na Hespa, da cuenta de lo que ha executado a fin del descubrimiento de la Vahia del Espíritu sto, con los mapas que embia, y vna carta qe V. M. remitió de Dn Pedro Ronquillo; April 16, 1687, total of 43 pp. (Enc. Ronquillo to the king, July 8, Aug. 19, 1686, and Jan. 20, 1687; minute of Council of the Indies, Sept. 16, 1686; declaration of Gaspár de Palacios, Sept. 6, 1686; and the viceroy to the king, Dec. 30, 1686.)

Pedro de Aranda y Avellaneda to the king, June 22, 1687, 15 pp.

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Diego de Peredo to Enrique Enríquez de Guzman, Nov. 14, 1698, 2 pp. 61-6-22.

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El Mo. de Campo Dn Andres de Arriola da quenta a V. M. de hauer preocupado la Bahia de Sta Ma. de Galue y quedarla fertificando. Dec. 1, 1698, 5 pp.

El Honor de la florida da qta a V. M. de estar preocupada por los Vasallos de V. M. la bahia de Sta. Maria de Galve Con autos de las dilixas. que por su parte hizo. Jan. 5, 1699, 31 pp.

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- Carta del Gobernador Don Diego de Córdoba Laso de la Vega a S. M. fha en la Habana a 4 Abril 1699. 16 pp. (Enc. correspond-
ence with Arriola, Martínez, and Jordan concerning aid for Pen-
sacola.)
- El Mro de Campo Dn. Andres de Arriola: Da quenta a V. M. de lo sucedido en la Bahía de Santa Maria de Galve hasta su Vuelta a la Vera Cruz y remite con esta el Mapa y diseño de la Bahía. May 9, 1699. 9 pp. (Enc. correspondence with Chasteaumorant, 2 pp.)
- Francisco Martínez to the king, May 16, 1699, 6 pp.
- Copia de Capitulo de Carta del Virrey Don Joseph Sarmiento a Su Magestad fha en México en 12 de Julio de 1699. 6 pp.
- El Virrey: Da Quenta con dos quadernos de autos, de quedar preocupada poblada y fortificada la Bahía de Sta. Maria de Galve, haviendolo conseguido con tanta felizd. que aunq despues llego Vna esquadra de francia a cargo del Marqs. de Chater Morant su Gral. con el mismo fin se boluio sin hazer hostilidad. July 14, 1699. 10 pp. (With respuesta fiscal, Madrid, Feb. 24, 1700, 18 pp.)
- Laureano de Torres y Ayala to the king, Sept. 16, 1699, 24 pp. (En-
closing autos concerning exploration of Espiritu Santo or Ascen-
sion Bay.)
- The viceroy to the king, Sept. 26, 1699, 4 pp.
- Diégo de Córdoba Laso de la Vega to the king, Oct. 19, 1699, 16 pp.
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- Andrés de Arriola to the king, Oct. 27, 1699, 2 pp.
- Juan Jordan de Reina to the king, Nov. 7, 1699, 3 pp.
- Andrés de Arriola to the king, Nov. 15, 1699, 4 pp.
- Jaime Franck to the king, June 4, 1700, 7 pp.
- Traduccion de carta de M. de Pontchartrain para el Duque de Arcourt, Versailles a 23 de Marzo de 1701, con vna memoria y mapa tocante al descubrimto. del Rio de Missisipi. 2 ff. MS.
- Traduccion de memoria de Monsr de Yberville tocante al Rio de Missisipi en el Golfo Mexicano. 6 ff. MS.
- Junta de Guerra de Indias: Pone en noticia de V. M. las que se an recinido de la orden que ha dado su Mgd Nptianisima para que preocupen sus Armas la Vahia de la Mouila. Aug. 1, 1702. 2 pp.

(Enc. summary of letter of Francisco Martínez to the king, April 14, 1702, 5 pp.)

There is a great deal of additional material in this legajo relating to local affairs at Pensacola, which it is impossible to cite in detail.

61-6-33: Expediente sobre la salida de los navios de Don Martín de Zavala que fueron a fortificar la Bahía de Santa María de Galve, y exterminio de Escoceses en el Darien. 1698 á 1700.

Real cédula: Al Genl Dn. Martín de Zavala ordenandole lo que ha de ejecutar en la operacion de Panzacola caso de no encontrar los Galeones en la havana. April 24, 1698. 4 pp.

Real cédula: Al Genl Dn. Martín de Zavala participandole las noticias que nuevamte. se an tenido de la fortificacion de Escoceses en la Isla de Oro; y de pasar franceses a la Vahía del Espiritu Sto. y providencias que se an tomado para precautelar vno y otro riesgo. May 13, 1699. 3 pp.

El Virrey de Na. España Da quenta a V. M. con Autos de las providencias que aplico pa. que los Nauios del gl. Don Mrn de Zavala pasassen al exterminio de escocesses, por las noticias repetidas que tubo de hauerse empezado a poblar y fortificar en la Ysla del Oro de el Darien. July 14, 1699. 16 pp. (With respuesta fiscal, Madrid, Feb. 8, 1700, 5 pp.)

El Genl Dn. Martín de Zavala. Expresa difusamte. diferentes Ordenes que ha tenido del Virrey de Na. España y lo qe le represento sobre su salida del Puerto de la Vera Cruz para ir a la faccion del Dariel (sic). July 28, 1699. 9 pp.

El Virrey Dn. Joseph Sarmiento Avisa el reciuo de la Copia de despacho que se dirigio al Genl. Dn. Martín de Zavala para q sin instante de dilacion fuese a Cartexna. con los nauios de su cargo. Sept. 24, 1699. 6 pp. (Enc. correspondence with Zavala, 15 pp.)

Martín Aranguren de Zavala to the king, Jan. 11, 1700, 5 pp.

61-6-35: Expediente sobre entrada y poblacion de Franceses en el Seno Mexicano y Santa María de Galve y otros, 1701-1719.

Para despachar dos cartas de Dn. Andres de Arriola sobre el reconocimto hecho de las Poblaciones de franceses en el Seno Mexicano, y las q despues se han recibido del Virrey y de Arriola. Feb. to June, 1701. 6 pp.

La Junta de Guerra de Yndias Dize lo que se le ofrece en Vista del papel, y memoria presentados por el embiado exrio. de franzia sre. la dependencia de las Poblaciones de Pensacola, y Rio Misipipi en que ay voto particular. June 6, 1701. 7 pp.

La Junta de Guerra de Yndias Representa lo que de nuevo se la ofrece con motiuo de lo mandado por V. M. en vista de la Consta. ynclusa sre la dependencia de las Poblaciones de Pensacola, y Rio Misipipi, en que ay votos particulares. June 21, 1701. 19 pp. (Copy in México, 61-6-22.)

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66-6-6:

Real cédula confiscating goods of French subjects in America. Dec. 13, 1683. MS.

67-1-28:

Alonso de León to the Bishop of Guadalajara, May 12, 1689. 6 pp.

67-3-2:

Memorial of Juan Domínguez de Mendoza, 1686. 12 pp.

67-4-13:

Auto de fundacion de la Villa de Santiago de Monclova, Aug. 12, 1689, 4 pp.

67-4-11:

Autos fijos por el Sor. Gour. y Capn Genl de la Nueva Viscaya Dn Juo. Ysidro de Pardiñas Villar de francos sobre las noticias q dieron los Yndios del Rio del Norte de qe subian Por el Naciones estrangeras y prouidencias qe dio sobre ello. (With letter of Pardiñas, April 1, 1693.) 46 pp.

Testimonio de Auttos sobre las Prouidencias Dadas Por El Exmo Señor Conde de Galve Virrey de esta nueva España pra los Socorros y Permanencia de los Religiosos Misioneros en la Proua de los Texas hasta su retirada y razones Porque se executto. (With letter of the viceroy, Jan. 17, 1694.) 86 pp.

Testimonio: Prosiguen los Autos de la Retirada de los Religiosos Misioneros y soldados de la Prouincia de los Texas. Como se executto y sus Causas. Y Prouidencias sobre ello Dadas Por El exmo. Sr. Virrey Conde de Galve Con Respuesta del Señor fiscal y Resolucion de Juntta de Hacienda. (With letter of the viceroy, June 17, 1694. 17 pp.

*Indiferente General*140-2-8 (*Registros*):

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141-3-3:

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141-3-4:

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1/7-5-28:

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